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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 
78-2-2(4) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE # 1 
Whether the trial court was correct in concluding that the facts stated on pages 1-4 of 
Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Johnson"'s Summary 
Judgment Opposition Memorandum'^failed to conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, and therefore, concluded that those facts would not be 
considered for purposes of appellee/defendant Utah Department of Transportation's (;iUDOT") 
Motion for Summary Judgment.1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has recognized that "a trial court may exercise its discretion to require 
compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly rule 4-501," and therefore, will 
review the trial court's actions to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. Fennell v. Green, 
77 P.3d 339, 341-42 (Utah App. 2003). 
1
 Johnson's Docketing Statement identified this issue as one of the issues being raised on 
appeal. (Docketing Statement at pp. 3-4 (UDOT was unable to locate the Docketing Statement in 
the Appellate Record or Index)). As discussed more fully herein, however, Johnson's Appellate 
Brief fails to identify or make any reference to this issue. Therefore, it is UDOT's position that 
Johnson has waived any right to challenge this issue on appeal. 
1 
ISSUE # 2 
Whether the trial court was correct in granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
thereby dismissing appellant/plaintiff Craig Johnson's (wcJohnson") negligence claims against UDOT 
as a matter of law. This issue can be divided into the following three sub-issues:2 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in ruling, as a matter of law, that Johnson's claim 
that UDOT was negligent in its design of the traffic control plan, and specifically the decision to use 
plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers, is barred by the discretionary function exception of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to -38); 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in ruling, as a matter of law, that UDOT cannot 
be held liable for any failure to implement or monitor the traffic control plan during the course of 
the construction project; and 
3. Whether the trial court was correct in ruling, as a matter of law, that UDOT cannot 
be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of co-defendant Granite Construction Company, 
an independent contractor hired by UDOT to implement the traffic control plan and perform the road 
construction project. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, no deference is given to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, and the grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Dick Simon 
Trucking. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2004 UT 11, _ P.3d_ (Utah, Jan. 30,2004). The facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Id. 
2
 Johnson's Appellate Brief states four sub-issues rather than three. (Johnson Appellate 
Brief at pp. 1-2). UDOT's sub-issue (2) actually encompasses Johnson's sub-issues (a) and (b). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3: 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, . . . 
* * * 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8: 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within 
the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is 
abused; 
* * * 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
* * * 
3 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all 
or any part thereof. 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. . . 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-50U2)(B):3 
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains 
a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material 
facts which support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
3
 CJA Rule 4-501 was recently repealed, effective November 1, 2003, and the rule was 
essentially incorporated into Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The above-stated 
version of Rule 4-501 was still in effect, however, at the time of the trial court's consideration 
and grant of UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, and is applicable for purposes of this 
Court's review of the trial court's decision. 
4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim for personal injuries allegedly sustained by Johnson in a one-car 
motor vehicle accident that occurred during the early morning hours of September 14, 1996. The 
accident occurred when Johnson's vehicle, while traveling southbound through a highway 
construction zone (referred to herein as the ''Layton-Clearfield Project'') on Interstate 15 near Layton, 
Utah, left the traveled portion of the highway and entered the construction area where the vehicle 
went into and out of several large holes that had been created where sections of highway had been 
removed for replacement. Johnson brought claims against both UDOT and Granite, alleging that 
they were negligent in failing to adequately separate the highway traffic from the construction zone.4 
Johnson's negligence claims against UDOT are based on the following three theories: 
1. Johnson alleges that UDOT was negligent in its design of the traffic control plan for 
the Layton-Clearfield Project, and specifically in its decision to use plastic barrels rather than 
concrete barriers to separate the motoring public from the construction zone; 
2. Johnson alleges that UDOT was negligent in failing to inspect, monitor and supervise 
Granite's work on the Layton-Clearfield Project to ensure proper implementation of the traffic 
control plan; and 
3. Johnson alleges that UDOT should be held vicariously liable for Granite's alleged 
negligence. 
4
 Johnson's claims against Granite are still pending in the trial court, and are not part of 
this appeal. 
5 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Johnson commenced this litigation with the filing of his Complaint on October 3, 1997. (R. 
1-5). UDOT filed its Answer to the Complaint on November 7, 1997. (R. 29-34). 
On October 16, 2002, and after considerable discovery had been completed, UDOT filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 676-677) and Memorandum in Support of Defendant UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 678-779) (Attached hereto as Addendum 1). Johnson responded 
to UDOT's motion on November 12,2002 with Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 862-962) (Attached hereto as Addendum 2)(hereinafter ''Johnson's 
Memorandum"). UDOT submitted its Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on November 18, 2002 (R. 1024-1107) (Attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
On November 19,2002, UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the trial court 
for oral argument. (Hearing Transcript, R. 1195) (Attached hereto as Addendum 4). At the 
commencement of this hearing, and throughout the arguments, the trial court expressed concern over 
the fact that Johnson's Memorandum failed to conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, thereby making it difficult for the trial court to evaluate 
whether there were disputed material facts that would preclude summary judgment. (R. 1195:3-6, 
45-46, 55-56 (Add. 4)). The trial court's concern focused on pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum 
which contained twenty numbered fact paragraphs which Johnson claimed "dispute the facts alleged 
in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 862-866 (Add. 2)). Those twenty numbered 
paragraphs on pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum made no reference to the facts stated in 
UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum. The trial court concluded that pages 1 -4 of Johnson's 
Memorandum failed to comply with the Rule 4-501 requirement that a summary judgment 
opposition memorandum "shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of 
6 
the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a 
concise statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall 
be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies/' (R. 1195:55-56; R. 1158 (Add. 4)) (quoting CJA Rule 4-501). 
As a result of Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501, the trial court disregarded the facts stated 
on pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum for purposes of UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
While the trial court rejected pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum, the trial court 
acknowledged that a second section of facts found on pages 5-8 of Johnson's Memorandum did 
conform with the Rule 4-501 requirements in that it responded directly to the specific numbered 
paragraphs from UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum. (R. 1195:55-56; R.l 158 (Add. 4)). 
On pages 5-8 of Johnson's Memorandum, Johnson attempted to dispute Fact Nos. 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 
22,23,24, and 26 from UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum. (R. 866-869 (Add. 2)). UDOT 
responded to Johnson's attempt to dispute these specific facts in its Summary Judgment Reply 
Memorandum (R. 1032-1034 (Add. 3)), and the trial court sought further clarification on each of 
these individual facts during the oral arguments in an attempt to determine whether there was any 
disputed fact that would preclude summary judgment.5 (R. 1195:6-17 (Add. 4)). 
Based upon the written submissions and the oral arguments, the trial court concluded that 
Johnson had failed to establish any material disputes that would preclude summary judgment, and 
granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT. (R. 1195:55-56 (Add. 4)). The trial court's Order 
* UDOT's Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum also responded to the facts stated on 
pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum, therein showing that Johnson's non-conforming facts 
failed to establish any dispute that would preclude summary judgment in favor of UDOT. (R. 
1025-1032 (Add. 3)). Those facts were not singled out by the trial court during oral arguments, 
however, since the trial court chose to disregard that portion of Johnson's Memorandum 
altogether. 
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of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice was entered on January 8, 2003. (R. 1157-60) 
(Attached hereto as Addendum 5). In addition to granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
that Order expressly states: 
There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary 
judgment on plaintiffs claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 
1-20 on pages 1-4 of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOT's 
Statement of Facts. While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5,6,20,21,22.23, 
24, and 26, found on pages 5-8 of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiff s response 
to those facts does not establish any genuine issues of fact which would preclude 
summary judgment. 
(R. 1158,H1 (Add. 5)). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts found on pages 4-12 of Johnson's Appellate Brief relies heavily on 
factual allegations and evidence that were presented to the trial court in pages 1-4 of Johnson's 
Memorandum. Since the trial court disregarded that portion of Jolinson's Memorandum for failing 
to comply with Rule 4-501, UDOT contends that this Court's analysis should be limited to those 
facts and evidence that were properly before the trial court, and that many of the facts being 
presented by Johnson on appeal should likewise be disregarded by this Court.6 
In order to assist the Court in reviewing those facts which were properly before the trial court, 
UDOT provides the following verbatim restatement of the "Statement of Undisputed Facts" set forth 
in UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum (Add. I):7 
6
 This issue is addressed in greater detail in the Argument. Section I, of this Brief. 
7
 For those citations to the record in this Statement of Facts that are [bracketed], UDOT 
has substituted a citation to the Appellate Record for the citation originally contained in UDOT's 
Summary Judgment Memorandum. 
8 
1. Prior to September 26, 1995, UDOT let out for bid Project No. 
IM-15-7(191)332, a highway construction project involving joint repair and slab 
replacement on sections of Interstate 15 in Davis County (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Layton-Clearfield Project"). (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, ffif 5-6, [Add. 1, R. 
710]). 
2. UDOT's bid specifications on the Layton-Clearfield Project included 
a proposed traffic control plan. The proposed traffic control plan called for the use 
of plastic road construction barrels, rather than concrete barriers, as the primary 
channeling devices to be used to separate the motoring public from the actual 
construction area throughout most of the Layton-Clearfield Project. (Affidavit of 
Dyke LeFevre, | 7 [Add. 1, R. 710]). 
3. The decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to channel 
traffic throughout this project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT 
organization. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, HP-13 [Add. 1, R. 710-712]). 
4. At all times relevant to this case, the organizational structure of 
UDOT officials and employees involved with the Layton-Clearfield Project was, 
from top to bottom, as follows: 
(a) Clint Topham was UDOT's Deputy Director. As the 
Deputy Director, Mr. Topham was the chief engineer for the State of 
Utah, and had the final say for all transportation related engineering 
decisions. The only official above Mr. Topham in the UDOT 
hierarchy wras the UDOT Executive Director who reported directly to 
the Governor of the State of Utah. 
9 
(b) Dvke LeFevre was the Director of Region One. Within UDOT, 
the entire State of Utah is divided geographically into four different regions. 
UDOT's Region One covers the northern-most part of the state starting in 
Farmington, and included the Layton-Clearfield Project area. Each of 
UDOT's four regions are headed by a single Director who oversees all 
transportation related matters for that particular region. As the Director of 
Region One. Mr. LeFevre reported directly to UDOT Deputy Director, Clint 
Topham. 
(c) Stan Nielsen was the UDOT Construction Engineer who oversaw 
all road construction projects in Region One. Mr. Nielsen reported to Region 
One Director, Dyke LeFevre, as to the status of these Region One projects. 
(d) Kent Nichols was the UDOT Project Engineer who was assigned 
directly to the Layton-Clearfield Project, and who was specifically 
responsible for monitoring the completion of the project and dealing directly 
with Granite. 
(Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, «j1j 3-4, 8 [Add. 1. R. 710-712]; aUDOT Organizational 
Chart is attached as [Add. 1, R. 717]; a map of the state of Utah showing UDOT's 
different regions is attached as [Add. 1, R. 719]). 
5. The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete 
barriers in the proposed traffic control plan was made by Dyke LeFevre in 
consultation with Clint Topham. Several key factors were weighed as part of this 
decision, including the following: 
(a) The safety of project workers and the motoring public; 
10 
(b) The costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and 
(c) The impact on traffic congestion by increasing or decreasing the overall 
time to complete the project. 
(Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, H 13-16 [Add. 1, R. 712-713]). 
6. As part of UDOT's decision making process, Dyke LeFevre consulted 
with the Federal Highway Administration about the use of barrels rather than 
concrete barriers as channeling devices on similar projects in other states. Following 
these conversations with the Federal Highway Administration, Mr. LeFevre was 
confident that plastic barrels would provide adequate traffic channelization for the 
safety of project workers and the motoring public. Mr. LeFevre also concluded that 
the cost and time considerations also weighed in favor of using barrels rather than 
concrete barriers. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, ffif 12,14-16 [Add. 1, R. 712-713]). 
7. On or about September 26, 1995, UDOT awarded the contract on the 
Layton-Clearfield Project to Granite, one of several road construction contractors 
who had bid on the project. (A copy of relevant portions of the UDOT/Granite 
Contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project is attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 721-
722]). 
8. The formal contract between UDOT and Granite for the 
Layton-Clearfield Project identified Granite as the "Contractor," and stated that "the 
Contractor agrees to furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all 
materials not specifically mentioned as being furnished by [UDOT] and to do and 
perform all work in the construction of [the Layton-Clearfield Project] for the 
approximate sum of [$4,998,249.00]." (See [Add. 1, R. 721-722]) 
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9. Incorporated as part of the formal contract between UDOT and 
Granite were various attachments, one of which contained the following provision: 
107.6 Barriers, Barricades and Warning Signs: The 
CONTRACTOR shall provide, erect, and maintain barriers, 
barricades, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and 
shall protect the work and safety of the public. Highway sections 
closed to traffic shall be protected by barriers and barricades, and 
obstructions shall be illuminated during darkness. Warning signs 
shall be provided to control and direct traffic. 
The CONTRACTOR shall erect warning signs at locations where 
operations may interfere with the use of the road b\ traffic, and at all 
intermediate points where the new work crosses or coincides with an 
existing road. Warning signs shall be constructed and erected in 
accordance with the traffic control plan. Signs, barriers, barricades, 
lights, or other protective devices shall not be dismantled or removed 
without permission of the ENGINEER. 
All barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and 
other protective devices shall meet the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices for Streets and Highways and Traffic Control 
provisions of this specification. 
(See [Add. 1,R. 722]) 
10. Granite's construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project 
commenced in approximately March of 1996. (Rick Parkin Deposition at p. 13, 
relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 724-725]) 
11. On or about February 21, 1996, prior to the commencement of the 
construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project, a pre-construction meeting was 
held between representatives of UDOT and Granite to discuss work on the project. 
During that meeting, representatives of Granite raised the possibility of using 
concrete barriers in lieu of barrels in order to channel traffic through the construction 
site and to protect both motorists and construction workers. (Preconstruction 
12 
Conference Agenda, attached as [Add. 1, R. 727-737]; Ray Vlaovich Deposition at 
p. 35, relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 739-740]; Chuck Lindsay 
Deposition at pp. 10-11, relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 742-745]; 
Kent Nichols Deposition at p. 10, relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 747-
748]) 
12. At or about the time of the pre-construction meeting, Chuck Lindsay 
and Grant Fowkes, on behalf of Granite, expressed concerns about appropriate traffic 
control. Granite's representatives inquired as to whether they could use pre-cast 
concrete barriers, rather than plastic barrels, to separate the construction area from 
the motoring public. Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project Engineer, requested that 
Granite's representatives prepare and submit a written proposal regarding the use of 
concrete barriers. (Preconstruction Conference Agenda at p. 8 [Add. 1, R. 734]; 
Chuck Lindsay Depo. at pp. 10-11 [Add. 1, R. 743-744]) 
13. On or about March 20, 1996, Chuck Lindsay, acting on behalf of 
Granite, wrote a letter to Kent Nichols proposing the use of pre-cast concrete barriers 
to "channel traffic and protect our workers, UDOT employees overseeing the project, 
and the traveling public." Mr. Lindsay's letter noted that "traffic would be very close 
to [Granite's employees' work] and they would be virtually unprotected without the 
concrete barrier." Mr. Lindsay's letter indicated that the proposed use of concrete 
barriers would allow the construction to proceed at a faster pace, thereby resulting in 
an estimated net savings of approximately 56 days of construction time. The net 
additional costs associated with the use of concrete barriers were estimated by 
Granite to be approximately $540,475.00. (3/20/96 Letter attached hereto as [Add. 
13 
1,R. 750-753]) 
14. After receiving Granite's 3/20/96 written proposal, Kent Nichols wrote 
a memorandum dated March 21, 1996 to UDOT Region One Director, Dyke 
LeFevre, P.E., and included with the memorandum a copy of Granite's proposal. Mr. 
Nichols' memorandum stated that he shared in Granite's concerns regarding the safety 
of this project, and requested that Granite's proposal "be given serious consideration." 
(3/21/96 Memorandum attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 755]) 
15. On or about March 26,1996, a meeting was held between Granite and 
UDOT representatives at UDOT's Region One office. During that meeting, Granite 
proposed a new traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project, again 
requesting the use of pre-cast concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels. The details 
of Granite's proposal were formalized in a letter dated March 29, 1996 from Chuck 
Lindsay to Kent Nichols. Mr. Lindsay's 3/29/96 letter requested that consideration 
be given for the new traffic control plan for "the safety of our workers, UDOT 
employees, and the traveling public." Mr. Lindsay's written proposal estimated that 
the net additional cost for the proposed changes would be approximately $767,885. 
Granite's 3/29/96 proposal also stated that the proposed changes would result in the 
project being completed 28 days earlier than required under the original contract. 
(3/29/96 Letter attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 757-760]) 
16. Kent Nichols received Granite's 3/29/96 proposal, and reviewed the 
proposal with UDOT's Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. In a letter dated April 
2,1996, Kent Nichols responded to Granite's proposal, stating that Dyke LeFevre had 
considered Granite's cost breakdown and that Mr. LeFevre felt that "as [the proposal] 
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stands he does not feel that we could get approval." Mr. Nichols indicated that 
justification for the traffic control plan could be made only if the additional costs for 
the proposal were below $450,000 and would result in at least a 50 day reduction in 
the overall time needed to complete the entire construction project. Mr. Nichols 
indicated that UDOT was "not closing the door on this proposal" and requested that 
Granite review certain items in an attempt to lower the price of the proposed traffic 
control plan changes and to determine whether the project could be hastened because 
of the proposed changes. Mr. Nichols acknowledged that the proposed change to the 
traffic control plan "has merit" and indicated that he would "present a request for 
additional money to the Commission" if certain criteria were met. (4/2/96 Letter 
attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 762-763]) 
17. In a letter dated April 11,1996, Granite responded to UDOT's 4/2/96 
letter, stating that "in our judgment we cannot meet the criteria established by UDOT 
to justify a change in the traffic control plan." Granite's letter indicated that with 
UDOT providing certain equipment, the cost of the proposed traffic control plan 
changes could be lowered to approximately $490,000, but that Granite could not 
promise any additional time savings beyond 28 days. Granite's 4/11/96 letter 
concluded by stating that Granite "will proceed with the original traffic control plan 
established by UDOT." (4/11/96 Letter attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 765]) 
18. On or about JuK 2, 1996. after work had commenced on the 
Layton-Clearfield Project, Chuck Lindsay once again wrote a letter on behalf of 
Granite to Kent Nichols at UDOT asking for approval of the proposal to use pre-cast 
concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project. (7/2/96 Letter attached hereto as 
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[Add. 1,R. 767]) 
19. On July 2, 1996, after receiving Chuck Lindsay's 7/2/96 letter, Kent 
Nichols forwarded a memorandum to his superiors, Stan Nielsen, P.E., Region One 
Construction Engineer, and Dyke LeFevre, P.E., Region One Director. This 
memorandum, which was also copied to Clint Topham, P.E., UDOT Deputy 
Director, voiced concerns about "serious problems with control of traffic and 
providing safety for our contractor's workers as well as our own personnel." Mr. 
Nichols requested that his superiors review and give "serious consideration" to 
pre-cast concrete barriers and traffic cross-overs in order to maintain safety. (7/2/96 
Memorandum attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 769]) 
20. Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the 
use of pre-cast concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT 
management personnel including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and 
rejected the proposal based upon the same cost-benefit considerations that motivated 
the prior decisions to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers. (Affidavit of 
Dyke LeFevre, flf 17-18 [Add. 1, R. 713-714]) 
21. Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract for the 
Layton-Clearfield Project, Granite was allowed to utilize the means and methods of 
construction it desired in order to carry out the joint repair and slab replacement in 
the Layton-Clearfield Project. (Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 11, relevant pages 
attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 771-773]) 
22. Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, UDOT allowed 
the contractor to select the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control 
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plan would be implemented and enforced. (Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 14 [Add. 
1,R. 773]) 
23. Granite's own personnel have acknowledged that, pursuant to the 
terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, Granite could have provided pre-cast concrete 
barriers for the Layton-Clearfield Project at its own cost, but chose not to do so. 
(Chuck Lindsay Deposition at pp. 11-12 [Add. 1, R. 744-745]; Affidavit of Dyke 
LeFevre,1f 19 [Add. 1,R. 714]) 
24. Granite's 3/20/96, 3/29/96, and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised 
concerns over the speed limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that 
the speed limit be reduced from 65 m.p.h. to 55 m.p.h. throughout the construction 
zone. (See [Add. 1, R. 750-753, 757-760, 767]) 
25. While the posted speed limit in the construction zone at the time of 
the September 14, 1996 accident was 65 m.p.h., temporary orange advisory speed 
limit signs had also been posted throughout the construction zone with an advisory 
speed limit of 50 m.p.h. The Utah Highway Patrol officer who investigated the 
accident stated in his accident report and again during his deposition that these 50 
m.p.h. advisory speed limit signs were posted throughout the Layton-Clearfield 
Project at the time of the accident. (Greg Lundell Deposition at pp. 38-39, relevant 
pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 775-776]. A copy of the police report showing 
the posted speed limits and advisory speed limits at the time of the accident is 
attached hereto as [Add. 1, 778-779]) 
26. On or about September 14,1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident within the confines of the Layton-Clearfield Project when his car left 
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the traveled portion of the highway and entered into the construction zone where it 
collided with one or more holes created as part of the ongoing slab replacements. 
(Amended Complaint ffl 9-11 [R. 98-99]) 
27. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint seeks damages for personal injuries 
allegedly sustained in the 9/14/96 accident, and alleges that UDOT and Granite "were 
negligent in one or more of the following particulars:" 
(a) "The defendants failed to adequately warn of the condition of the 
roadway." 
(b) "The defendants failed to properly control freeway traffic in 
the area." 
(c) "The defendants failed to adequately barricade and/or provide a safe 
lane of travel to the [plaintiff] and other motorists." 
(d) "The defendants failed to properly train, supervise, or otherwise 
control their particular agents, servants, or employees in aspects of 
traffic safety and construction zone traffic control." 
(e) "The defendants failed to comply with applicable regulations 
concerning traffic control and construction zone safety for the type of 
construction occurring in the area." 
(f) "The defendants specifically failed to use jersey barriers, flaggers, or 
other appropriate warning devices, failed to provide a safe zone 
between the lane of travel and the construction area, and failed to 
adequately illuminate the dangerous condition." 
(Amended Complaint, 1 12 [R. 99]) 
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28. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint also alleges that Granite was acting 
as "the agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT and therefore, the negligence of 
Granite would be imputable to UDOT. (Amended Complaint, ffif 3, 13 [R. 97-99]) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UDOT contends that the trial court was correct in determining that there were no issues of 
fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of UDOT, and that UDOT was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. From a procedural standpoint, the trial court acted correctly in limiting 
the scope of facts being considered because Johnson failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 
4-501 in responding to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Johnson failed to even 
address this issue in his appellate arguments, and because the trial court acted within its discretion, 
this Court should likewise limit the scope of the facts being considered on appeal to those facts that 
were properly before the trial court. 
As for the substantive issues. UDOT contends that the discretionary function exception to 
the Governmental Immunity Act protects UDOT from being held liable for its design of the traffic 
control plan used on the Layton-Clearfield project, and specifically the decision to use plastic barrels 
rather than concrete barriers to channel traffic through the construction zone. The undisputed facts 
of this case show that the traffic control plan was reviewed and authorized by UDOTs upper 
management in consultation with the Federal Highway Administration, and that the decision to use 
barrels was made by UDOT's Region One Director. Since these decisions were clearly made at the 
"policy making'' level, and not by "operational" employees, Johnson's claim against UDOT must 
be barred by the discretionary function exception. 
UDOT also cannot be held liable for failing to inspect, monitor or supervise Granite's work. 
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The contract between UDOT and Granite expressly provides that Granite is the party responsible for 
performing all work on the project, and that Granite is responsible for implementing the traffic 
control plan and maintaining highway safety throughout the construction zone. Thus, any failure to 
follow the traffic control plan would be attributable to Granite, and not UDOT. Furthermore, even 
if UDOT had a duty to inspect or monitor Granite's work, UDOT would be protected from liability 
by the negligent inspection exception to the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Finally, UDOT cannot be held vicariously liable for Granite's alleged negligence. It is clear 
under Utah law that someone who hires an independent contractor cannot be held liable for a 
dangerous condition created by that independent contractor, unless the employer maintains control 
over, and actively participates in the work being performed by the independent contractor. Since it 
is undisputed that UDOT did not maintain control over, or actively participate in Granite's work, 
UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence. 
Therefore, it is UDOT's position that the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE APPELLATE REVIEW SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE 
FACTS THAT WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
Before this Court can consider the substantive issues being raised on appeal, the Court needs 
to address a procedural issue that arises from Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration in his summary judgment pleadings filed at the trial court 
level. As a result of Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501, the trial court entirely disregarded 
approximately four pages of alleged facts contained in Johnson's Memorandum, many of which 
Johnson relies upon on appeal. UDOT contends that those alleged facts should likewise be 
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disregarded by this Court, and that the appellate review should be limited in scope to those facts that 
were properly before the trial court. 
Rule 4-501(2)(B) requires that "[t]he points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the 
movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a 
concise statement of material facts which support the party's contention'' and fejach disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the opposing party relies." This Court has emphasized the importance 
of complying with Rule 4-501(2)(B), and recognized that it is within the trial court's discretion to 
require compliance with the rule. Fennell v. Green, 77 P.3d 339, 341-42 (Utah App. 2003). 
In Fennel], the plaintiff had filed a summary judgment opposition memorandum that "did not 
refer to Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead included only his own statement 
of undisputed facts." Id. at 341. During the arguments on the motion, the trial court "noted its 
frustration with" the plaintiffs response to the motion for summary judgment, and granted the 
motion for summary judgment, in part, because of plaintiffs "failure to comply with [Rule 4-
501(2)(B)] by not specifically controverting the facts as set forth by Defendants in the memoranda 
in support of their motions for summary judgment." Id. at 341-42, n.2. 
On appeal, this Court stated *"[i]t is clear that Fennell failed to comply with the rule . . . As 
a result, it was unclear what facts Fennell contended were disputed." IcL at 341. The Court 
recognized a long line of Utah cases where the appellate courts have placed enforcement of Rule 4-
501 within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 342; see e.g., Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist 63 P.3d 
705 (Utah 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that there was insufficient evidence to support summary 
judgment because plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 4-501 requirement to specifically 
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controvert those facts that are claimed to be disputed); Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 
694, 701-702 (Utah App. 1994) (upholding trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept 
supplemental memoranda outside bounds of rule 4-501); Golding v. Ashlev Cent. Irrigation Co.. 902 
P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1995) (determining that failure to comply with Rule 4-501 made additional 
filings moot). 
This Court noted that "these cases establish that a trial court may exercise its discretion to 
require compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly rule 4-501, without 
impairing a party's substantive rights/' Fennell, 77 P.3d at 342. The Court went on to conclude that 
the trial court in Fennell had not abused its discretion in requiring compliance with Rule 4-501. Id. 
Because the trial court had acted within its discretion, this Court limited the scope of its appellate 
review by relying on only those facts that the trial court deemed to be admitted under Rule 4-501. 
Id 
The scope of the Court's appellate review in the present case should likewise be limited for 
the same reasons addressed by the Court in Fennell. Contrary to the requirements of Rule 4-
501(2)(B), Johnson's Memorandum began with four pages of facts which Johnson claimed "dispute 
the facts alleged in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment/*but which made no reference to 
UDOT's numbered fact paragraphs, thereby leaving the trial court to speculate as to which of 
UDOT's facts Johnson wras attempting to dispute. The trial court expressed its frustration with 
Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B), stating "there's no secret why we have Rule 4-
501 as it relates to summary judgment motions, and that is so the judge who has to review a 
summary judgment doesn't have to have [sic] through, you know, six inches of paper and put it 
together for themselves." (R. 1195:4-5 (Add. 4)). At the conclusion of the arguments, the trial court 
again stated, UI don't know how many times this needs to be said, but the whole purpose of Rule 4-
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501 as to summary judgment is to help a judge say is there an issue, because everybody's going 
down the same way and following the procedure. And when they don't do that, it's very hard." (R. 
1195:55-56 (Add. 4)). The trial court also pointed out that in the language used in Rule 4-501 (2)(B), 
"it's a 'shall begin', it doesn't say may begin, of [sic] if you'd like it to, it says shall." (R. 1195:5 
(Add. 4)). In the end, the trial court, like the trial court in Fennell exercised its discretion and 
concluded that the first four pages of Johnson's Memorandum had failed to comply with Rule 4-
501(2)(B), and that those facts would not be considered for the purpose of UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 1158 (Add. 5)). 
Johnson's Docketing Statement suggested that he would challenge this aspect of the trial 
court's ruling on appeal. Johnson's Appellate Brief, however, makes no mention of this issue, and 
Jolinson makes no attempt to challenge the trial court's ruling that pages 1-4 of Johnson's 
Memorandum failed to comply with Rule 4-501, and therefore, would not be considered for purposes 
of summary judgment. Since Johnson makes no attempt to challenge this issue in his Appellate 
Brief, UDOT contends that Johnson has waived any right to challenge the issue. As a result, there 
is no need for this Court to review the trial court's action to determine if there was an abuse of 
discretion. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to review the trial court's ruling on this issue, 
UDOT contends that the above-stated facts and authority clearly support a conclusion that the trial 
court acted well within its discretion in requiring compliance with Rule 4-501, in limiting the scope 
of facts to those facts that were properly before the trial court, and in rejecting the factual allegations 
contained at pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum.. 
While Johnson has waived his right to challenge this issue on appeal, his Appellate Brief 
nevertheless relies heavily on many of the same factual allegations properly disregarded by the trial 
court due to Johnson's non-compliance with Rule 4-501. In addition, UDOT contends that the 
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manner in which many of these facts are presented, both to the trial court and on appeal, is 
misleading, and often lacks proper evidentiary support from the record. For example, Johnson 
makes reference to Granite's requests to lower the speed limit from 65 mph to 55 mph in an attempt 
to imply that UDOT was negligent in failing to allow Granite to reduce the speed limit throughout 
the construction zone. This issue, however, is a red herring, and has absolutely nothing to do with 
Johnson's negligence claims against UDOT. While UDOT has been unable to locate any evidence 
confirming that it responded to Granite's speed limit request, it is undisputed from the Highway 
Patrol accident report and the deposition testimony of the investigating Highway Patrol officer that 
50 mph advisory speed limit signs were posted throughout the construction zone on the night of 
Johnson's accident. (R. 775-779 (Add. 1)). Thus, Johnson's continued attempts to raise this issue 
can be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to confuse the real issues. 
Another example is Johnson's allegation that a UDOT representative instructed Granite to 
open a second lane of travel in violation of UDOT's traffic control plan. This particular allegation 
is relied on heavily by Johnson in his appellate arguments. The trial court did not. and this Court 
need not, consider this allegation since it was presented on page 4 of Johnson's Memorandum which 
did not comply with Johnson's duties under Rule 4-501. Even if that allegation had been considered 
by the trial court, UDOT pointed out in its Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum that the citation 
of Jimmie Keyes' deposition testimony, which is the only evidence cited by Johnson in support of 
this allegation, does not state that anyone from UDOT expressly authorized two lanes of traffic on 
the night of Johnson's accident, or that UDOT ever authorized Granite to set up the barrels in the 
manner Johnson alleged occurred on the night of his accident. (R. 1031, f 18 (Add. 3)). In addition, 
Johnson has failed to present any evidence showing that UDOT ever authorized Granite to open two 
lanes of traffic in any manner other than that specified for peak hour traffic in the traffic control plan. 
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The allegations that the traffic control plan required white striping and a two foot buffer 
between the construction zone and traffic are other examples of factual allegations which are cited 
throughout Johnson's Appellate Brief, but which were not properly before the trial court. The 
allegations of missing barrels on the night of the accident also fall into that category. In short, 
Johnson's Appellate Brief is replete with factual allegations never properly presented to the trial 
court in connection with Johnson's opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
All of the "facts" stated in Johnson's Appellate Brief which were not properly before the trial 
court should be completely disregarded for purposes of this appellate review, especially where 
Johnson does not challenge that portion of the trial court's ruling in his Appellate Brief. Since the 
trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 4-501 in disregarding pages 1-4 of Johnson's 
Memorandum, this Court must focus its appellate review on those facts stated in UDOT's Summary 
Judgment Memorandum (Add. 1), Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum (Add. 3), and that 
portion of the oral argument transcript where the trial court walked through each of UDOT's stated 
facts in an attempt to determine whether there were any material disputes. (R. 1195:6-17 (Add. 4)). 
In doing so, it is clear that the trial court acted correctly in concluding that there were no disputed 
facts that would have precluded summary judgment in favor of UDOT. 
II. THE CLAIM THAT UDOT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS DESIGN OF 
THE TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN IS BARRED BY THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Although it may not be clear from Johnson's Appellate Brief, a major focus of Johnson's 
claims against UDOT throughout this litigation, and a major focus of the summary judgment 
pleadings and oral arguments to the trial court was the allegation that UDOT was negligent in its 
design of the traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield project which specifically authorized the 
use of barrels rather than concrete barriers as the principal means of traffic channelization throughout 
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the construction project. UDOT contends that, even if its design of the traffic control plan, including 
the decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers were deemed negligent, any claims against 
UDOT based on that allegation must fail under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides that," [e]xcept as may otherwise be provided 
in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function...." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1997) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three part test that is used to determine whether this grant 
of governmental immunity is applicable to a specific situation, stating: 
To determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), three questions must be answered: (1) Was 
the activity undertaken by the entity a governmental function and therefore 
immunized from suit under the general grant of immunity contained in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-3? (2) If the activity undertaken was a governmental function, has 
another section of the Act waived the blanket immunity? (3) If immunity has been 
waived, does the Act contain an exception to that waiver resulting in a retention of 
immunity against the claim asserted? 
Keeganv. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Utah 1995). 
In the present case, the claims against UDOT arise out of UDOT's involvement in a highway 
construction project. The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that "the construction and maintenance 
of state highways can only be performed by governmental agencies." Id. at 620. Therefore, there 
can be no question, and Johnson does not dispute, that any UDOT activity associated with the 
Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed a "governmental function" which falls under the general 
grant of immunity offered by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The next step is to determine whether any part of the Governmental Immunity Act operates 
as a waiver to UDOT's general grant of immunity. UDOT acknowledges that such a waiver likely 
exists in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 of the Governmental Immunity Act which states: 
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Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them. 
Since this case involves a claim for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a "defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous condition of [a] highway," Section 63-30-8 likely operates as a waiver of UDOT's 
claim of immunity. 
Since UDOT's immunity appears to have been waived by § 63-30-8, the next step is to 
determine whether any of the "exceptions to waiver set forth in § 63-30-10" are applicable to the 
facts of this case. UDOT asserts that the "discretionary function" exception should apply to 
Johnson's claim that UDOT negligently designed the proposed traffic control plan, including 
UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels to channel traffic. If the discretionary function exception has 
any significance, the Court must conclude that UDOT is immune from liability for any claims 
alleging negligence in the design of the proposed traffic control plan. 
The discretionary function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act states as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within 
the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added). 
Keegan is controlling in the present case because that case also involved claims against 
UDOT, and the Utah Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment should have been granted 
in favor of UDOT because certain UDOT decisions regarding a highway construction project were 
immune from liability under the discretionary function exception. 896 P.2d at 625-26. In Keegan, 
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a motorist was killed when his car climbed a concrete median barrier and collided with a bridge 
support pillar. Id. at 619. The victim's estate brought a wrongful death action against UDOT, 
arguing that UDOT negligently failed to maintain a concrete traffic barrier in a reasonably safe 
manner. The plaintiffs in Keeean specifically alleged that, although the barrier had originally been 
constructed in accordance with the prevailing safety standards, two subsequent surface overlay 
projects had shortened the barrier's height, rendering it unsafe. Id. UDOT moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the decision to not raise the barrier during resurfacing was a discretionary act 
that should be shielded from liability under the Governmental Immunity Act. Id- The trial court 
denied UDOT's motion and a jury verdict was ultimately entered against UDOT. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the discretionary function exception and 
concluded that UDOT's actions should have been deemed immune from suit as a matter of law. Id. 
at 623-26. In reaching its decision, the Court looked at the reasoning behind the discretionary 
function exception, stating: 
Discretionary function immunity under section 63-30-10 is designed to 
"shield those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of people 
in a myriad of unforseen ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual 
threat of which would make public administration all but impossible." In keeping 
with this purpose, this court has distinguished between discretionary and 
nondiscretionary decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question involves 
the formulation of policy or the execution of already-formulated policies. This court 
has held that the discretionary function exception "should be confined to those 
decisions and acts occurring at the 'basicpolicy-making level,' and not extended to 
those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level... 'which concern 
routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation ojbroad policyfactors:'" The 
reason for such a rule is plain, given the purpose of the discretionary function 
exception: "Where the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed 
to one of the branches of our tri-partite system of government, the courts have 
refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety of those decisions." 
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Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).8 
In order to clarify and create some consistency in the application of the discretionary function 
exception, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the following four-part test "to determine whether a 
given decision or act qualifies under the discretionary function exception": 
1. "Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective?" 
2. "Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would 
not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or objective?" 
3. "Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved?" 
4. "Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged 
act, omission, or decision?" 
Id. at 624. 
When this four-part test was applied in Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the 
decision to not raise the concrete barrier fell within the scope of the discretionary function exception. 
Id. First, the "decision involved a basic governmental objective: to wit, public safety on the roads." 
Id. Second, "the decision was essential to the realization of that policy; it involved a determination 
of not only the degree of safety that would be provided by various options considered, but also what 
8
 The Utah Supreme Court noted that, in other cases, it had found the discretionary 
function exception applicable to "decisions concerning placement of railroad warning signs" and 
"the design of a city flood control system." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (citing Velasquez v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 219, 469 P.2d 5, 6 (1970); Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 
835 (Utah 1992); Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989). 
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degree of safety would be an appropriate goal given time and cost constraints."9 Id. Third, "the 
decision involved the basic policy judgment and expertise of the agency involved," noting that 
"studies of the plan, its cost, and the degree of safety it would provide were carried out by senior 
engineers and circulated throughout and debated within the department." Id. Finally, the Court 
concluded that UDOT had the authority to make this decision since the legislature has provided 
UDOT with "general responsibility for statewide highway . . . and transportation planning, research 
and design, construction, maintenance, security and safety." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
63-49-4(1)). 
Based on its application of that four-part test to the facts at issue in Keegan, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that, "[i]n essence, UDOT's decision involved just the sort of policy-driven 
weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function exception was meant to protect" 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that: 
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominantly fiscal matters. 
Every highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we will not 
hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a difficult 
balance between the need for greater safety and the burden of funding improvements. 
Id. The Court concluded by stating: 
UDOT's decision not to raise the concrete barrier during the surface overlay 
projects was not an operational decision involving the negligent installation or 
maintenance of a traffic device, but rather involved a policy-based plan, approved by 
the [Federal Highway Administration], which resulted from a considered weighing 
of the costs and benefits of certain safety and construction policies and wrhich 
involved the exercise of UDOT's judgment and discretion. Accordingly, we hold that 
the decision not to raise the concrete barrier was a discretionary act shielded from 
9
 The Utah Supreme Court noted that, prior to submitting the design plans to the Federal 
Highway Administration for approval, a safety study was performed and the project design 
engineer prepared a cost-benefits report that looked at the safety factors, the cost of removing and 
replacing the barrier, and the added delays and inconvenience to highway users that would be 
created by replacing the barrier. Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. 
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liability under section 63-30-10. 
Id. at 626. Based on that conclusion, the trial court's denial of UDOT's motion for summary 
judgment was reversed. Id. 
UDOT contends that Keegan controls the resolution of the present case. In contrast to 
Keegan, this Court's opinion in Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah App. 1999) is an example 
of a case where the facts could not support a summary judgment ruling. Trujillo involved a 
construction project where a four lane divided highway - two eastbound lanes and two westbound 
lanes - had been shut down on the eastbound side for resurfacing work. 986 P.2d at 755. To 
accommodate the traffic traveling in both directions, eastbound traffic was channeled onto the 
westbound side of the highway which was temporarily used to provide one lane of traffic moving 
in each direction. Id. The eastbound traffic was separated from the westbound traffic by temporary 
double yellow painted lines and the placement of plastic construction barrels spaced at 100-foot 
intervals. Id. The plaintiffs in Trujillo were injured when a westbound vehicle veered into on-
coming traffic and collided head on with the plaintiffs' motor home. Id. The plaintiffs brought 
claims against UDOT and the contractor alleging that they were "negligent in the design, 
supervision, and implementation of the traffic control plan," and specifically that they "negligently 
failed to install concrete barriers to prevent crossover accidents in the area where the Trujillo's 
accident took place." Id. at 756. The trial court dismissed the claims against UDOT as a matter of 
law on the basis of the discretionary function exception. Id. 
On appeal, this Court followed the same analysis used in Keegan in finding that UDOT had 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that its allegedly negligent acts 
and decisions met the discretionary functions exception. The evidence before the Court established 
that the "[p]lans for the entire . . . project were drafted, formulated, and approved in a series of 
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meetings and reviews over the course of approximately one year." and that the participants included 
"Federal Highway Administration representatives; UDOT maintenance, engineering, design, and 
administrative personnel; and several city and county officials." jd. at 756. The Court also noted, 
however, that "the record contains no evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically 
singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process." Id. Based on 
this lack of evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that UDOT had failed to meet its burden 
of proving, as a matter of law, that its formulation of the traffic control plan at issue in Trujillo fell 
within the scope of the discretionary function exception, and therefore, the grant of summary 
judgment was reversed. Id. at 761-63. 
While the present case and Trujillo are similar in that they both involve UDOT's decision 
to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers, the similarities between the two cases end there. 
UDOT contends that the facts surrounding this case fall squarely within the Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Keegan, and that Trujillo is easily distinguishable. It is important to note that Trujillo 
made no attempt to limit, restrict, or modify the rule of law recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Keegan. . The outcomes of the two cases were different, however, because this Court concluded 
in Trujillo that UDOT had failed to present sufficient evidence to the trial court to establish that its 
decisions surrounding the traffic control plan were made at the policy making level, and therefore, 
were within the scope of the discretionary function exception. In the present case, however, there 
is an overwhelming amount of undisputed evidence establishing that UDOT's decisions concerning 
the traffic control plan on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the decision to use plastic barrels 
rather than concrete barriers, were singled out, separately analyzed, and made at the highest level of 
a coordinate branch of state government. The policy discussions and policy making decisions made 
by UDOT on the Layton-Clearfield Project, like the decisions in Keegan, were precisely the types 
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of "policy-driven" decisions which are immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The undisputed facts before the trial court included evidence that prior to pursuing bids on 
the Lavton-Clearfield Project. UDOT researched traffic control alternatives, and consulted with the 
Federal Highway Administration regarding those alternatives. (R. 712-713 (Add. 1)). While the 
proposed traffic control plan was initially prepared by UDOT's traffic engineers, the decision to use 
plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers was ultimately considered and made by UDOT's upper 
management. Specifically, that decision was made by UDOT's Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. 
(R. 710-713 (Add. 1)). As the Region One Director, Mr. LeFevre was the individual who oversaw 
all traffic related matters for the entire northern portion of the state. (R. 710-712. 717, 719 (Add. 
1)). When considering whether to use plastic barrels or concrete barriers on the Lavton-Clearfield 
Project, Mr. LeFevre weighed several key factors, including: (1) the safety of project workers and 
the motoring public; (2) the costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and (3) the 
overall impact on traffic congestion that would result from increasing or decreasing the project 
completion time. (R. 712-713 (Add. 1)). As part of Mr. LeFevre's decision-making process, he 
consulted with UDOT Deputy Director, Clint Topham, the chief traffic engineer for Utah who had 
the final say on all transportation related decisions for the entire state of Utah. (R. 710-713 (Add. 
1)). Mr. LeFevre also consulted with officials from the Federal Highway Administration about the 
use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on similar projects in other states. (R. 712-713 
(Add. 1)). Based on those consultations, and after considering all of the safety, cost, and time 
factors, Mr. LeFevre decided that barrels, rather than concrete barriers, should be used in the 
proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
After the contract for the project was awarded to Granite, the barrel versus barrier issue 
resurfaced when Granite requested on several occasions that the contract be modified to include the 
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use of concrete barriers to separate traffic from the construction zone. In at least two different 
meetings, and in at least three different letters, Granite's representatives specifically asked UDOT 
to authorize the use of concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels for greater project safety. (R. 727-
737, 739-740, 742-745, 747-748, 750-753, 767 (Add. 1)). Granite presented UDOT with different 
proposals as to the estimated additional costs and time savings associated with the use of concrete 
barriers. (R. 750-753, 765 (Add. 1)). It is important to note that Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project 
Engineer overseeing the Layton-Clearfield Project, agreed with Granite's safety concerns, and 
recommended that UDOT approve the use of concrete barriers. (R. 755, 769 (Add. 1)). The 
decision, however, was not Mr. Nichols' to make at the operational level of the project; rather, the 
decision was for UDOT's policymakers to make. 
Each of Granite's requests concerning the use of concrete barriers were forwarded to Dyke 
LeFevre and other members of UDOT's upper management for consideration. (R. 755,762-763,769 
(Add. 1)). On each occasion. Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management considered and 
weighed the safety considerations against the cost and time factors. (R. 712-714, 762-763 (Add. 1)). 
In the end, Mr. LeFevre concluded that the safety and time factors did not outweigh the additional 
costs associated with using concrete barriers, and therefore, Granite's proposals were rejected. (R. 
712-714 (Add. 1)). 
Johnson argues that UDOT's decisions surrounding the traffic control plan were not 
"'essential to the realization' of a basic government objective." (Johnson Appellate Brief at pp. 28-
34). In doing so, Johnson attempts to focus the Court's attention on the narrow issue of barrels 
versus barriers, and suggests that barrels and barriers are not things that are essential to 
accomplishing basic governmental goals. The Utah Supreme Court did not adopt such a narrow 
approach in Keegan. In fact. Keegan concluded that UDOT's decision making was essential to the 
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realization of a basic government objective because "it involved a determination of not only the 
degree of safety that would be provided by various options considered, but also what degree of safety 
would be an appropriate goal given time and cost constraints." 896 P.2d at 624. UDOT's decisions 
surrounding the traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the use plastic barrels 
rather than concrete barriers, likewise involved an analysis of not only safety factors, but also time 
and executive branch budgetary cost limitations that had to be weighed against the safety factors. 
Johnson also attempts to unfairly characterize UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels as 
solely a financial decision. UDOT does not dispute that cost was a significant factor in its original 
decision to use barrels, and in its later rejections of Granite's proposed change orders. It is also 
undisputed, however, that UDOT consulted with the Federal Highway Administration specifically 
on the issue of using barrels rather than barriers on this type of project, and concluded that the project 
could be done safely without the use of barriers. This analysis of the safety issues was completed 
before the project was ever let out to bid, and did not need to be re-performed each time Granite 
came forward with another change order request. While Johnson would have this Court believe that 
UDOT's decision to stick with barrels was simply an attempt to save a few dollars, it is important 
to remember that the issue being presented to UDOT by Granite's proposed change orders was 
whether to approve an additional $500,000 for a project that was already costing the taxpayers of the 
State of Utah more than $5,000,000. Once again, as noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Keegan: 
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominantly fiscal matters. 
Every highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we will not 
hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a 
difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the burden of funding 
improvements. 
896 P.2d at 624 (emphasis added). The fact that cost played a significant role in UDOT's decision 
to use barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project does not defeat UDOT's 
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argument that this decision is protected under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
It is also important to note that, even if UDOT did fail to give adequate consideration to 
safety issues as Johnson has suggested, UDOT's actions should still be protected under the 
discretionary function exception. That exception applies not only to the "exercise or performance 
. . . [of] a discretionary function," but also "the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function" Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added). Thus, even if Mr. LeFevre or UDOT 
somehow acted negligently by placing cost before safety, thereby failing to "exercise or perform a 
discretionary function," Johnson's negligence claim would still be barred. 
Johnson also attempts to argue that UDOT's decision to use barrels was not made at the 
"policy-making" level. (Johnson's Appellate Brief at pp. 34-36). This argument ignores the 
undisputed facts of this case. Johnson does not dispute that the final decision surrounding the use 
of barrels was ultimately made by Mr. LeFevre. Instead, Johnson would have this Court believe that 
Mr. LeFevre was just another operational level engineer. Mr. LeFevre, however, was the Region 
One Director who retired from UDOT in 2000 after 39 years of service. (R. 1028, •[ 8). As the 
Region One Director. Mr. LeFevre was not someone who was out working on the various 
construction projects. To the contrary, Mr. LeFevre was the individual in charge of reviewing and 
making policy and fiscal decisions for all highway related projects for the entire northern portion of 
the State of Utah. The Utah Legislature has required that UDOT Region Directors such as Mr. 
LeFevre be "qualified executivefs] with technical and administrative experience and training." Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-1-205(2). The fact that Mr. LeFevre was faced with difficult policy and fiscal based 
decisions on a daily basis does not somehow convert his responsibilities from the "policy-making 
level" to the "operational level," as Johnson urges. 
The undisputed facts surrounding UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete 
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barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly establish that those decisions were policy-driven 
decisions made by UDOT's upper management. Had those decisions been made at the "operational 
level" by the UDOT personnel who were physically involved with the project on a daily basis, the 
evidence suggests that UDOT would have accepted Granite's proposal to use concrete barriers. That 
was not the case, however. Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management, after duly considering 
the competing safety, cost, and time factors involved, rejected Granite's proposals and the 
recommendations of UDOT's own project engineer. There can be no question that these decisions 
were policy-driven, and not operational. Therefore, this case falls squarely within the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding in Keegan, and this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that UDOT's 
decisions surrounding the proposed traffic control plan, including the decision to use plastic barrels 
instead of concrete barriers, are shielded from liability under the discretionary function exception 
of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
III. UDOT CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR FAILING TO INSPECT, 
MONITOR, OR SUPERVISE GRANITE'S WORK. 
Johnson also alleges that UDOT was negligent in failing to properly implement the proposed 
traffic control plan, and in failing to properly inspect or monitor Granite's implementation of the 
traffic control plan. These arguments should likewise fail, as a matter of law, for several reasons. 
First, UDOT was not responsible for implementing or monitoring the traffic control plan. 
Johnson does note dispute the contractual requirements of the Layton-Clearfield Project that were 
imposed upon Granite. The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly states that Granite was 
the party responsible for furnishing all the labor and equipment necessary to "perform all work" on 
the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the implementation of the traffic control plan throughout 
the project. (R. 721-722 (Add. 1)). The contract expressly states that Granite "shall provide, erect, 
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and maintain barriers, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and shall protect the 
work and safety of the public."10 (R. 721-722 (Add. 1)). Thus, anv claims arising out of the alleged 
failure to properly implement the proposed traffic control plan could only be brought against Granite. 
There is no basis for imposing any duty or liability on UDOT in regards to the manner in which the 
traffic control plan was actually implemented on the Layton-Clearfield Project by Granite. 
Johnson incorrectly states in his Appellate Brief (p. 19) that the "the only evidence UDOT 
submitted on this point was the contract between itself and Granite." In actuality, facts 21 and 22 
in UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum cited to the deposition testimony of Randy Hunter, 
and stated that, pursuant to the UDOT/Granite contract, "Granite was allowed to utilize the means 
and methods of construction it desired in order to carry out the joint repair and slab replacement in 
the Layton-Clearfield Project,*' and was allowed to "select the means and methods by which the 
proposed traffic control plan would be implemented and enforced." (R. 688 (Add. I)).11 
Despite the plainly stated contractual obligations imposed on Granite, Johnson also contends 
that UDOT had an independent duty to supervise or monitor Granite's work. UDOT contends that 
there is no authority under Utah law that imposes a duty to inspect, monitor, or supervise the work 
of an independent contractor. Even if such a duty did exist, however, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act would again shield UDOT from any liability. That statute contains an exception 
which states that a governmental entity cannot be held liable for "a failure to make an inspection or 
10
 The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project also required Granite to see that M[a]ll 
barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and other protective devices shall 
meet the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices [MUTCD] for Streets and Highways and 
Traffic Control provisions of this specification." (R. 721-722 (Add. 1)). 
11
 Johnson attempted to dispute these two facts in his Summary Judgment Opposition 
Memorandum, but did so without any citations to the record as required by Rule 4-501. and thus, 
the trial court viewed these facts as undisputed. (R. 867-868 (Add. 2)). 
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by making an inadequate or negligent inspection." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
UDOT contends that any claim that UDOT failed to monitor or supervise Granite's work on 
the Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed to be an allegation that UDOT either "fail[ed] to make 
an inspection" or made an "inadequate or negligent inspection" of Granite's work and therefore, 
would fall within the scope of the Section 63-30-10(4) exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In those cases where the Utah appellate courts have analyzed this "negligent inspection" exception, 
it has been made clear that this exception is not designed to shield a governmental entity from an 
inspection of its own work or property, but rather to shield governmental entities who are involved 
with inspecting the property and work of third parties for purposes of ensuring public safety. See 
e.g., Ilottv. Univ. of Utah, 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2000); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 
265 (Utah 1995); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp, 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). That is precisely what 
Johnson is alleging that UDOT failed to do in the present case. 
Johnson claims that UDOT should be held liable because it allegedly failed to monitor 
Granite's work or inspect the Layton-Clearfield Project for purposes of ensuring that Granite 
complied with the traffic control plan, and ensuring that Granite's work on the project did not 
endanger the public. Thus, while Johnson avoids using the word "inspection" to characterize his 
claim, it is clear that Johnson is alleging that UDOT was negligent in inspecting the work of a third 
party, independent contractor, Granite. Such a claim falls squarely within the scope of the "negligent 
inspection"exception, and therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Johnson's claims against UDOT 
based on those allegations should be affirmed. 
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IV. UDOT CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
GRANITE'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE. 
Johnson also seeks to impose liability on UDOT by claiming that Granite was acting as an 
agent, servant, or employee of UDOT. and that the negligence of Granite, if any, should be imputed 
to UDOT. There is absolutely no evidence, however, to suggest that Granite was an agent, servant, 
or employee of UDOT. The undisputed facts of this case show that Granite was nothing more than 
an independent contractor hired by UDOT to do the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
The Utah courts have long recognized that "Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 
'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by 
an act or omission of the contractor or his servants!" Thompson v. Jess. 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 
1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937)). 
Johnson does not dispute that Granite was an independent contractor hired by UDOT to perform the 
Layton-Clearfield Project. Instead, Johnson relies on Thompson to argue that UDOT should be held 
liable under the "retained control" doctrine. Thompson, however, does not support Johnson's 
argument. 
In Thompson, the Utah Supreme Court described the "retained control" doctrine as "a narrow 
theory of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer of an independent 
contractor exercises enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care.*' 
979 P.2d at 326. The Court adopted what it called the '"active participation standard,'' which 
provides that "a principal employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent 
contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of 
performance of the contracted work." Id. at 327. The Court defined this standard by stating: 
[T]o have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal employer must 
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work. 
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The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty must involve either 
the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's 
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court also 
noted: 
It is not enough that [the employer] has merely a general right to order the work 
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions 
or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe 
alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but 
it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to 
operative detail. 
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965)). 
Applying the standard adopted by the Utah Supreme Court to the present case, it is clear that 
the trial court was correct in concluding that UDOT cannot be held liable under the "active 
participation" or "retained control" standard. The UDOT/Granite contract expressly states that all 
work under the contract, including the implementation of the traffic control plan, was to be 
performed by Granite. There was also undisputed testimony presented to the trial court establishing 
that Granite was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired in order to 
complete the Layton-Clearfield Project, and was allowed to select the means and methods by which 
the proposed traffic control plan would be implemented and enforced. (R. 688, 771-773 (Add. I)).12 
While UDOT had its own personnel on site on a daily basis, those personnel were there to inspect 
Granite's work, and to identify the sections of highway that needed to be replaced. As noted above, 
however, even this limited involvement is not enough to subject UDOT to vicarious liability. There 
is absolutely no evidence to suggest that UDOT's personnel were actively participating in or 
12
 As noted earlier, Johnson attempted to dispute these facts in his Summary Judgment 
Opposition Memorandum, but did so without any citations to the record as required by Rule 4-
501, and thus, the trial court viewed these facts as undisputed. (R. 867-868 (Add. 2)). 
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controlling the means or methods by which Granite went about its work. Therefore. Johnson's 
reliance on the "active participation" or "retained control'* standard should be rejected. 
Johnson also attempts to argue that UDOT should be held liable for Granite's alleged 
negligence under the "inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk" doctrines that are found in Sections 
416 and 427 of the Restatement (second) of Torts. It is important to note that the Utah courts have 
never adopted these theories of liability. While the Utah Supreme Court did consider their 
application in Thompson, the Court refused to apply these sections to claims involving an injured 
employee of the independent contractor. 979 P.2d at 328-331. Johnson has failed to present any 
authority suggesting that Utah law would apply the "inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk" 
doctrines to a claim involving an allegedly dangerous condition created by an independent contractor 
on a road construction project. Therefore, the Court should reject Johnson's claims that UDOT 
should be liable for Granite's alleged negligence under the "inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk" 
doctrines. 
Finally, Johnson attempts to argue on appeal that UDOT should be held liable under Section 
418 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which deals specifically with highway construction 
projects. This particular argument based on Section 418 was never made at the trial court level, and 
therefore, was not preserved for appeal. As a result, this Court should conclude that Johnson has 
waived any right to rely on Section 418 for the purpose of opposing UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. It is also important to note that Section 418 has never been considered or adopted by the 
Utah courts. Furthermore, even if Section 418 was recognized under Utah law, comment c. to 
Section 418 makes it clear that "[n]othing in this Section is intended in any way to affect any 
immunity which the State, a municipality, or other government may have from liability. The rule 
stated here applies only where there is no such immunity." (Section 418 is attached as Addendum 
42 
6 to Johnson's Appellate Brief). Therefore, Johnson's reliance on Section 418 should be rejected. 
In short, Johnson would have this Court hold that UDOT has a nondelegable duty to protect 
the public from any dangerous condition on any public highway, regardless of whether the dangerous 
condition was created by an independent contractor or other third party, rather than by UDOT. If 
Utah law were to recognize such a duty, UDOT could potentially be held liable for ever}' motor 
vehicle accident caused by an unsafe driver simply because UDOT failed to protect the public from 
a dangerous condition (the unsafe driver) on the highway. UDOT contends there is no such duty 
under Utah law. Johnson's avenue for relief from damages allegedly caused by an allegedly 
dangerous condition created by Granite is his claim directly against Granite, something which he is 
still free to pursue. Johnson is not entitled to recovery from UDOT, however, for Granite's alleged 
negligence. 
Since Utah law protects UDOT from being held liable for physical harm caused by the acts 
or omissions of an independent contractor, this Court should court should affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling that UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, UDOT respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment dismissal of Johnson's claims against UDOT. 
DATED this 1H day of February, 2004. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By. 
tephen mer 
H. Scott Jacooson 
AttorneysTor Appellee/Defendant UDOT 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH, 
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, 
JOHN DOES l-V, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT UDOT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Civil No. 970700411 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendant Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT"), through counsel, submits the following memorandum of points and authorities 
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and respectfully asks the Court to grant 
said motion by dismissing all claims against UDOT as a matter of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case arises out of a single vehicle accident during the early morning hours of 
September 14, 1996. The accident occurred when plaintiffs southbound vehicle on 
Interstate 15 near Layton, Utah, left the traveled portion of the highway and entered a 
construction zone where the vehicle went into and out of several large holes where 
sections of highway had been removed for replacement. Plaintiff alleges that this accident 
and his alleged injuries were caused because UDOT and the project contractor, defendant 
Granite Construction Company ("Granite"), were negligent in failing to make the highway 
safe for vehicles traveling through the construction zone. 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, UDOT contends that the claims against 
UDOT should be dismissed as a matter of law for the following reasons: 
1. UDOT's alleged negligence in designing and approving the proposed traffic 
control plan is subject to the discretionary function exception of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act; 
2. UDOT did not have any contractual duty to implement and monitor the proposed 
traffic control plan, and UDOT cannot be held liable for any alleged failure to inspect, 
monitor, or supervise Granite's work; and 
3. UDOT cannot be held liable for any negligence attributable to an independent 
contractor, Granite Construction. 
2 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
For purposes of UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT contends that the 
following material facts are undisputed: 
1. Prior to September 26, 1995, UDOT let out for bid Project No. IM-15-
7(191)332, a highway construction project involving joint repair and slab replacement on 
sections of Interstate 15 in Davis County (hereinafter referred to as the "Layton-Clearfield 
Project"). (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, fflj 5-6, attached hereto as Exhibit 1). 
2. UDOTs bid specifications on the Layton-Clearfield Project included a 
proposed traffic control plan. The proposed traffic control plan called for the use of plastic 
road construction barrels, rather than concrete barriers, as the primary channeling devices 
to be used to separate the motoring public from the actual construction area throughout 
most of the Layton-Clearfield Project. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, fl 7). 
3. The decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to channel traffic 
throughout this project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT 
organization. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, ffl[ 8-13). 
4. At all times relevant to this case, the organizational structure of UDOT 
officials and employees involved with the Layton-Clearfield Project was, from top to bottom, 
as follows: 
(a) Clint Topham was UDOTs Deputy Director. As the Deputy 
Director, Mr. Topham was the chief engineer for the State of Utah, and had 
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the final say for all transportation related engineering decisions. The only 
official above Mr. Topham in the UDOT hierarchy was the UDOT Executive 
Director who reported directly to the Governor of the State of Utah. 
(b) Dyke LeFevre was the Director of Region One. Within UDOT, the 
entire State of Utah is divided geographically into four different regions. 
UDOTs Region One covers the northern-most part of the state starting in 
Farmington, and included the Layton-Clearfield Project area. Each of 
UDOTs four regions are headed by a single Director who oversees all 
transportation related matters for that particular region. As the Director of 
Region One, Mr. LeFevre reported directly to UDOT Deputy Director, Clint 
Topham. 
(c) Stan Nielsen was the UDOT Construction Engineer who oversaw 
all road construction projects in Region One. Mr. Nielsen reported to Region 
One Director, Dyke LeFevre, as to the status of these Region One projects. 
(d) Kent Nichols was the UDOT Project Engineer who was assigned 
directly to the Layton-Clearfield Project, and who was specifically 
responsible for monitoring the completion of the project and dealing directly 
with Granite. 
(Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, fflj 3-4, 8; a UDOT Organizational Chart is attached as Exhibit 
2; a map of the state of Utah showing UDOTs different regions is attached as Exhibit 3). 
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5. The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers in 
the proposed traffic control plan was made by Dyke LeFevre in consultation with Clint 
Topham. Several key factors were weighed as part of this decision, including the 
following: 
(a) The safety of project workers and the motoring public; 
(llll:: •) The costs associated with using barrels versi is concrete barriers; 
and 
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overall time to complete the project. 
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As part of UDOTs decision making process, Dyke LeFevre consulted with 
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weighed in favor of using barrels rather than concrete barriers. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, 
T Ii-
On or about September 26, 1995, U DOT awarded the contract on the Layton-
Clearfield Project to Granite, on ie ol ' sever al i oad coi isti i jctic -\ i contractors « .... . n i 
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the project. (A copy of relevant portions of the UDOT/Granite Contract for the Layton-
Clearfield Project is attached hereto as Exhibit 4). 
8. The formal contract between UDOT and Granite for the Layton-Clearfield 
Project identified Granite as the "Contractor," and stated that "the Contractor agrees to 
furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all materials not specifically 
mentioned as being furnished by [UDOT] and to do and perform all work in the 
construction of [the Layton-Clearfield Project] for the approximate sum of [$4,998,249.00]." 
(See Exhibit 4) 
9. Incorporated as part of the formal contract between UDOT and Granite were 
various attachments, one of which contained the following provision: 
107.6 Barriers, Barricades and Warning Signs: The 
CONTRACTOR shall provide, erect, and maintain barriers, 
barricades, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control 
devices, and shall protect the work and safety of the public. 
Highway sections closed to traffic shall be protected by 
barriers and barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated 
during darkness. Warning signs shall be provided to control 
and direct traffic. 
The CONTRACTOR shall erect warning signs at locations 
where operations may interfere with the use of the road by 
traffic, and at all intermediate points where the new work 
crosses or coincides with an existing road. Warning signs 
shall be constructed and erected in accordance with the traffic 
control plan. Signs, barriers, barricades, lights, or other 
protective devices shall not be dismantled or removed without 
permission of the ENGINEER. 
All barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary 
signals and other protective devices shall meet the Manual on 
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Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways and 
Traffic Control provisions of this specification. 
(See Exhibit 4) 
10. Granite's construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project commenced in 
approximately March of 1996. (Rick Parkin Deposition at p. 13, relevant pages attached 
hereto as Exhibit 5) 
11. On or about February 21, 1996, prior to the commencement of the 
construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project, a pre-construction meeting was held 
between representatives of UDOT and Granite to discuss work on the project. During that 
meeting, representatives of Granite raised the possibility of using concrete barriers in lieu 
of barrels in order to channel traffic through the construction site and to protect both 
motorists and construction workers. (Preconstruction Conference Agenda, attached as 
Exhibit 6; Ray Vlaovich Deposition at p. 35, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 7; 
Chuck Lindsay Deposition at pp. 10-11, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 8; Kent 
Nichols Deposition at p. 10, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 9) 
12. At or about the time of the pre-construction meeting, Chuck Lindsay and 
Grant Fowkes, on behalf of Granite, expressed concerns about appropriate traffic control. 
Granite's representatives inquired as to whether they could use pre-cast concrete barriers, 
rather than plastic barrels, to separate the construction area from the motoring public. 
Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project Engineer, requested that Granite's representatives 
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prepare and submit a written proposal regarding the use of concrete barriers. 
(Preconstruction Conference Agenda at p. 8; Chuck Lindsay Depo. at pp. 10-11) 
13. On or about March 20, 1996, Chuck Lindsay, acting on behalf of Granite, 
wrote a letter to Kent Nichols proposing the use of pre-cast concrete barriers to "channel 
traffic and protect our workers, UDOT employees overseeing the project, and the traveling 
public." Mr. Lindsay's letter noted that "traffic would be very close to [Granite's employees' 
work] and they would be virtually unprotected without the concrete barrier." Mr. Lindsay's 
letter indicated that the proposed use of concrete barriers would allow the construction to 
proceed at a faster pace, thereby resulting in an estimated net savings of approximately 
56 days of construction time. The net additional costs associated with the use of concrete 
barriers were estimated by Granite to be approximately $540,475.00. (3/20/96 Letter 
attached hereto as Exhibit 10) 
14. After receiving Granite's 3/20/96 written proposal, Kent Nichols wrote a 
memorandum dated March 21,1996 to UDOT Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, P.E., 
and included with the memorandum a copy of Granite's proposal. Mr. Nichols' 
memorandum stated that he shared in Granite's concerns regarding the safety of this 
project, and requested that Granite's proposal "be given serious consideration." (3/21/96 
Memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit 11) 
15. On or about March 26,1996, a meeting was held between Granite and UDOT 
representatives at UDOT's Region One office. During that meeting, Granite proposed a 
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new traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project, again requesting the use of pre-
cast concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels. The details of Granite's proposal were 
formalized in a letter dated March 29, 1996 from Chuck Lindsay to Kent Nichols. Mr. 
Lindsay's 3/29/96 letter requested that consideration be given for the new traffic control 
plan for "the safety of our workers, UDOT employees, and the traveling public." Mr. 
Lindsay's written proposal estimated that the net additional cost for the proposed changes 
would be approximately $767,885. Granite's 3/29/96 proposal also stated that the 
proposed changes would result in the project being completed 28 days earlier than 
required under the original contract. (3/29/96 Letter attached hereto as Exhibit 12) 
16. Kent Nichols received Granite's 3/29/96 proposal, and reviewed the proposal 
with UDOT's Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. In a letter dated April 2, 1996, Kent 
Nichols responded to Granite's proposal, stating that Dyke LeFevre had considered 
Granite's cost breakdown and that Mr. LeFevre felt that "as [the proposal] stands he does 
not feel that we could get approval." Mr. Nichols indicated that justification for the traffic 
control plan could be made only if the additional costs for the proposal were below 
$450,000 and would result in at least a 50 day reduction in the overall time needed to 
complete the entire construction project. Mr. Nichols indicated that UDOT was "not closing 
the door on this proposal" and requested that Granite review certain items in an attempt 
to lower the price of the proposed traffic control plan changes and to determine whether 
the project could be hastened because of the proposed changes. Mr. Nichols 
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acknowledged that the proposed change to the traffic control plan "has merit" and 
indicated that he would "present a request for additional money to the Commission" if 
certain criteria were met. (4/2/96 Letter attached hereto as Exhibit 13) 
17. In a letter dated April 11,1996, Granite responded to UDOT's 4/2/96 letter, 
stating that "in our judgment we cannot meet the criteria established by UDOT to justify a 
change in the traffic control plan." Granite's letter indicated that with UDOT providing 
certain equipment, the cost of the proposed traffic control plan changes could be lowered 
to approximately $490,000, but that Granite could not promise any additional time savings 
beyond 28 days. Granite's 4/11/96 letter concluded by stating that Granite "will proceed 
with the original traffic control plan established by UDOT." (4/11/96 Letter attached hereto 
as Exhibit 14) 
18. On or about July 2, 1996, after work had commenced on the Layton-
Clearfield Project, Chuck Lindsay once again wrote a letter on behalf of Granite to Kent 
Nichols at UDOT asking for approval of the proposal to use pre-cast concrete barriers on 
the Layton-Clearfield Project. (7/2/96 Letter attached hereto as Exhibit 15) 
19. On July 2,1996, after receiving Chuck Lindsay's 7/2/96 letter, Kent Nichols 
forwarded a memorandum to his superiors, Stan Nielsen, P.E., Region One Construction 
Engineer, and Dyke LeFevre, P.E., Region One Director. This memorandum, which was 
also copied to Clint Topham, P.E., UDOT Deputy Director, voiced concerns about "serious 
problems with control of traffic and providing safety for our contractor's workers as well as 
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our own personnel." Mr. Nichols requested that his superiors review and give "serious 
consideration" to pre-cast concrete barriers and traffic cross-overs in order to maintain 
safety. (7/2/96 Memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit 16) 
20. Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the use of 
pre-cast concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT management 
personnel, including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and rejected the 
proposal based upon the same cost-benefit considerations that motivated the prior 
decisions to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, 
H1J17-18) 
21. Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract for the Layton-Clearfield 
Project, Granite was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired 
in order to carry out the joint repair and slab replacement in the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
(Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 11, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 17) 
22. Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, UDOT allowed the 
contractor to select the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control plan 
would be implemented and enforced. (Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 14) 
23. Granite's own personnel have acknowledged that, pursuant to the terms of 
the UDOT/Granite contract, Granite could have provided pre-cast concrete barriers for the 
Layton-Clearfield Project at its own cost, but chose not to do so. (Chuck Lindsay 
Deposition at pp. 11-12; Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, U 19) 
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24. Granite's 3/20/96,3/29/96, and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised concerns 
over the speed limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that the speed limit 
be reduced from 65 m.p.h. to 55 m.p.h. throughout the construction zone. (See Exhibits 
10, 12, 15) 
25. While the posted speed limit in the construction zone at the time of the 
September 14,1996 accident was 65 m.p.h., temporary orange advisory speed limit signs 
had also been posted throughout the construction zone with an advisory speed limit of 50 
m.p.h. The Utah Highway Patrol officer who investigated the accident stated in his 
accident report and again during his deposition that these 50 m.p.h. advisory speed limit 
signs were posted throughout the Layton-Clearfield Project at the time of the accident. 
(Greg Lundell Deposition at pp. 38-39, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 18. A 
copy of the police report showing the posted speed limits and advisory speed limits at the 
time of the accident is attached hereto as Exhibit 19) 
26. On or about September 14,1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident within the confines of the Layton-Clearfield Project when his car left the traveled 
portion of the highway and entered into the construction zone where it collided with one 
or more holes created as part of the ongoing slab replacements. (Amended Complaint fflf 
9-11) 
27. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly 
sustained in the 9/14/96 accident, and alleges that UDOT and Granite "were negligent in 
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one or more of the following particulars:" 
(a) "The defendants failed to adequately warn of the condition of the 
roadway." 
(b) "The defendants failed to properly control freeway traffic in the area." 
(c) "The defendants failed to adequately barricade and/or provide a safe 
lane of travel to the [plaintiff] and other motorists." 
(d) "The defendants failed to properly train, supervise, or otherwise 
control their particular agents, servants, or employees in aspects of 
traffic safety and construction zone traffic control." 
(e) "The defendants failed to comply with applicable regulations 
concerning traffic control and construction zone safety for the type of 
construction occurring in the area." 
(f) "The defendants specifically failed to use jersey barriers, flaggers, or 
other appropriate warning devices, failed to provide a safe zone 
between the lane of travel and the construction area, and failed to 
adequately illuminate the dangerous condition." 
(Amended Complaint, fl 12) 
28. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint also alleges that Granite was acting as "the 
agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT and therefore, the negligence of Granite would be 
imputable to UDOT. (Amended Complaint, ffl| 3, 13) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT SHOULD ALL BE DISMISSED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The allegations of plaintiffs Amended Complaint against UDOT can be grouped into 
the following three categories: 
1. UDOT was negligent in designing a proposed traffic control plan 
which used plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers to separate the 
motoring public from the construction zone; 
2. UDOT negligently failed to implement and follow the proposed 
traffic control plan as it was designed, and failed to properly inspect or 
monitor the construction zone during the ongoing construction to ensure that 
the highway remained safe for the motoring public; and 
3. Plaintiff alleges that Granite was acting as an agent of UDOT, and 
therefore, UDOT would be liable for any negligence attributed to Granite. 
As will be shown below, each of these claims must fail as a matter of law. 
A. UDOTs Design of the Traffic Control Plan Was a Discretionary 
Function Subject to Protection under the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
Regardless of whether or not plaintiff is correct in alleging that UDOT was somehow 
negligent in designing the proposed traffic control plan or authorizing the use of barrels 
rather than concrete barriers as the principal means of traffic channelization on the Layton-
Clearfield Project, any claims against UDOT based on those allegations must be dismissed 
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under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides that, "[e]xcept as may otherwise be 
provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function " Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-3 (1997) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three part test 
that is used to determine whether this grant of governmental immunity is applicable to a 
specific situation, stating: 
To determine whether a governmental entity is immune 
from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(the Act), three questions must be answered: (1) Was 
the activity undertaken by the entity a governmental 
function and therefore immunized from suit under the 
general grant of immunity contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-3? (2) If the activity undertaken was a 
governmental function, has another section of the Act 
waived the blanket immunity? (3) If immunity has been 
waived, does the Act contain an exception to that 
waiver resulting in a retention of immunity against the 
claim asserted? 
Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Utah 1995). 
In the present case, the claims against UDOT arise out of UDOTs involvement in 
a highway construction project. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "the 
construction and maintenance of state highways can only be performed by governmental 
agencies." Id. at 620. Therefore, there can be no question that any UDOT activity 
associated with the Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed a "governmental function" 
which falls under the general grant of immunity offered by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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The next step is to determine whether some part of the Governmental Immunity Act 
operates as a waiver to UDOTs general grant of immunity. UDOT acknowledges that 
such a waiver likely exists in Section 63-30-8 of the Governmental Immunity Act which 
states: 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 
Since this case involves a claim for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a 
"defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of [a] highway," it would appear that Section 63-
30-8 operates as a waiver of UDOTs claim of immunity. 
Because UDOTs immunity appears to have been waived by Section 63-30-8, the 
Court must next determine whether any of the "exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-
30-10" are applicable to the facts of this case. UDOT contends that the "discretionary 
function" exception, set forth in Section 63-30-10(1), would be applicable to any claims 
arising out of UDOTs design of the proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield 
Project, including the decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers to 
channel traffic. If the discretionary function exception is applicable, the Court must 
conclude that UDOT is immune from liability for any claims alleging negligence in the 
design of the proposed traffic control plan. 
The discretionary function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act states as 
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follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except 
if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused] 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added). 
Keegan is particularly relevant to the present case because that case also involved 
claims against UDOT, and the Utah Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment 
should have been granted in favor of UDOTbecause certain UDOT decisions regarding 
a highway construction project were immune from liability under the discretionary function 
exception. 896 P.2d at 625-26. In Keegan, a motorist was killed when his car climbed a 
concrete median barrier and collided with a bridge support pillar. Id. at 619. The victim's 
estate brought a wrongful death action against UDOT, arguing that the state negligently 
failed to maintain the concrete barrier in a reasonably safe manner, and alleging that, 
although the barrier had originally been constructed in accordance with the prevailing 
safety standards, two subsequent surface overlay projects had shortened the barrier's 
height, rendering it unsafe. Id. UDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
decision to not raise the barrier during resurfacing was a discretionary act that should be 
shielded from liability under the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. The trial court denied 
UDOT's motion and a jury verdict was ultimately entered against UDOT. 
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the discretionary function exception 
and concluded that UDOTs actions should have been deemed immune from suit as a 
matter of law. Id. at 623-26. The Court began its analysis by looking at the reasoning 
behind the discretionary function exception, stating: 
Discretionary function immunity under section 63-30-10 is 
designed to "shield those governmental acts and decisions 
impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforseen 
ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual 
threat of which would make public administration all but 
impossible." In keeping with this purpose, this court has 
distinguished between discretionary and nondiscretionary 
decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question 
involves the formulation of policy or the execution of already-
formulated policies. This court has held that the discretionary 
function exception "should be confined to those decisions and 
acts occurring at the 'basic policy-making level,1 and not 
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the 
operational level . . . 'which concern routine, everyday 
matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors.'" The 
reason for such a rule is plain, given the purpose of the 
discretionary function exception: "Where the responsibility for 
basic policy decisions has been committed to one of the 
branches of our tri-partite system of government, the courts 
have refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety of those 
decisions." 
Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).1 
In order to clarify and create some consistency in the application of the 
1
 The Court noted that, in other cases, it had found the discretionary function exception 
applicable to "decisions concerning placement of railroad warning signs" and "the design of a city flood 
control system." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (citing Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 219, 
469 P.2d 5, 6 (1970); Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992); Rocky Mountain Thrift 
v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989). 
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discretionary function exception, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the following four-
part test "to determine whether a given decision or act qualifies for a discretionary function 
exception": 
1. "Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily 
involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective?" 
2. "Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the 
realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as 
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective?" 
3. "Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental 
agency involved?" 
4. "Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the 
challenged act, omission, or decision?" 
Id. at 624. 
When this four-part test was applied to the facts in Keegan, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that the decision to not raise the concrete barrier fell within the scope of 
the discretionary function exception. Id. First, the "decision involved a basic governmental 
objective: to wit, public safety on the roads." Id. Second, "the decision was essential to 
the realization of that policy; it involved a determination of not only the degree of safety 
that would be provided by various options considered, but also what degree of safety 
would be an appropriate goal given time and cost constraints."2 Id. Third, "the decision 
2
 The Court noted that, prior to submitting the design plans to the Federal Highway 
Administration for approval, a safety study was performed and the project design engineer prepared a 
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involved the basic policy judgment and expertise of the agency involved," noting that 
"studies of the plan, its cost, and the degree of safety it would provide were carried out by 
senior engineers and circulated throughout and debated within the department." Id. 
Finally, the Court concluded that UDOT had the authority to make this decision since the 
legislature has provided UDOT with "general responsibility for statewide highway... and 
transportation planning, research and design, construction, maintenance, security and 
safety." Id. {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-49-4(1)). 
Based on its application of that four-part test to the facts at issue in Keegan, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that, "[i]n essence, UDOTs decision involved just the sort 
of policy-driven weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function 
exception was meant to protect" Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (emphasis added). The 
Court went on to state that: 
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominantly 
fiscal matters. Every highway could probably be made safer 
by further expenditures, but we will not hold UDOT (and 
implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a 
difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the 
burden of funding improvements. 
Id. The Court concluded by stating: 
UDOTs decision not to raise the concrete barrier during the 
surface overlay projects was not an operational decision 
involving the negligent installation or maintenance of a traffic 
device, but rather involved a policy-based plan, approved by 
cost-benefits report that looked at the safety factors, the cost of removing and replacing the barrier, and 
the added delays and inconvenience to highway users that would be created by replacing the barrier. 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. 
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the [Federal Highway Administration], which resulted from a 
considered weighing of the costs and benefits of certain safety 
and construction policies and which involved the exercise of 
UDOT's judgment and discretion. Accordingly, we hold that 
the decision not to raise the concrete barrier was a 
discretionary act shielded from liability under section 63-30-10. 
Id. at 626. Based on that conclusion, the trial court's denial of UDOTs motion for summary 
judgment was reversed. Id. 
UDOT contends that the facts and ruling in Keegan should be controlling in the 
present case. Plaintiff, however, may argue that Truiillo v. UDOT. 986 P.2d 752 (Utah 
App. 1999), is applicable to this case. Although the facts at issue in Truiillo are arguably 
similar to both Keegan and the present case, the evidence presented to the court in Trujillo 
makes that case easily distinguishable from Keegan and the present case. 
Truiillo involved a construction project where a divided highway which usually had 
four lanes of traffic - two eastbound lanes and two westbound lanes - had been shut 
down on the eastbound side for resurfacing work. 986 P.2d at 755. To accommodate the 
traffic traveling in both directions, those vehicles traveling eastbound were channeled onto 
the westbound side of the highway which was temporarily used to provide one lane of 
traffic moving in each direction. Id. The eastbound traffic was separated from the 
westbound traffic by temporary double yellow lines painted on the road, and the placement 
of plastic construction barrels spaced at 100-foot intervals. Id. The plaintiffs in Trujillo 
were injured when a westbound vehicle veered into the eastbound traffic and collided head 
on with the plaintiffs' motor home. Id. The plaintiffs brought claims against UDOT and the 
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contractor alleging that they were "negligent in the design, supervision, and 
implementation of the traffic control plan," and specifically that they "negligently failed to 
install concrete barriers to prevent crossover accidents in the area where the Trujillo's 
accident took place." Id. at 756. The claims against UDOT were dismissed by the trial 
court on a motion for summary judgment which argued that UDOT was shielded from 
liability by the discretionary function exception. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals followed the same analysis which had been 
used by the Utah Supreme Court in Keegan, and came to the conclusion that UDOT had 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that its allegedly 
negligent acts and decisions qualified as discretionary functions. The evidence before the 
court established that the "[p]lans for the entire .. . project were drafted, formulated, and 
approved in a series of meetings and reviews over the course of approximately one year," 
and that the participants included "Federal Highway Administration representatives; UDOT 
maintenance, engineering, design, and administrative personnel; and several city and 
county officials." Id. at 756. The court also noted, however, that "the record contains no 
evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically singled out for discussion, 
review, or approval at any point in the approval process." Id. Based on this lack of 
evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that UDOT had failed to meet its burden 
of proving, as a matter of law, that its formulation of the traffic control plan at issue in 
Trupillo fell within the scope of the discretionary function exception, and therefore, the grant 
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of summary judgment was reversed. Id. at 761 -63. 
UDOT contends that the facts surrounding this case fall squarely within the Utah 
Supreme Court's holding in Keegan, and that Truiillo is easily distinguishable. It is 
important to note that the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Trujillo made no attempt to 
limit, restrict, or modify the rule of law followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Keegan. 
Instead, the analysis applied in Truiillo was the very same analysis that was applied in 
Keegan. The only reason the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that summary judgment 
was not appropriate in Trujillo was because UDOT had failed to present sufficient evidence 
to the trial court to establish that its decisions surrounding the traffic control plan were 
made at the policy making level, and therefore, within the scope of the discretionary 
function exception. In the present case, however, there is an overwhelming amount of 
undisputed evidence establishing that UDOT's decisions concerning the traffic control plan 
on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the decision to use plastic barrels rather than 
concrete barriers, were singled out, separately analyzed, and made at the highest level, 
and that those decisions, like the decisions in Keegan, were precisely the types of "policy-
driven" decisions that are shielded under the discretionary function exception of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Prior to pursuing bids on the Layton-Clearfield Project, UDOT researched traffic 
control alternatives, including consulting with the Federal Highway Administration, before 
preparing a proposed traffic control plan which included the use of plastic barrels as the 
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primary channeling device. While that proposed traffic control plan was initially prepared 
by UDOTs traffic engineers, the decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete 
barriers was ultimately considered and made by UDOTs upper management. Specifically, 
that decision was initially made by UDOTs Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. As the 
Region One Director, Mr. LeFevre was the individual who oversaw all traffic related 
matters for the entire northern portion of the state. When considering whether to use 
plastic barrels or concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, Mr. LeFevre weighed 
several key factors, including: (1) the safety of project workers and the motoring public; (2) 
the costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and (3) the overall impact 
on traffic congestion that would result from increasing or decreasing the project completion 
time. As part of Mr. LeFevre's decision-making process, he consulted with UDOT Deputy 
Director, Clint Topham, the chief traffic engineer for Utah who had the final say on all 
transportation related engineering decisions. Mr. LeFevre also consulted with officials 
from the Federal Highway Administration about the use of plastic barrels rather than 
concrete barriers on similar projects in other states. Based on those consultations, and 
after considering all of the safety, cost, and time factors, Mr. LeFevre decided that barrels, 
rather than concrete barriers, should be included in the proposed traffic control plan for the 
Layton-Clearfield Project. 
After the contract for the project was awarded to Granite, the barrel versus barrier 
issue resurfaced when Granite requested on several occasions that the contract be 
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modified to include the use of concrete barriers to separate traffic from the construction 
zone. In at least two different meetings, and in at least three different letters, Granite's 
representatives specifically asked UDOT to authorize the use of concrete barriers rather 
than plastic barrels for greater project safety. Granite presented UDOT with different 
proposals as to the estimated additional costs and time savings associated with the use 
of concrete barriers. It is important to note that Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project Engineer 
overseeing the Layton-Clearfield Project, agreed with Granite's safety concerns, and 
recommended that UDOT approve the use of concrete barriers. The decision, however, 
was not Mr. Nichols' to make at the operational level of the project; rather, the decision 
was for UDOTs policymakers to make. 
Each of Granite's requests concerning the use of concrete barriers were forwarded 
to Dyke LeFevre and other members of UDOT's upper management for consideration. On 
each occasion, Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management considered and weighed 
the safety considerations against the cost and time factors. In the end, Mr. LeFeFevre 
concluded that the safety and time factors did not outweigh the additional costs associated 
with using concrete barriers, and therefore, Granite's proposals were rejected.3 
The undisputed facts surrounding UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather 
than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly establish that those 
3
 It is Important to note that UDOT never prohibited Granite from using concrete barriers rather 
than plastic barrels. UDOT's decisions were simply that UDOT would not modify the contract to pay the 
additional costs associated with using the concrete barriers. Granite's representatives acknowledge that 
Granite could have used concrete barriers throughout the project if Granite wanted to absorb the 
additional costs. 
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decisions were policy-driven decisions made by UDOTs upper management. Had those 
decisions been made at the "operational level" by the UDOT personnel who were 
physically involved with the project on a daily basis, the evidence suggests that UDOT 
would have accepted Granite's proposal to use concrete barriers. That was not the case, 
however. Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management, after duly considering the 
competing safety, cost, and time factors involved, rejected Granite's proposals and the 
recommendations of UDOTs own project engineer. There can be no question that these 
decisions were policy-driven, and not operational. Therefore, this case falls squarely 
within the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Keegan, and this Court should rule, as a matter 
of law, that UDOTs decisions surrounding the proposed traffic control plan, including the 
decision to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers, are shielded from liability under 
the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
B. UDOT Was Not Responsible for Implementing the Proposed Traffic 
Control Plan, and Is Immune from Liability for Any Failure to Monitor 
Granite's Work. 
Plaintiff has also alleged that UDOT was negligent in failing to properly implement 
the proposed traffic control plan, and in failing to properly inspect or monitor Granite's 
implementation of the traffic control plan. These arguments should likewise fail, as a 
matter of law, for several reasons. 
First, UDOT was not responsible for implementing or monitoring the traffic control 
plan. The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly states that Granite was the 
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party responsible for furnishing all the labor and equipment necessary to "perform all work" 
on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the implementation of the traffic control plan 
throughout the project. The contract expressly states that Granite "shall provide, erect, 
and maintain barriers, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and shall 
protect the work and safety of the public."4 Thus, any claims arising out of the alleged 
failure to properly implement the proposed traffic control plan could only be brought 
against Granite. There is no basis for imposing any duty or liability on UDOT in regards 
to the manner in which the traffic control plan was actually implemented on the Layton-
Clearfield Project. 
In light of this plain contract language, plaintiff also contends that UDOT had a duty 
to inspect or monitor Granite's work. Even if that were true, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act would again shield UDOT from any liability. That statute contains an 
exception which states that a governmental entity cannot be held liable for "a failure to 
make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection" Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1997) (emphasis added). 
UDOT contends that any claim that UDOT failed to monitor or supervise Granite's 
work on the Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed to be an allegation that UDOT 
either "fail[ed] to make an inspection" or made an "inadequate or negligent inspection" of 
4
 The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project also requires that Granite was to see that "[a]ll 
barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and other protective devices shall meet the 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices [MUTCD] for Streets and Highways and Traffic Control 
provisions of this specification." 
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Granite's work and therefore, would fall within the scope of the Section 63-30-10(4) 
exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. In those cases where the Utah appellate 
courts have analyzed this "negligent inspection" exception, it has been made clear that this 
exception is designed to shield governmental entities who are involved with inspecting the 
property and work of third parties for purposes of ensuring public safety. See e.g., llott v. 
Univ. of Utah, 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2000); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 898 P.2d 265 
(Utah 1995); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp, 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). That is precisely 
what plaintiff is alleging that UDOT failed to do in the present case. 
Plaintiff claims that UDOT should be held liable because it allegedly failed to 
monitor Granite's work or inspect the Layton-Clearfield Project for purposes of ensuring 
that the work on the project did not endanger the public. Such a claim falls squarely within 
the scope of the "negligent inspection"exception, and therefore, plaintiffs claims against 
UDOT based on those allegations must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
C. UDOT Cannot Be Held Liable for Any Negligence Attributable to Granite 
or Granite's Employees. 
Plaintiffs final basis for attempting to impose liability on UDOT is a claim that 
Granite was acting as "the agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT, and that the negligence 
of Granite, if any, should be imputed to UDOT. There is absolutely no evidence, however, 
to suggest that Granite was an "agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT. The undisputed 
facts of this case show that Granite was nothing more than an independent contractor 
hired by UDOT to do the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
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The Utah appellate courts have long recognized that "Utah adheres to the general 
common law rule that 'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for 
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his 
servants"' Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added) {quoting 
Gleason v. Salt Lake City. 74 P.2d 1225,1232 (Utah 1937)). Since there is no evidence 
to suggest that Granite was anything more than an independent contractor on the Layton-
Clearfield Project, and since Utah law protects UDOT from being held liable for physical 
harm caused by the acts or omissions of a contractor, this Court should rule, as a matter 
of law, that UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence.5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant UDOT respectfully asks this Court to grant 
its Motion for Summary Judgment by dismissing the claims against UDOT with prejudice 
and as a matter of law. 
DATED this \(g day of October, 2002. 
STRONG & HANNI 
^^- -^ tephenl j . Trayner 
H^ScotfJacobson 
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT 
It should also be noted that, if Granite were somehow deemed to be an agent or employee of 
UDOT for purposes of this case, then the Utah Governmental Immunity Act would also apply to any 
claims or allegations against Granite. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Ik day of October, 2002, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT UDOT's MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Erik M. Ward, Esq. 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
4495.008 
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Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
H. Scott Jacobson, #8469 
STRONG & HANN1 
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT 
Nine Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH, 
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, 
JOHN DOES l-V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DYKE LEFEVRE 
Civil No.: 970700411 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
'SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, DYKE LEFEVRE, being first duly sworn, do state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of all the information set forth in this affidavit. 
2. Prior to retiring in 2000, I worked for approximately 39 years in various 
positions at the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDO"T). 
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3. For management purposes, UDOT has divided the entire state of Utah into 
four geographical regions. Each of these Regions are headed by a single "Director" who 
is responsible for overseeing all transportation related matters for that particular Region. 
(A map of Utah showing these different regions is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit 1). 
4. From 1989 to 1990, and again from 1995 until retirement in 2000, I was the 
Director of UDOTs Region One, which included the northern-most part of the state, 
starting in Farmington. As the Region One Director, I was personally in charge of all 
transportation related matters for that geographical region. 
5. During my tenure as Region One Director, it was decided that certain joint 
repair and slab replacement work needed to be done on portions of Interstate 15 running 
through Region One in the Layton/Clearfield area. This particular project was identified by 
UDOT as Project No. IM-15-7(191)332 (hereinafter the "Layton-Clearfield Project"). 
6. At some point prior to September 26,1995, the Layton-Clearfield Project was 
let out for bid, and the contract for the project was later awarded to Granite Construction. 
7. UDOTs initial bid specifications that were given to prospective contractors 
for the Layton-Clearfield Project included a proposed traffic control plan which called for 
the use of plastic barrels as the primary channeling devices to separate the motoring public 
from the construction zone throughout most of the Layton-Clearfield project. 
8. Throughout the various phases of the Layton-Clearfield Project, several levels 
of UDOT personnel were involved in the decisions, design, supervision, and actual 
completion of the work, including the following individuals: 
-2-
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(A) Clint Topham was involved as UDOT'S Deputy Director. As the 
Deputy Director, Mr. Topham was the chief engineer for the entire 
state of Utah, and had the final say on all transportation related 
engineering decisions. Mr. Topham was the immediate supervisor to 
each of the Region Directors, including myself, at the time of the 
planning, development, and completion stages of the Layton-
Clearfield Project. The only official above Mr. Topham in the UDOT 
hierarchy was the UDOT Executive Director, who reported directly to 
the Governor of the state of Utah. 
(B) Stan Nielsen was the UDOT Construction Engineerwho oversaw all 
road construction projects in Region One. Mr. Nielsen reported 
directly to me as to the status of all Region One construction projects, 
including the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
(C) Kent Nichols was the UDOT Project Engineer who was assigned 
directly to the Layton-Clearfield Project, and who was specifically 
responsible for monitoring the completion of the project. Mr Nichols1 
responsibilities included supervising other UDOT engineers and 
inspectors who were involved with the Layton-Clearfield Project on a 
daily basis, and coordinating the project with Granite Construction, the 
general contractor who was ultimately selected to complete the 
Layton-Clearfield project. 
•> 
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(An organizational chart showing the UDOT hierarchy from the Executive Director down 
to the Region Directors is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit 2.) 
9. In addition to the above-identified individuals, the Region One safety and 
design engineers worked together with officials of the Federal Highway Administration 
(uFHAn) to develop a proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
10. While the basic design of UDOTs proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-
Clearfield Project was a standard plan that was used on nearly all highway construction 
projects, the decision to use plastic construction barrels rather than concrete barriers as 
the primary means of traffic channelization throughout the project was something which 
underwent substantial scrutiny, and was ultimately decided by UDOTs upper management 
and FHA officials. 
11. All facets of the proposed traffic control plan, including the use of plastic 
barrels rather than concrete barriers, were reviewed and ultimately approved by the FHA. 
12. Prior to the Layton-Clearfield Project, I had discussions with FHA officials 
concerning the use of plastic barrels for channelization on similar jobs in other states, and 
these discussions led me to believe that the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield 
Project would be an appropriate means of channeling traffic in a manner that was safe for 
both the motoring public and the construction zone workers. 
13. The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers in 
the proposed traffic control for the Layton-Clearfield project was made by me after 
consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham. 
-4~ 
14. Several factors were considered in my decision to use plastic barrels rather 
than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the following key factors: 
(A) The safety of project workers and the motoring public throughout the 
construction zone; 
(B) The financial costs associated with using plastic barrels versus 
concrete barriers; and 
(C) The impact on the public and traffic congestion by increasing or 
decreasing the overall time to complete the project. 
15. My duties as the Region One Director required me to balance the safety 
factors, cost factors, and other factors on every project, including the Layton-Clearfield 
Project, in order to ensure that the projects were completed as safely as possible and as 
fast as possible, and to ensure that all of this was accomplished with the limited funds 
available. 
16. After considering each of the above-stated factors, and after consulting with 
Clint Topham and FHA officials, I concluded that plastic barrels were the most appropriate 
option for the Layton-Clearfield project. 
17. After the contract for the Layton-Clearfield project was awarded to Granite 
Construction, several requests were made by Granite Construction for additional funding 
from UDOTfor the purpose of using concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels to channel 
traffic throughout the construction zone. Granite Construction's requests included written 
proposals that were forwarded to me, and which outlined the additional financial costs and 
-5-
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time savings that would be associated with the use of concrete barriers. 
18. In response to Granite Construction's subsequent proposals regarding the 
use of concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, I considered the same safety, 
cost and time factors that had been considered previously, and ultimately I concluded that 
the safety and time considerations could not justify the additional financial costs that UDOT 
would be forced to incur if it accepted Granite's proposals. As a result, Granite 
Construction's proposals were rejected. 
19, Although UDOT rejected Granite Construction's requests for additional 
funding for concrete barriers, there was nothing in UDOT's contract with Granite 
Construction which prevented Granite Construction from using concrete barriers at Granite 
Construction's own expense. 
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DATED this / £ day of October, 2002. 
4^r^ 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UJ£B£/^ ) 
On this / ^ day of October, 2002, before me personally appeared Dyke LeFevre, 
known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person who executed the foregoing 
document. 
Notary Public 
PATRICIA A. HOESEL 
NOTAM PUBLIC • STATl of UTAH] 
W WORTH WALL AVEKUC 
O60GN.UT 04112 
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CONTRACT 968243 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and executed in Four (4) original counterparts this
 m day of 
( H ( U M J J ^ A.D. 1995 between the Utah Department of Transportation, hereinafter called "Department," first 
party, and Gibbons and Reed Company hereinafter called "Contractor," second party. 
WITNESSETH, That for and in consideration of payments, hereinafter mentioned, to be made by the Department, the 
Contractor agrees to furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all materials not specifically mentioned as being furnished 
by the Department and to do and perform all work in the construction of Joint Repair and Slab Replacement in Davis County, State 
of Utah, the same being that section of South Layton to SR-193 identified as 1M-15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19 approximately 5.852 
miles in length for the approximate sum of Four Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Nine and 
00/100 Dollars ($4,998,249.00). 
The Contractor further covenants and agrees that all of said work and labor shall be done and performed in the best and most 
workmanlike manner and in strict conformity with the plans, and specifications. The said plans and specifications and the notice to 
contractors, instruction to bidders, the proposal, special provisions and contract bond are hereby made a part of this agreement as 
fully and to the same effect as if the same had been set forth at length herein. 
In consideration of the foregoing premises, the Department agrees to pay to Contractor in the manner and in the amount 
provided in the said specification and proposal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have subscribed their names through their proper officers thereunto duly 
authorized as of the day and year first above written. 
Attest: 
L^hjd. 
PROCESSED BY 
APPROVED 
Director of Finance 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Y'j'L^ Directo/of Transportation - First Party 
Gibbons and Reed Company 
by. ou 
William C Dorey, Senior Vice Pres ident 
Title' 
P |U |g;pM HF FINANCE 22-225800 
Utah Contractor License Number 
FUNDS AVAILABLE 
/0-Z7~<?£ 
Budget Officer Date 
^%\ 
107.4 Federal Aid Participation: When any Federal laws, rules, or regulations are in 
conflict with any provisions of a federally assisted contract, the Federal requirements shall 
prevail, take precedence, and be in force over and against any such conflicting provisions. 
If there is Federal participation in the cost of the Contract work, the work shall be under 
the supervision of the DEPARTMENT but subject to the inspection and approval of the 
proper officials of the United States Government Inspections made by authorized Federal 
representatives shall not make the United States Government a party to the Contract and 
will not interfere with the rights of the contract parties. 
107*5 Public Convenience and Safety: Construction shall be conducted so obstructions 
to traffic are minimized. The safety and convenience of the public and the protection of 
persons and property shall be provided as specified under Subsection 104.6: Maintenance 
of Traffic. The safety provisions of all laws, rules, codes, and regulations applicable to the 
class of work being performed shall be followed. 
107.6 Barriers, Barricades and Warning Signs: The CONTRACTOR shall provide, erect, 
and maintain barriers, barricades, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and 
shall protect the work and safety of the public. Highway sections closed to traffic shall be 
protected by barriers and barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated during darkness. 
Warning signs shall be provided to control and direct traffic. 
The CONTRACTOR shall erect warning signs at locations where operations may interfere 
with the use of the road by traffic, and at all intermediate points where the new work 
crosses or coincides with an existing road. Warning signs shall be constructed and erected 
in accordance with the traffic control plan. Signs, barriers, barricades, lights, or other 
protective devices shall not be dismantled or removed without permission of the 
ENGINEER. 
All barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and other protective devices 
shall meet the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways and 
Traffic Control provisions of this specification. 
107.7 Not Used: 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
CRAIG JOHNSON, a minor by 
and through his guardian 
ad litem, Tonni Carpenter, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS & 
REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO. 970700411 PI 
DEPOSITION OF: 
RICK PARKIN 
Held June 14, 2000 
REPORTED BY: 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
Deposition of RICK PARKIN, taken on behalf of 
the Plaintiff, at 849 West Hillfield Road, Layton, 
Utah, commencing at 9:00 a.m. on June 14, 2000, 
before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah, pursuant to Notice. 
* * * * 
REPORTING SERVICES INC 
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PARKIN, EXAM BY WARD 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
when you 
A 
Q 
A 
going, yo 
slow, and 
Sure . 
The answer? 
Yes. 
Was the full complement of workforce there 
arrived or did the workforce grow over time? 
It grew over time. j 
Do you know why? 
Yes. I mean, when a project just gets 
u got a couple guys getting -- things start 
as you progress into the project and then 
you get into the meat of the project, you know, you 
gear up with - - I think we had forty something people 
at one point. 
Q 
in March? 
A 
believe. 
Q 
completed 
A 
August. 
Q 
Okay. So the project started effectively ; 
It was around the last week of March, I | 
And when did it end? When was it 
? 
We didn't complete until 1997, about 
And do you know how that timetable matches 
the contract timetable? 
A 
calendar 
It was planned to complete in — within one 
year, 19 -- the year 1996. However, due to 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 13 
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PRECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE AGENDA 
FEBRUARY 21. 1996 
9-30 A.M. 
Region One Conference Room 
169 North Wall Avenue 
Ogden. Utah 
PROJECT NO: Project No. IM-15-7C19D332 
PROJECT Name: SOUTH UrrON TO SR-193 JOINT REPAIR & SLAB REPLACEMENT 
CONTRACTOR: GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY 
INTRODUCTIONS OF UDOT PERSONNEL 
Project Engineer: Kent A. Nichols 
Field Engineer: Kevin Griffin 
Chief Inspector: Philip Paskett 
Traffic Control: Philip Paskett 
E.E.O. Officer: Susan Peterson 
Survey: Everett Ovard 
Survey Don Carter 
Sampling & Testing Dennis Berglund 
Office Manager: Jim Cottrell 
Region Constr. Eng.: Stan Nielsen 
Region EEO Officer* Lloyd Hunt 
Civil Rights Office: Charles K. Larson 
Region Design Eng : Bruce Swenson 
UDOT MAILING ADDRESS HAS BEEN CHANGED TO: 
PO BOX 12580 
OGDEN. UTAH 84412 
Phone 399-5921 
PROJECT OFFICE LOCATION: 
3544 Lincoln Place, Suite "E" 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Phone* 621-6162 
FAX: 627-3014 
INTRODUCTION OF CONTRACTORS PERSONNEL 
Grant Fowkes. Project Superintendent 
John Egbert, General Manager 
Chuck Lindsay. Project Engineer 
J. Lynn Walker, Operations Manager 
Ethel Taylor Ogden Office, Shoulder Work/Paving & Roadway Ex. 
Brad Sweet. Ogden Office. Engineer 
Gary Siddoway. Ogden's Operations Manager 
Ray Korth. Ogden*s General Manager 
001310 
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PAGE TWO 
CONTRACTORS HAILING ADDRESS & PHONE NO. 
Gibbons & Reed Company 
1111 Brickyard Road 
P 0 Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
Phone: 486-2411 
FAX: 487-1603 
SUBCONTRACTOR'S 
DONNA CLARK, NORTHEAST TRAFFIC. TRAFFIC CONTROL & FLAGGING 
Phone No's: 774-0292 & 540-1765 
CONTROL OF WORK 
1. The Project is to be completed in 140 WORKING DAYS. Time charges will be 
made on a working day basis. Delays caused by weather will be taken into 
consideration, a percentage will be computed or at least 0.15 will be 
charged. 
2. Project Bid Price is $4.998.249.00. 
3. The contract was awarded on 
4. Contractor received the notice to proceed OCTOBER 26. 1995 
5. Normally time charges begins 10 days from the notice to proceed starting 
but. because of winter weather conditions, time charges will start March 
1. 1996 according the specifications. 
6. The Contractor will begin work when weather permits. 
PARTIAL ESTIMATES 
1. Monthly estimates will close on the Saturday after four week of work 
performed. 
2. Estimates to Contractors with assigned estimate closing dates WILL HAVE 
PRIORITY over any additional estimates. 
3. All estimates will close a minimum of two (2) working days prior to 
estimate preparation by the Project Engineer in order to obtain all the 
necessary information and documentation for pay quantities. 
4. Estimates found to be in error, either by the Project Engineer or the 
Contractor, will be adjusted IN FULL on the next estimate date. 
5. Estimates WILL BE delayed for payment if the Contractor's or any 
Subcontractor's payrolls or Monthly EE0 Reports are not received within 
the prescribed time period. The Estimate WILL NOT be paid until payrolls 
and monthly EE0 Reports are current and ^re found acceptable by the 
Project Engineer. 
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SUBCONTRACTS 
The following provisions will be required on each subcontract submitted: 
1. Five (5) copies of the subcontract properly signed by both parties must be 
submitted to the project engineer before the subcontractor can begin work 
on the project. 
2. Attach UDOT form R-872 to all five copies of each Subcontract 
Agreement. 
3. A copy of both Contractors licenses are to be attached to the agreements. 
4. DBE subcontractors items are not to be completed or performed by the Prime 
or any other subs. UDOT will not pay for the work. 
5. Subcontractors are not to perform any work on the project until the 
subcontract's agreements have been submitted and approved by the Project 
Engineer. 
6. Percentage of work sublet is found by dividing the contract amount into 
the total of the contract unit bid prices, not the prices paid to the 
subcontractors. The total amount of work sublet cannot exceed 502 of the 
contract. 
List of subcontractors are: 
1. A-CORE INC SAWCUTTING 
2. BIDWELL MAINTENANCE CRACKSEAL & RESEALING 
3. EVERLAID GROUTING SLAB JACKING & FLOWABLE FILL 
4. FLASHER BARRICADES TEMP. STRIPE. REMOVAL & PLOWABLE MARKERS 
5. HIKIAU & ASSOCIATES PERM. SIGNS & DELINEATORS 
6. J.O. MCNEIL CONST CO. PRECAST CQNC. BARRIER 
7. MARK RITE LINES OF MONTANA EPOXY PAINT STRIPE 
8. NORTHEAST TRAFFIC CONTROL TRAFFIC CONTROL & DEVICES 
9. PAVEMENT SPECIALIST SURFACE GRINDING 
DISADVANTAGE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (see Appendix A) 
Item (A) Contract Goals, paragraph 2 states the following: 
Project Office received the letter from Gibbons and Reed requesting substitution 
for Pacheco Corp to insert Bidwell Maintenance. Project Office faxed a copy to 
UDOT Civil Rights Office to obtain their opinion. Their response is no 
substitutions only if Pacheco cannot reform, which no work has begun, so it is 
not possible to tell until they begin work on the job. 
Project EEO Officer. Susan Peterson asked the Comractor (Chuck Lindsay) what 
they have decided to do. Chuck stated that they would let it go with Pacheco. 
Percentages for bidding purposes shall be calculated using dollar values and 
quantities as shown in proposals received for this project, and percentages for 
compliance shall be based on final estimate invoice quantities. Overruns or 
underruns individual contract items may required adjustments in predetermined DBE 
percentage for project if those items were not related to DBE performance. 
The contract goals are 12X for DBE participation. 
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The D8E Letter of Commitment is on file with both The Civil Rights Office and the 
Project Engineer's Office. PERCENT IS 11.09. 
The Prime Contractor is not to assist a DBE subcontractor in any way. by lending 
or leasing equipment or employees. The DBE is to lease or rent equipment from 
a bona fide rental company. The DBE is to be independent from any other 
business. Prime Contractor or other subcontractors. 
PAYROLL REQUIREMENTS 
Payrolls are to be received by the project engineer within 7 days following the 
date of payment. The contractor is responsible for the timely submission of any 
and all subcontractor payrolls. 
U.S.D.Q.T. LABOR COMPLIANCE MANUAL 
Payrolls and Records - A certified copy of each weekly payroll must be submitted 
by the prime contractor and each subcontractor within 7 days after the regular 
payment date thereof. Payrolls must be complete. 
Delay in submittal of payrolls will result in delay in processing payment 
estimates. The prime contractor is responsible for the submittal of payrolls by 
subcontractors. 
All basic records pertaining to the payrolls, including time cards, must be 
preserved for a period of 3 years after completion of the contract. 
Subcontracts - (see p.10 of UDOT Labor Compliance Manual). The prime contractor 
is responsible for the subcontractor's adherence to labor compliance regulations. 
The UDOT has no direct contract with the subcontractors and will resolve all 
labor compliance matters with the prime contractor. This can result in the prime 
contractor being responsible for restitution of wages due for the violation of 
one of the subcontractors. Required labor provisions (FHWA 1273) as well as wage 
rates must be physically attached to each subcontract. (This is referred to on 
Form R-872). 
Laborers and mechanics employed by the prime contractor and subcontractors are 
covered by the contract provisions, but employees of material suppliers are not. 
Employees Working in More that One Classification - The contractor must record 
on the payroll those cases where an employee works in more that one 
classification. When an employee works in more that one work classification, 
they must be paid separate wage rates. However, the contractor may pay the 
higher of the two rates if desired. 
OVERTIME - All hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week must be paid at one and 
half time the basic wage rate. The term "basic wage rate" means the straight 
time hourly rate actually being paid Fringe benefits are not paid at one and 
a half times the rate, when an employee works in more that one classification 
for the week and works over 40 hours, his overtime is figured on a "weighted 
average" - unless the employer can prove that he has informed each employee prior 
to the employee going to work, how overtime will be paid, (see sample attached). 
001313 
HM-31 Ql 15:55 FROM:UDOT RL IftNflGEMENT 801-965-4838 T 31 323 2090 PAGE: 09 
Page Five 
The Contractor is to provide the Project Engineer's Office with this 
documentation regarding overtime payment. The employees of the contractor or 
subcontractor must be informed before the project begins in writing how they will 
be paid for the overtime they have worked. 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE OVERTIME - SEE EXAMPLE 
Donna Clark. Northeast Traffic Control had questions regarding the weighted 
average and asked for information to be sent to her. 
If you or any of your subcontractors have any questions regarding payrolls, 
contact Susan Peterson Phone: 621-6162 
This can help you alleviate the expense of submitting Supplemental Payrolls with 
required corrections. 
Be alert to any and all Wage Rate Modifications regarding this contract. It is 
the contractors responsibility to obtain the necessary information of any 
classification not listed in the proposal form the governing union/agency 
involved. This information must be submitted to the project engineer and 
attached to the Certified Payroll when it appears for the first time. 
A copy of Plate No. 24 (attached sheet 5) will help in payroll preparation. 
EEO REQUIREMENTS 
Project EEO Officer is: SUSAN PETERSON Phone: ( 801 ) 621-6162 
The contractor's company EEO Officer is . 
1. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN- Gibbons and Reed Company have ^r\ approved plan on 
file with Civil Rights only one copy is required. Another copy is required 
to be placed on the project bulletin board. Gibbons and Reed submitted 
their plan at the meeting. 
2. INTERVIEWS OF RANDOM WORKERS will be taken at least monthly to determine 
the actual wages paid, the proper classifications, and familiarity of the 
workers with the contractor's EEO policy and officer. If the Contractor 
places the Employees' Fringe Benefits in an approved plan, each employee 
is to have knowledge of the worth of the program. 
U.S.D.O.T. LABOR COMPLIANCE MANUAL p. 30 & 31 
508-5 Interviews of Contractors' and Subcontractors8 Employees: 
Systematic spot interviews are to be conducted by the project engineer 
with the employees of the contractor or subcontractors on the job to 
establish that the minimum wage and other labor standards of the 
contract are being fully complied with and that there is no 
misclassification of labor or disproportionate employment of 
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apprentices, etc. STATEMENTS HADE BY AN EMPLOYEE. WHETHER ORALLY OR 
IN WRITING. MUST BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL SO AS TO AVOID DISCLOSING 
THE EMPLOYEE'S IDENTITY TO HIS EMPLOYER WITHOUT THE EMPLOYEE'S CONSENT. 
COMPLAINTS MUST BE TREATED CONFIDENTIALLY. 
DISSEMINATION OF EEO POLICY-MONTHLY EEO MEETINGS 
The letter EEO-1. was submitted to the Contractor restating the Provisions 
of this contract requiring the contractor to conduct meetings with his 
supervisory and office employees BEFORE THE WORK STARTS ON THE PROJECT, and 
not less than once very six (6) months, at which time your EEO policies and 
their implementation will be reviewed and explained. A copy of the minutes 
MUST be submitted to the project engineer's office within five--(£)-days 
following the meeting. Susan requested that the Contractor notify her of 
the meetings, that she can document them. The subcontractor may attend the 
rime's EEO Meetings or conducted their own. However, the meetings need to 
e consistently held during the duration of the project. 
MONTHLY EEO MEETINGS shall be given on the project site each month. 
a. The contractor shall invite UDOT's project engineer or his 
representative to attend these meetings. 
b. Copies of these minutes shall be submitted to the project engineers 
office which is to have the employees signatures attached to the 
minutes for proof of attendance. 
4. PROJECT BULLETIN BOARD (Letter EEO-2). 
Location of the EEO Bulletin Board will be determined after the project has 
started, they will inform the project office of it's location. The contractor 
was informed that the bulletin board must be accessible 24 hours a day and cannot 
be place inside a trailer. 
The following information must be constantly displayed and accessible on a 
bulletin board at the project site; 
1. Contractor's EEO policy. 
2. Wage Rates (as found in the contract proposal). 
3. WH-Publication 1921. Notice to employees working on federal or 
federally funded construction projects. 
4. Equal Opportunity is the Law (Bi-lingual). 
5. Form PR-809. Wage Rate Information (Bi-lingual). 
6. State of Utah. Utah State and Federal Laws Guaranteed Equal 
Opportunity Employment (Bi-lingual). 
7. Penalty poster, PR-1Q22 
8. Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of company and/or project 
EEO and Safety officers. 
9. Emergency phone numbers (hospital. Doctor. Sheriff. Etc) 
Lloyd Hunt the District EEO Officer will present the Contractor with the above 
mentioned posters. 
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5. MONTHLY EEO REPORT Submittal of the Form PR-1391 see the attached letter 
EEO-3 and the attached forms. Susan requested of the Contractor to close 
out the month on the 25th. that they can be submitted in a timely manner. 
She reminded them they are due in the Civil Rights Office on the 6th of the 
Month. 
6. HARASSMENT. INTIMIDATION AND COERCION A STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT IS TO 
BE SIGNED BY ALL THE CONTRACTOR'S AND SUBCONTRACTOR'S WORKING ON THE 
PROJECT SITE that these situations will not be tolerated. A SAMPLE IS 
ATTACHED. THIS IS TO BE SENT TO THE PROJECT OFFICE TO BE PLACED ON 
FILE. Susan informed the Contractor that the roster would be checked 
against the payroll to make sure all employees have signed this 
statement. 
7. Training - the contract has setup 4.000 hours of training (see letter EED-5) 
wherein we need a letter from the Contractor stating what trades will be 
utilized and how many trainee etc. Mr. Nichols asked the Contractor if he 
has thought about this. The response what yes. and they will be submitting 
a letter. Susan complemented the Contractor on his performance on the 
Antelope Drive project where they exceeded the goal. 
TRUCK HAULING REGULATIONS - LETTER PREVIOUSLY SENT TO THE CONTRACTOR 
This regulation mostly applies to owner-operators, if they are hired to work on 
the job all the information is to be sent to the project office prior to working 
on the project. (Vehicle Registration, Fuel Permits etc.) Susan informed the 
contractor to make sure all truck drivers have registration and legal drivers 
licenses as well. 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION PLAN 
Required are 5 copies. 24 HOUR EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE TO BE INCLUDED 
IN THE SAFETY PLAN. 
SAFETY MEETINGS - WEEKLY 
The contractor shall submit to the project engineer a copy of his weekly safety 
meeting minutes. Said copy shall show the employees signatures of those 
attending. The Contractor was requested to invite the project inspectors (Phil 
Paskett) that they also could document the meetings. 
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TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS 
Any change other than those in the Traffic Control Plan must be approved ahead 
of that phase of construction by the project engineer. 
The contractor Grant Fowkes stated that he had major concerns about controlling 
the traffic especially during the peak hours which really restricts their time 
between Monday thru Friday and the fact that there is nothing between the 
individuals out there doing the work and the live traffic, which makes us awfully 
nervous. Since this job was bid the speed limited has been increased from 55 MPH 
to 65 MPH. so we are wondering about precast concrete barriers? For us to be as 
efficient and productive as possible we are looking at working Saturdays and 
Sundays because we won't be dealing with peak hours traffic. Even with that on 
Saturday and Sunday it will only have one lane open for the motoring public which 
will create major traffic congestion problem. He stated that they will be 
working two shifts, day and night shift. -2 ten hour shifts. Stan Nielsen asked 
if there would be some nighttime operations. Grant answered yes, therefore they 
would like to put of barricades to protect the workers. 
Kent Nichols requested that Grant put this proposal in writing and couple things 
that you have stated the shifts, days working in and the amount of area that you 
plan to be working in at any given time. 
Grant stated that they are planning to propose to close off the full length of 
the project. 
Stan Nielsen made comments about the mobile barrier used down by Lagoon the 
mobile transporter machine if that would be something they could used. 
Grant stated that there is also problems in using barricades: one. is the off 
and on ramps and the other, is when you put traffic over onto the shoulder and 
that lane, then you are restricted to 2 ten foot lane verses 10 to 12 ft lane so 
that also could propose a problem also. 
There was a discussion about the various problems of closing off lanes and 
problems with the bridge decks. They discussed stretching out the project may 
cause problems. Contractor stated that if they closed down the full 6 miles they 
could do the job quicker and more cost effective. 
Kevin Griffin stated the best interest of the public was considered in the design 
they intended that the Contractor as they were starting their full depth test for 
slab replacement would leave that section either barrelled off or barrier 
protected until it has cured its 7 to 8 day strength, then put traffic back on 
it. Then only have the section closed off which is needed for the curing 
purposes for the curing period for that time. That is what was originally in the 
traffic control plans. 
There was more general discussion on the traffic flow problems of bottle necking 
and proposing to work the weekends which -also causes problems with the union 
labor agreements for the contractor. Kent concluded by requesting Grant Fowkes 
to make a formal proposal for the change in traffic control plans for his 
approval. 
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MATERIALS 
UDOT Minimum Sampling And Testing Requirements. 
Concrete mix designs must have a history of breaks attached. 
LIST OF SUPPLIERS: 
Contractor had a problem with bid item no. 60 ASPHALT CEMENT AC20R VISCOSITY 
GRADED ASPHALT, which requires PBA-50 that is not available. Contractor was 
requested to write a letter if is not changed on the plan sheet. Kent will check 
with Charles Mace. Materials Engineer. 
The contractor submitted a list of Suppliers as follows: 
Concrete: unknown 
Asphalt: AC-10 
PBA-50 
SS-1H PHILLIPS 
LIME CONTINENTAL 
AGG. G&R SO OGDEN PLANT 
MISCELLANEOUS CONCRETE PRODUCTS: ? 
ATTENUATORS: INTERWEST SAFETY 
8RIDGE EXPANSION JT: WABO EXPANDEX JOINT EXPANSION SYSTEM 
WATSON BOWMAN ACME 
PIPE CULVERT: AMCOR 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS & PUNS: 
Ray Korth representing Gibbons and Reed ask a question of Kent Nichols about the 
outside shoulders, there is a place in there that restricts having that open to 
3.000' at any one time and are you going to holds us to that. Mr Nichols 
responded that he would have to look at n . because it could be detrimental to 
the whole project and he didn't know what the real reason was for it. Mr Korth 
further explained that all they going to do is take off 3 1/2" of asphalt and of 
couple of inches of gravel and putting asphalt back. It wasn't their intent to 
take out the whole thing and leaving "the whole thing open, they would like to 
work progressively. Mr. Nichols asked Mr. Korth to give him a breakdown on what 
they would like to do and he take a look at it and advise him of his discission. 
nni'Via 
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Mr. Korth stated that another problem is the inside shoulders are only five feet 
wide which presents another problem he asked Mr. Nichols to entertain the idea 
of excavating the shoulders out and pulverize it and place the waste material in 
the median. Mr, Nichols said he would entertain that idea. Mr. Korth stated 
that their objective is to get the job done because that is going to be a slow 
process. The outside shoulders is alot more material and placing wasted 
materials in the median. Phil Paskett interjected that putting the material in 
the median would effect the water system because that is where all the drainage 
goes. Mr. Nichols stated that they would have to look at the depth because you 
would be mixing it this some other materials, but we would have to look at it and 
then make a discission, 
Mr. Korth had a another question on the outside shoulder materials and asked if 
there was a possibility that they could stockpile the removed asphalt in a couple 
of the interchange areas. Mr. Nichols asked them to submit a proposal and he 
would present it to the powers to be and then he would informed them of the 
discission. Mr. Korth stated that there are two or three probable locations. 
Mr. Nichols responded that they would look at each separate location if it was 
possible. Mr. Korth asked if was UDOT's intent to redhead the shoulders and if 
it would be alright for them to use the concrete as control. He also stated they 
would like to use a lazer to control the cross slopes, it would make less work 
for UDOT. Mr. Nichols agreed that they could use it. Mr. Korth stated that they 
need to check on a mix design for the shoulders and inform the state of his 
findings. 
Mr. Stan Nielsen cautioned the Contractor when saw cutting the joints to be 
careful with the runoff and not blow the joints off towards the traffic. 
Phil Paskett. UDOT Inspector had a concern about the epoxy and sealant materials 
to be pretest and approved before placing into the project because there is such 
a variety that have been pretested but not pre-approved. 
Grant Fowkes stated that their vendor should have all the testing and approval 
done, and they plan to stay with one type of material. He also asked about the 
specifications for those that do the epoxy injection are to have two years of 
experience and they do not intend to sub that out. They have personnel in their 
own company that could do the procedure. Mr. Nichols stated that they need to 
produce a letter and then he would look at it and give them a determination. 
Grant Fowkes asked about the delamination of the bridge deck and entertain the 
idea of shotcrete for the repairs on the bent caps in those areas where the rebar 
is exposed yerses the use of epoxy injection. They have receive alot of 
information from the World of Concrete on cleaning, blasting and preparing of the 
concrete. They attended technical seminar in Las Vegas. Mr. Nichols asked them 
to prepare a letter that they could submit to UDOT'S Structures Division. 
CHANGE ORDERS 
No comments or questions were made. 
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PARTNERING: 
Mr. Nichols siated that he would assume this would be a continuation of their 
last job on Antelope Drive and he suggested a half of day conference may be 
appropriate. After the discussion, it was agreed that no additional partnering 
sessions would be held. 
PERFORMANCE RATING: 
Stan Nielsen. Region One Construction Engineer, informed the Contractor of the 
rating system and complimented them on their past performances. Mr. Nichols 
stated that he nominated Grant Fowkes and did receive the award. 
CIVIL RIGHTS - DBE COMMITMENT 
Charles Larson. Civil Rights Manager made the comment regarding the request of 
substitution mentioned earlier that they are very reluctant to make changes only 
when the DBE is unable to perform. He stated that the Federal Highway's 
Administration is of the same opinion, therefore they would not agree to a change 
order, only when the circumstances prove that the DBE is unable to perform. 
START DATE: 
Grant Fowkes stated that they anticipated starting the first of April. Mr. 
Nichols stated that was fine as long as the temperatures were high enough. 
Standard Specification state time charges will begin on March 1st. Ray Korth 
stated that they were do the shoulder work. Mr. Nichols stated that they would 
look at the charges if preparatory work is done only partial time would be 
charged. Mr. Korth stated that they would be prepared to lay asphalt on the 
first of April. Mr. Nichols stated that he would work with on the time charges. 
Phil Paskett requested that the Contractor get the mix design in for approval 
some of them take as long as six weeks. 
MEETING ADJOURNED AT 10:35 A.M. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
• • * 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS 
& REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 12th 
day of June, 2000, commencing at the hour of 11:05 a.m., 
the deposition of ROY VLAOVTCH, JR., produced as a 
witness at the instance and request of the Plaintiff in 
the above-entitled action before the above-named Court, 
was taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Gridley Ward & 
Shaw, 849 West Hillfield Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah. 
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Civil No. 970700411 PI 
Deposition of: 
ROY VLAOVICH, JR. 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
©FY 
1 Q Did you in this case? 
2 A I believe at the beginning of the project we 
3 discussed the use of jersey barrier or K-rail, as I'm 
4 accustomed to calling it in California. At the beginning 
5 of the project that discussion was had from UDOT and 
6 Granite Construction Company personnel at the outset of 
7 the work. 
8 Q And UDOT didn't want to do it? 
9 A I think it was--I wasn't actually in the 
10 meeting that they had. It was a pre-conference meeting, 
11 pre-construction conference. I wasn't at that meeting, 
12 but I know that it was discussed. And my recollection is 
13 that it was decided that we wouldn't use it. 
14 Q Are jersey barriers more expensive to use? 
15 A Than? 
16 Q Barrels. 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q So if the plan came back to use barrels and 
19 then Granite wanted to switch to jersey barriers, then by 
20 necessity it would mean an increased cost to UDOT, 
21 wouldn't it? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q When did you first find out about this 
24 accident? 
25 I A It was in the early morning hours, Monday, that 
35 
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Defendants. 
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Judge Thomas L. Kay 
- - 0 0 O 0 0 - -
Deposition of CHUCK LINDSAY, taken on behalf 
of the Plaintiff, at 849 West Hillfield Road, 
Suite 202, Layton, Utah, commencing on July 18, 2000, 
before KAPRICE GUNN, a Certified Shorthand Peporter 
and Notary Public within and for the State of Utah, 
pursuant to Notice. 
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1 Q. And did you in the preconstruction meeting 
2 go through the traffic control plan so that everybody 
3 understood that concept of more lanes open during peak 
4 hours than non-peak hours? 
5 A. Yes, we did. 
6 Q. Was there any discussion at that time that 
7 you recall about the use of Jersey barriers versus 
8 barrels as protective devices to use when you had 
9 those open holes? 
10 A. There was discussion. I can't remember if 
11 it was in the preconstruction meeting or if it was 
12 with Kent Nichols before or after. 
13 Q. After you got started? 
14 A. I think there was discussion before we got 
15 started. 
16 Q. Can you tell me what you recall about that 
17 discussion? 
18 A. I remember Grant Fowkes and I approached 
19 Kent Nichols. And like I say, I can't remember if 
20 there was even discussion in the preconstruction 
21 meeting or not. 
22 We told him that working behind the barrels, 
23 I we thought, was unsafe for the workers, especially 
24 | without a reduced speed limit, and -- you know, had 
25 1 several discussions. And he said, Well, give us a 
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1 barriers; they just said they wouldn't pay for it. 
2 Does that ring a bell? 
3 A. Yeah, as a contractor, we probably had that 
4 option. 
5 Q. Did that get discussed among the Granite 
6 management, that, hey, the state's not willing to pay 
7 for this, but we better do it anyway? 
8 A. No. The job was bid that way, and that's 
9 the way we pursued with the job. 
10 Q. Had you had training in the development of 
11 traffic control plans prior to this project starting? 
12 A. I did have a card at the time saying that I 
13 could act as a traffic control supervisor. I had gone 
14 through training with the state, with an agency. 
15 Q. That's the -- is that a one-day course the 
16 state does? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Anything besides that? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Do you know how to read a traffic control 
21 plan? 
22 A. Yes, I do. 
23 Q. Okay , L e t me g i v e you a t l e a s t t h e p a r t 
24 t h a t ' s a p p l i c a b l e t o o u r s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i s w h a t I 
2 5 w a s p r o v i d e d b y t h e s t a t e a s a c o p y o f t h e t r a f f i c 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
• * * 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS 
& REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 12th 
day of June, 2 0 00, commencing at the hour of 2:10 p.m., 
the deposition of KENT A. NICHOLS, produced as a witness 
at the instance and request of the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action before the above-named Court, was 
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Gridley Ward & 
Shaw, 849 West Hillfield Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah. 
REPORTING SERVICES, INC 
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Q So Chuck Lindsay was the second guy and Jim 
Keyes was the third guy? 
A Right. 
Q Anybody else? 
A They were the basic key guys on the job. 
Q And when did you initiate or when did they 
initiate the contact? Was it before construction started 
to discuss generally how things were going to occur? 
A Well, we have a pre-construction conference 
after we know who is going to get the bid and after the 
bid is awarded and a notice to proceed is received. Then 
we have a pre-construction conference and discuss those 
things. 
Q Who comes to the pre-construction conference? 
A We invite the contractor. We invite his 
subcontractors that he wants to bring. That would be up 
to him. We then have people from various departments in 
UDOT, materials people. We invite the safety people. We 
invite the traffic engineering people. 
Q What are traffic engineering people? What is 
their job? Why do they get invited? 
A We have several, but we have a traffic engineer 
in the region and I don't know all his duties. Whenever 
I have a problem, I go to him. But I can't speak for his 
total duties. 
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SINCE 1915 
Utah Department of Transportation 
P.O. Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
March 20,1996 
1111 Brickyard Read 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429 
Telephone (801) 486-2411 
Fax (801) 487-1603 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: Project No. IM -15 - 7 (191) 332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Kent: 
As discussed in the preconstruction conference for this project, we would like to 
propose the use of precast concrete barriers to channel traffic and protect our workers, UDOT 
emloyees overseeing the project and the traveling public. These barriers would be used in lieu 
of the plastic drums and channelizing devices on the traffic control phases in the plans and 
specifications. The speed limit in this section of 1-15 has been raised from 55 MPH, at the time 
of bid in September 1995, to 65 MPH. Our concern is for the safety of our workers and UDOT 
employees. Traffic would be very close to their work and they would be virtually unprotected 
without the concrete barrier. 
Attached is a rough sketch of how we propose to place the barriers in three phases and 
use asphalt crossovers in the median at the south end of the project and end approximately at 
station 660+00 at the north end. From station 660+00 northward to the end of the project, work 
would be accomplished with drums and traffic control as outlined in the drawings and 
specifications. This would be required due to the excessive elevation difference between the 
northbound and southbound lanes at that portion of the project. 
The barrier footage was calculated by installing barrier through the entire project 
northbound and southbound. In Phase II and Phase III approximately 18,500 If of barrier would 
be removed to allow an area approximately 1320 foot in length at each offramp and another 
1320 foot at each onramp. The traffic would be channeled through the on and off ramps with the 
use of plastic drums. UDOT's traffic engineers will need to specify what might be needed at 
these locations. We would propose message boards at each end of the project to advise the 
motoring public that some phases will have an express lane that will not have an exit 
throughout the entire project and that they will have to travel in mandatory lanes to be able to exit 
1-15 between Kaysville and Clearfield. 
In evaluating this plan, we would change our schedule from the one proposed at the 
preconstruction meeting, ie., working Saturday through tuesday double shift; to working seven 
days per week behind the protection of the concrete barrier. This would reduce the calendar 
weeks that traffic control would be restricting lanes from 35 weeks to 20 weeks. A savings of 
105 days However, it would take much longer to set, move and remove the concrete barrier. 
We estimate an additional 40 days that would need to be added to the contract time. There 
would still be a net savings of 56 days that traffic would not be disrupted, provided that the repair 
quantities do not overrun. Using concrete barrier would eliminate the problems with peak traffic 
hours by providing two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times. 
Attached is a breakdown of the estimated cost to change to concrete barriers on this 
project. It has been assumed that all the concrete barrier is stockpiled and available at UDOTs 
District 1 Yard. We also request, whether this proposal is accepted or not, that throughout this 
project the speed limit be reduced to 55MPH, as it was when the project was originally bid. If 
you have any questions please call me at 231-5780 We need a decision as soon as possible so 
we can advise our subcontractors and suppliers when work will begin on this project. 
GIBBONS £ REED COMPANY 
1111 BRICKYARD ROAD 
POST OFFICE BOX 30429 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84130-0429 
TELEPHONE 801 486-2411 FAX 801 487 1603 
MAMT T-t£ Sn,mJ/#tfm* h~t>£-(93 DATE 2-Z&-96, 
C.IB.FHT -T/eAPF/c rnsrrrzaL firoaesAL 
COST PROPOSAL - CONCRETE BARRIER 
CONCRETE BARRIER-
1. LOAD, HAUL & INSTALL 56.500LF @ 2.75 $ 155,375.00 
2. MOVE BARRIER ONSITE 
(ONE LANE) 56,500LF@1.75 $ 98,875.00 
3. REMOVE & STOCKPILE 
AT DIST. 1 YARD 56,5000 LF @ 2.75 $ 155,375.00 
SUBTOTAL $ 409,625.00 
CROSSOVERS: 
1.UTBC (APPROXIMATE) 
2. ASPHALT (APROX.) 
3. EXC. CROSSOVERS 
2000 TON® 16.00 
650 TON @ 23.00 
1400CY @ 8.00 
SUBTOTAL 
$ 32,000.00 
$ 14,950.00 
$ 11,200.00 
$ 58,150.00 
MESSAGE BOARDS: 
1. MESSAGE BOARD 7200 HR@ 20.00 $ 144,000.00 
"CZ" ATTENUATORS 
1.CZ ATTENUATORS 5 EACH @ 20,500.00 $ 102,500.00 
( Rental Units ) 
TOTAL $ 714,275.00 
DELETED & REDUCED BID ITEMS: 
1. ITEM # 36 - TRAFFIC SUPERVISOR (30) DAYS @ 300.00 ( 
2. ITEM # 39 - DRUMS 
3. ITEM # 42 - ADV. WARNER 
4. ITEM # 43 - STRIPE REMOVE 
5. ITEM # 44 - TEMP. STRIPE 
6. ITEM # 45 - TR4UCK MOUNTED 
ATTENUATOR 
(120,000) DD@.50 
(8,000) HR@ 6.00 
(60,000) LF @ 0.08 
(73,000) LF @ 0.25 
(450) DD @ 75.00 
9,000.00) 
( 60,000.00) 
{ 48,000.00) 
( 4,800.00) 
( 18,250.00) 
( 33,750.00) 
REDUCED ITEM TOTAL ($173,800.00) 
NET CHANGE FOR 
CHANGE ORDER $ 540,475.00 
CONTRACT TiME ADDITIONAL - 40 DAYS 
m x z 
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Memorandum UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Region One 
DATE: March 21,1996 
TO: Dyke LeFevre, P.E. 
Region One Director 
FROM: Kent Nichols 
Project Engineer 
SUBJECT: Project No. IM -15-7(191 )332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Attached you will find a proposal from Gibbons and Reed Company to use precast barrier to 
channelize traffic and provide protection for the project workers, department personnel, and the 
traveling public. 
Based on this proposal the contractor would start his operations in the median area. The inside 
lane on both the northbound and southbound lanes would be closed off with barrier and the 
drainage modifications, shoulder work, and concrete repair on the inside lanes would be 
completed. 
The northbound traffic would then be moved onto the inside lanes with the inside lane of the 
southbound lanes being used as an 'express' lane for the north bound traffic. Openings for the 
various off ramps would be provided. The concrete rehabiiition on the two outside northbound 
lanes and outside northbound shoulder work would proceed. 
When the work on the northbound lanes was complete the south bound traffic would be shifted 
into the median area and work on the two outside southbound lanes and outside southbound 
shoulder would be completed. 
The estimated cost to use control plan would be $714,275.00. The cost savings through 
reduction in the amount of some bid items together with elimination of some items be 
approximately $173,800.00. The estimated additional cost would be $540,475.00. 
There is an overwhelming feeling among the people who will be involved in the contract that 
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration. I share that feeling and 
recommend that this proposal be given serious consideration. 
Attachment: 4 sheets 
cc: Region File 
Project File 
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction 
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EED company SINCE 1915 
1111 Brickyard Road 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429 
. , , ™ , ^ ^ Telephone(801)486-2411 
March 29, 1996 
Fax (801) 487-1603 
Utah Department of Transportation 
P. O. Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: Project No. IM - 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Dear Kent: 
Following discussions in Tuesday's meeting at UDOT's District One office, we 
propose the following traffic control plan for this project. We propose to start the project 
using the outside shoulder phasing as per the contract drawings. During this phase the 
outside shoulders on the entire project will be excavated and replaced with asphalt. Once the 
asphalt shoulders are replaced, precast barrier would be hauled from stockpiles at the District 
One yard and installed per the attached drawing. Phasing the work with precast barriers 
allows for two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times. This would eliminate the need 
for peak and off-peak work requirements on the 1-15 portion of the work and allow us to 
work more hours to complete the project. The traffic crossovers would be located at the 
same locations as proposed in our March 20, 1996, letter. The work north of station 
6604-00 would be completed behind drums. 
This project allowed a contract completion of 140 work days. Starting the project on 
April 15, 1996, and allowing 140 work days @ 5 days per week would complete the project 
November 4, 1996, after subtracting the holidays during this period. Using the precast 
barrier option we can complete the work by October 7, 1996, a savings of 28 days. This 
savings means 28 less days that UDOT would not have inspectors on the project and 28 less 
days the traveling public would be subjected to constricted traffic flow. 
/ n 
Utah Department of Transportation 
March 29, 1996 
Page Two 
Attached is a breakdown of the cost associated with this proposal. There would be a 
considerable cost savings if UDOT had the three CZ Attenuators in stock. This savings 
would be $78,000.00. An additional savings of $67,200.00 could be recognized if the 
crossovers could remain in the median for future projects to the north or to the south of this 
project. Temporary striping will be paid for at the contract unit price. We have not allowed 
for drainage in the median at the crossover locations. 
If this proposal is approved, we will commit to a final completion date of September 
30, 1996. In the event we do not complete the work by this date, we would expect 
liquidated damages of $2,070.00 per calendar day, per section 108.9 of the 1992 Standard 
Specifications. We would expect any weather related shutdown of the work to be added to 
this completion date on a day for day basis. We would also expect a bonus of $2,070.00 per 
calendar day for each day we complete prior to September 30, 1996. 
As we have mentioned in other letters, our concern on this project and the reason for 
this proposal is the safety of our workers, UDOT employees and the traveling public. We 
also request that the speed limit throughout this project be reduced back to the 55 MPH 
speed limit as it was at the time this project was bid regardless of whether or not you accept 
this proposal. 
Please review this plan and proposal and let us know your intent as to a decision by 
April 3, 1996, so we can plan our work and our subcontractors. If you have any questions, 
please call Grant Fowkes or myself. 
Sincerely, 
GIBBON & REED COMPANY 
*" 7 /Cnuck/Lindsay 
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COST PROPOSAL - CONCRETE BARRIER 
CONCRETE BARRIER. 
1. LOAD, HAUL S INSTALL 
2. MOVE BARRIER ONSITE 
(ONE LANE) 
3. REMOVE & STOCKPILE 
AT DIST. 1 YARD 
56.500LF @ 2.75 
56,500LF@1.75 
56.500LF @ 2.75 
SUBTOTAL 
CROSSOVERS: 
1. 10" GRANULAR BORROW 6760 TON @ 10.00 
2. 8" UTBC (APPROXIMATE) 5410 TON @ 16.00 
3. 6" ASPHALT (APROX.) 4050 TON @ 23.00 
4. EXC. CROSSOVERS 
MESSAGE BOARDS: 
1. MESSAGE BOARD 
"CZ" ATTENUATORS-
ATTENUATORS: 
1.CZ ATTENUATORS 
1. TRUCK MOUNTED 
8400 CY @ 8.00 
SUBTOTAL 
5500 HR @ 20.00 
3 EACH @ 26,000.00 
240 DD @ 75.00 
( 2 - used at on ramps to save purchase of 
2 -CZ Attenuators) 
TOTAL 
$ 155,375.00 
$ 98,875.00 
$ 155,375.00 
$ 409,625.00 
$ 67,600.00 
$ 86,560.00 
$ 93,150.00 
$ 67,200.00 
$ 314,510.00 
$ 110,000.00 
$ 78,000.00 
$ 18,000.00 
$ 930,135.00 
DELETED & REDUCED BID ITEMS: 
LITEM #36-TRAFFIC SUPERVISOR (35) DAYS @ 300.00 ( 10,500.00) 
2. ITEM # 39 - DRUMS (120,000) DD @ .50 ( 60,000.00) 
3. ITEM # 42 - ADV. WARNER ('8,000) HR @ 6.00 
4. ITEM # 45 - TRUCK MOUNTED (450) DD @ 75.00 
ATTENUATOR 
5. ITEM # 28 & 29 (DELETE) & USE BARRIER IN TRAFFIC 
CONTROL THEN RESET 800LF AFTER USE. 
( 48,000.00) 
( 33,750.00) 
( 10,000.00) 
REDUCED ITEM TOTAL ($162,250.00) 
NET CHANGE FOR 
CHANGE ORDER $ 767,885.00 
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 Stale oi' Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Thomas R. Warne 
Execuctive Director 
Dyke M. LeFevre, P.E. 
Region One Director 
REGION ONE 
169 North Wall Avenue 
PO.Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412-2580 
(801)399-5921 
Fax:(801)399-5926 
Commission 
Glen E Brown 
Chairman 
Todd G. Weston 
James G. Larkin 
Ted D. Lewis 
Hal M. Clyde 
April 2, 1996 
Gibbons & Reed Company 
1111 Brickyard Road 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84130-0429 
Att: Chuck Lindsey 
Subject: Project No. IM-15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Change in Traffic Control Plan 
Dear Chuck: 
I have reviewed the cost break down in your letter of March 29, 1996 with Dyke LeFevre, 
Region One Director and, as it stands he does not feel that we could get approval from the 
Commission. 
In order for us to justify the proposal for a change in the traffic control plan using user cost 
data, the net cost of the change would have to satisfy two conditions: 1) be in the range of 
$450,000 or below, and 2) time savings must be at least a 50 days time saving, which is what we 
discussed during our initial conversations on this proposal. 
We are not closing the door on this proposal and request that you review the following items 
for possible adjustment: 
1. Concrete Barrier, (load, haul, install, move, and return to Region One yard). We believe that 
the cost of this item could be reduced. During one of our conversations I suggested that we 
consider Force Account on this item, and most likely a lump sum item would be more 
acceptable to our management people. 
2V Crossovers, We would suggest that you review the prices for Granular Borrow and 
Untreated Base Course material. We believe that the cost to install this material in the cross-
overs would less expensive than in the shoulder areas. 
Page 2 
April 2, 1996 
3. Message Boards, Could be eliminated but the advanced waniers would remain as originally 
bid. 
4. "CZ" Attenuators, We are looldng into the possibility of buying the attenuators and using 
them on other projects if we can get a change approved. 
We believe that this change has merit and will present a request for additional money to the 
Commission if the above criteria are met. 
Respectfully; * 
Kent A. Nichols, 
Project Engineer 
cc: Region One File 
Dyke LeFevre, Region One Director 
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OIBBOnS & REED CDITIPHny SINCE 1915 
Utah Department of Transportation 
P O Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
Attention Kent Nichols 
Re Project No IM- 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Dear Kent 
April 11, 1996 
1111 Brickyard Road 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 0429 
Telephone (801) 486 2411 
Fax (801) 487-1603 
We have reviewed UDOT correspondence dated April 2, 1996 and in our judgement 
we can not meet the criteria established by UDOT to justify a change in the traffic control 
plan 
The net cost of the change itemized in our letter dated March 29, 1996 could be reduced 
to approximately $ 572,832 by reducing the cost of 5410 ton of 8" UTBC to $ 12 70 per ton, 
leaving the crossovers in place and eliminating the message boards If UDOT were to provide the 
CZ Attenuators another $ 78,000 could be eliminated 
However, Gibbons and Reed Company can not reduce the time savings beyond the 28 
days or alter the other conditions proposed in its letter dated March 29, 1996 
At this point, Gibbons and Reed will proceed with the original traffic control plan 
established by UDOT We lemain available to continue discussions concerning this matter. 
Sincerely, 
GIBBONS & REEDJGOMPANY 
h^up&f Lindsay 
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oiBBons & HEED compnny SINCE »« 
1111 Brickyard Road 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429 
Utah Department of Transportation July 2,1996 
P.O. Box 12580 Telephone (801) 486 2411 
Ogden, Utah 84412 Fax (801) 487-1603 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: IM-15-7(191)332, 1-15 South Layton to SR-193 
Kent: 
We have had numerous close calls on this project with vehicles coming into the work 
zone. Last early this morning we had a vehicle go through the drums on the south end of the 
project on the north bound lanes and drove into and through a full depth slab replacement that 
had just been excavated. Minutes before we had workers installing dowels in this area. We 
were fortunate not to have workers in the area at the time of the accident. The traffic control 
plan along with the speeds people are driving on 1-15 have put our people and UDOT employees 
in jepordary every night. This has been a concern of ours before this project ever started and 
have made recommendations to change the traffic plan to a safer situation with barrier. We 
have also asked for the speed limit to be reduced to 55 MPH, which was the speed limit at the 
time this job was bid, which we were told could not be done. Safety of workers has been ignored 
and dollars has been the guiding factor. 
We request that the peak hour schedule be adjusted one hour earlier in the mornings 
and a half an hour longer in the afternoon to allow us to work strictly days starting Monday July 
8,1996. By shifting our workers to a daytime operation we will avoid the traffic problems we are 
experiencing at night and it will be less confusing for the traveling public during night time hours. 
Please let us know as soon as possible as to the changes in off peak hour work hours. 
We do plan to change our night crew to days beginning Monday. 
^ 
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Memorandum UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Region One 
DATE: July 2,1996 
TO: Dyke LeFevre, P.E. 
Region One Director 
THRU: Stan Nielsen, P.E. 
Region One Construction Engineer 
FROM: Kent Nichols 
Project Engineer 
SUBJECT: Project No. IWI -15-7(191 )332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
As you are aware we have had serious problems with control of traffic and providing safety for 
our contractors worker as well as our personnel. The traffic is traveling the posted speed limit 
which is 65 M.P.H. and this adds to our anxiety level. It must be noted that at the time the 
contract was advertised and awarded the speed limit was 55 M.P.H. I believe that it is in our 
best interest to post the speed limit back down to the 55 M.P.H. for the duration of this project. 
Early this morning we had workmen installing dowels in a section of full depth repair. 
Fortunately they left the site of the work to get more dowels, shortly after they left the site a car 
knocked down two barrels and was into the work zone. The car ran into the full depth hole and 
the momentum of the vehicle was arrested almost completely by its impact with the open face 
of the concrete slab. The vehicle did have sufficient momentum to carry it out of the hole but it 
came to rest on top of the of the slab on the edge of the hole. There is no doubt that we would 
have had people killed but for the fact they were temporarily out of materials. 
Because of the type of work we are doing, that is small partial depth repairs, the work is slow 
and tedious. And it is made even slower by the fact that we are doing the work at night. With 
the near miss that we had last night the contractor is formally requesting that we make the 
following minimum changes: that, 1) the restricted peak time hours in the morning be reduced 
by one hour in the morning and the peak time hours in the afternoon be reduced by one half 
hour (preferably one hour), and 2) the speed limit be reduced to 55 M.P.H. as discussed above. 
The contractor feels that he must work in the daylight hours to make the job site safer. 
There is an over-whelming feeling among the people who are involved in the contract that 
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration. I share that feeling and 
recommend that the proposal to use precast barrier and cross-overs be reviewed and given 
serious consideration. 
The contractor has hand delivered a letter, copy attached, which echos my sentiments with 
regards to the conditions on the project. 
This letter will be followed by a Change Order, specification change, to reduce the peak hour 
restrictions. The contractor is going to be hard put to complete this project on schedule if some 
way isn't found to increase productivity. 
Attachment: 1 sheet 
cc: Region File 
Project File 
Clint Topham, P.E., Deputy Director 
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
• * * 
Civil No. 970700411 PI 
Deposition of: 
RANDY S. HUNTER 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
ORIGINAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 12th 
day of June, 2000, commencing at the hour of 8:55 a.m., 
the deposition of RANDY S. HUNTER, produced as a witness 
at the instance and request of the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action before the above-nam^d Court, was 
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Publig in and 
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Gridley Ward & 
Shaw, 849 West Hillfield Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah. 
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CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS 
Sc REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
1 Q Slab replacement. Tell me what that entails. 
2 A Replacing a slab of concrete. 
3 Q How do you--I assume UDOT sets out the criteria 
4 for how the contractors are to do that. Is that correct? 
5 A The design plans here illustrate how the work 
6 should be done or what work should be done. 
7 Q Who decides what concrete is going to be 
8 replaced? UDOT or the contractor? 
9 A UDOT. 
10 Q So that would have already been decided before 
11 the contractor bid it, wouldn't it? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And so I guess what I'm asking, Mr. Hunter, is 
14 is there a method that's described; for instance, do you 
15 tell the contractor, "Come out and take out the concrete 
16 in this spot, put rebar in, pour it new, and then move on 
17 to this spot"? Or do you just say, "Take out all the 
18 concrete in that six-mile stretch and replace it all"? 
19 How much direction is given to the contractor? 
2 0 A These plans are provided to the contractor as 
21 to the work we want done. Means and method is totally at 
22 the selection of the contractor. 
23 Q Are there any written guidelines to the 
24 contractor as to between--I think you said it was mile 
25 post 332 is the start and where was the end again? Mile 
11 
for the whole project? 
A Correct. 
Q So is it fair to say that the traffic control 
plans in Exhibit 1 are the plans for traffic control that 
were in effect at the site of the accident? 
A That is not fair to say. 
Q Tell me why I was provided these then. 
A These are a portion of the package which is put 
out for bid that illustrates how UDOT would contemplate 
the project being developed. 
The contractor is in total charge of the means 
and methods of his construction and can certainly change 
those at any time. 
Q Were there change orders to the traffic control 
plan on that project? 
A I do not know. 
Q How would we find that out? 
A You-have got those people coming in for 
deposition today. 
Q Doesn't the State have to approve any changes? 
A Yes. 
Q Well, so is it fair to say then that absent 
any change orders that may have existed for this 
location, this would be the plan in effect at the 
accident site? 
14 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY UARD 
1 Novenber 5. 1999 
2 1:40 p.n. 
3 
4 P R O C E E D I N G S 
5 GREG LUNDELL 
B called as a witness at the instance and request of 
7 the Plaintiff, having been first duly suorn, uas 
8 exanined and testified as follows: 
9 EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. UARD: 
11 Q Could you give your nane, who your enp loyer 
12 is and what — let's start with that. 
13 A r n Greg Lundel l . I work for the Utah 
14 Highway P a t r o l as a p a t r o l o f f i c e r . 
15 Q May I c a l l you Greg? 
16 A Sure 
17 Q Thank you. Greg, how long have you worked 
18 for the Utah Highway Patrol? 
19 A I've vorked with the Utah Highway Patrol 
20 about eight years 
21 Q So — this is *99. You would have started 
22 probably in '91? 
23 A *92-ish. 
24 Q '92' Okay. 
25 A March 
REKEE L. STACY. CSR. RPR (801) 326-1188 
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11-5-99. GREG LUNDELL 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
LUMDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
Q So that was an additional barrel to the 
left of the channelization barrels? 
A That second one. just looking at the 
picture, it appears to be a different color or fresh 
concrete, and it was routine for then to place a 
barrel over the new stuff so their workers wouldn't 
run over it 
Q And on the right-hand side of Exhibit l. is 
that a base still upon a barrel? 
A I think it's just a black — well — the 
bases are — yeah, tt would appear to be a base with 
the barrel — you're looking towards the — 
Q Okay 
A — edge 
Q Now, in order for this — based on your 
reconstruction of the accident, would it have 
required this car to leave the travel portion, the 
narked travel lane to strike the hole, the first 
hole? 
A Yeah 
Q Now. in your accident report forn, you 
indicated on the second page of it — oh Let ne ask 
you another question first What was the weather 
like at the tine of this accident? 
A I don't recall I think it was — I nean, 
RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
1 it was 4:00 in the norning so I think it was a clear 
2 night or sonething 
3 Q The reason I'n wondering — 
4 A The boxes are narked, but I couldn't tell 
5 you which box shows the weather 
6 Q The reason i'n wondering is it looks like 
7 there's water in the botton of these bases, and the 
8 weather in the picture — and I don't know when these 
9 photographs were taken 
10 A I don't know, either. 
11 Q These color photographs. 
12 A I don't know I do not believe there was 
13 any water on the night of the accident. 
14 Q That's what I was wondering 
15 A They were dry 
16 Q On the second page of your report you 
17 indicated that the est mated travel speed of the 
18 Johnson vehicle was 70 niles an hour, correct? 
19 A Yes 
20 Q And the posted speed was what? 
21 A Posted speed was 65 
22 Q Nou as I understand it, that's — the 
23 naxinun speed — the posted speed is the naxinun 
24 speed under best conditions, correct? 
25 A Yes 
RENEE L STACY, CSR, 
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LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
1 Q And you have an additional speed underneath 
2 the posted speed of 50 niles an hour; is that 
3 correct ? 
4 A Right 
5 Q What did you intend by that? 
6 A They did post advisory speed Units through 
7 this project that were posted at 50 They were the 
8 orange advisory speed, but they still had the 65 
9 speed Unit signs as well 
10 Q Fron a law enforcenent perspective, at 4:30 
11 in the norning in a construction zone, is 70 niles an 
12 hour an appropriate speed? 
13 A Yes and no 
14 Q Uhafs the yes part of it? 
1 1S 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
you 
A 
think 
Q 
traveling 
Wlttl 
A 
Q 
Is it appropriate? It would depend on what 
your abilities to drive are 
Do you think it's a safe speed to be 
in that left-hand lane? 
No 
Did you ever have an opportunity to speak 
the driver of the vehicle about what happened? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Briefly, yes 
At the scene? 
Yes 
And what did he tell you at the scene? 
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR 
(801) 326-1186 39 
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LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
1 A He said he was just driving along, and the 
2 next thing he knew, he hit one of the holes and lost 
3 control 
4 Q Nou, you indicated that you had sone 
5 concerns about using concrete barriers 
6 A Yes 
7 Q Uere the plastic channel control devices, 
8 were those typical lane chanelizations in 
9 construction that you'd see on the freeways four 
10 nonths before then? 
11 A No 
12 Q Uere there both Jersey barriers and — 
13 A Prior to this project, on the project prior 
14 to this one in the south end in Centerville, they 
15 actually had a wall divider 
16 Q Nou. if they use Jersey barriers, those 
17 would have to be placed to tie left of the traffic 
18 sean if you're looking at t*e right-hand picture in 
19 Exhibit 1 correct? 
20 A Yes 
21 Q And they would have had to have been placed 
22 to the right of the sean on the left-hand picture of 
23 Exhibit 1 correct? 
24 A Yes 
25 Q Nou, uould there have been roon enough for 
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR 
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ERIK M . W A R D (3380) 
GRIDLEY WARD & SI I \ W 
Attorneys for Plain; i'' 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (80n<>:i : 
':; I 
, . , i i : -qTRirTr . .i . » • DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS & REED 
COMPANY, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT UDOT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Case No. 9707004L 
Judge Thomas Kay 
Plaintiff submits the following memorandum in opposition to ix *• •> d •»• vp.m \ :<••< 
-' '•.!• • ••• ; . '>i--uini I.II Niiminan Judgment: 
FACTS 
1. On or about September 14, 1996, (he plaintiff was seriously injured when his vehicle, 
traveling approximately 65 mph, dropped into a 12 inch pavement cut-out on 1-15. See deposition 
of Trooper Greg Lundell, pg. 31-38 - Exhibit 1; and accident photos - /\////'// 5. 
2. Dek-inkint >iaie u( i uili, I 'i,ill Department of Transportation ("UDOT") hired 
Defendant Granite Construction Company of Utah ("Granite") to perform construction on the section 
of I - 1 J ("herein alter ""! awon-t l> ;•'!'•" : i •• ' •; un- : •• i imuea. .Vi - ( / '< 
motion for summary judgment. 
3. ' : l )01 '"s original traffic control pi.in was designed wlini willi a ^Sniph spivd hnnl 
De>j >.: .-t .i.iiri. -..ii'ieenons. uie.s|.vcii Imui was 65 mph when the plaintiff was injured. Seegranite 
letter date 3/20/96 and 7/2/96- Exhibit 2. 
4. \ " ' : • :! :u.-. piaiiLJiledforawhitesolidlinetbllowedby a two foot buffer 
zone before the placement of plastic barrels in order to properly separate the temporary travel lane 
from the 12 ma ••!• • . >'<'Traffic* • >." ' - •• .:nesare 
open) - Exhibit 3; and deposition of UDOT Project Engineer, Kent Nichols, pg. 29 -31 - Exhibit 4. 
5. UDOT's traffic control plan was not followed: 
a. White stripping was not used between the second lane of travel and the 
construction cut-outs. See pictures attached as Exhibit 5. 
b. There was M , ! "^ * ^'weentlv1 •" • " 
the contrary, some of the barrels were placed inside the cut-outs . See picture 
- Exhibit 5. 
c. < la the night of the accident, there were missing barrels. See deposition of 
Trooper Greg Lundell, pg. 18 - Exhibit 1. 
6. UlJU - persoi n lei w< :M*e s i ipervisinj i oi i the project <i :• >\ere aware Granite was 
not meeting the requirements of the traffic control plan. UDOT took no corrective action. See 
deposition of UDOT Project Engineer, Kent Nichols, pg. 51 - Exhibit 4; and deposition ofPaskett, 
pg. 58 - Exhibit 6. 
7. Although the Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete 
barrier^ (< > i l n i ' d r o i t t s t i ncln HI I I i I he im ifm in;1 puhl if t\w\v i i \era M > nn h dn>|i 111 Tin paxcni t ' t t l 
next to travel lanes, UDOT's Regional One Manager, Dyke LeFevre (herein after "LeFevre") decided 
to use plastic barriers, a much cheaper alternative. See deposition of Phil Paskett, pg. 11-12 - Exhibit 
6; see also deposition of < yke LeFevre, pg. 102-103 - Exhibit 7. 
8 LeFevre, who had only recently been hired as the Region One Manager, did Ilot 
consi lit any of his I JDOrl si iperiol s oi tl ic FT I A regai ding his ii litial < lecision to i ise plastic barriei s 
rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfieid Project. LeFevre admitted his decision to use 
2 
plastic barrels was no different than the tviv oU*.-i --. .inn !».•.. 4:<^  -v? u .CMIIICU there was 
ilothing special about his decision 011 this project, and in fact, it was part of his daily duties for 
UDOT. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 3, andpg. 91 - 92, andpg. 102-103 - Exhibit 7. 
9. LeFevre • • ajr-oneoi itheLayton ( icarhcld project to perform a safety study 
on the use of plastic barrels rather than the MUTCD mandated concrete barriers. See deposition of 
LeFevre, pg. 60, In 15 - In 21 - Exhibit 7. 
10 UDOT plans do not identify the individual who designed the Layton-Clearfield traffic 
control plan. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 86-87 - Exhibit 7. 
11. LeFevre < -in m »l IVUICIIIIKT n ho originally recommended the use of plastic barriers 
but admits it could have been a lower level employee. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 88-89 - Exhibit 
7. 
12 In March, shortly after the project had commenced, Granite contacted UDOT's project 
engineer requesting a new traffic control plan which used concrete barriers. See letters dated 
3/20/96, 3'21'VO, mnl 3 29 96 - Exhibit ;: 
13. Granite's proposal for a new traffic control plan was denied by UDOT's Project 
Engineer, Kent Nichols, unless » nnipromises were nudi I in I ,i\ inn-Clearfield, was Nichols first 
project with pavement cut-outs. See letter dated 4/2/96 - Exhibit 2; and deposition of Nichols, pg, 
47 - Exhibit 4. 
14. Ii J:_- -..-J 'C proposed a "change order" to the existing traffic control plan, 
requesting the plastic barrels be replaced with concrete barriers and the speed limit be reduced to the 
intended 55 in.r !'• (irunite- M , i^ang sal«M> \ >--\h I - - l*»• 'jot i engineer sent the change 
order request, with a letter encouraging LeFevre to approve Granite's request; copies of the letter 
were sent to other supervisors as well but there is no evidence they were . i\ Lv^ . -
Seet •'. • In fed 7/2/96- ! w,.m/2. 
15. There was never a formal response to the proposed change order but UDOT has 
3 
acknowledged it is the Project Engineer's responsibility to resi .m<jc on h •: - \ t v ae/h •* .•//. m 
i - . i l / - »( / * ^ , > . N - ) s ' /• \ ninii 7, 
I)()'JT"s traffic control plan required that during phase four of the Layton Clearfield 
Project, when :•; •••niffs accident occi n i o :1, t! iei e shoi i.l( I have only one open lane of travel in order 
to provide distance between the construction cut-outs and the motoring public. See Special 
Provision, Supplemental Specification 108.4.2.6 - Exhibit 8; and Traffic Contn pLr 
I xlnh' '). 
17 The pavement cut-outs during phase four were 12 inches deep; some were o\vv;i 1 on 
f e e t I " - . : •• ' ••-» "**lt x " -;- •  • ' • ' 
I 8. MM >T's field engineer and/or inspector, gave Granite the authority to open two lanes 
of traffic during phase four when Granite' s workers \ w * n »t n i 1111 • n MI h i o 11, i 111 < 11 < > i I I 11 ( 1111 I i \ 
M•• • in \ K- ;.:;k i :...,*•.. iiie motoring public was allowed to drive adjacent to the cut-outs with 
no barriers preventing their vehicles from entering the gapping holes. See deposition ofJimmie 
Keyes, pg. JV» <'/ J M«- ? itn / \h, \ i 
19. The FHA "Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and 
Maintenance Work Zones" state that "any dropoff is coi= .iiir.-iix i-u- -;..tse greater than 
?. iin.'lies, left overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential". 
Accordingly, the FHA set forth five recommendations as mitigating measures \\ :>--n .m.-r.
 M; 
I A\ lon-( T-jiilirlil (iiun'i I. I l|)( )»I t.nlt (1 In follow any of the recommended guidelines pertaining to 
pavement dropoffs. See memorandum from US. Dept. of Trans., FHA , dated December 1, 1986 -
Exhibit 11. 
20. V\ : -,/f was traveling in the second lane of travel, which was opened by IJDO T 
during phase four of the construction in violation of their own traffic control plan, when plaintiff's 
\ cliiiTr ™ s lire dropped ii><" • ' 1 nidi reir hurl ion ci it ot it. See deposition of Trooper Lundell, pg. 
25-26 - Exhibit i, 
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In addition to Plaintiffs foregoing statement of facts, which dispute the facts alleged in 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff individually disputes UDOT's "undisputed 
facts'" by UDOT's paragraph numbers. Plaintiffs disputes Fact Nos. 3,5,6,20,21,22,23,24, 
and 26 as follows: 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #3: 
The decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to channel traffic throughout this 
project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT organization. 
Plaintiff disputes this conclusion because it is inconsistent with the evidence. There is no evidence 
any of the "uppermost officials" were involved in the decision. After UDOT drafted his affidavit, 
LeFevre testified he made the specific decision and does not recall discussing with his superiors. See 
deposition of LeFevre, pg. 91, In 13 - pg. 92, In 7 - Exhibit 7. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #5: 
The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barrier in the proposed 
traffic control plan was made Dyke LeFevre in consultation with Clint Topham. Several Key 
factors were weighed as part of this decision, including the following: 
(a) The safety of project workers and the motoring public; 
(b) The costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and 
(c) The impact on traffic congestion by increasing or decreasing the overall time 
to complete the project 
Plaintiff disputes this fact based on LeFevre's deposition which was taken following his affidavit. 
UDOT compiled portions of LeFevre's affidavit to form the above misleading statement. LeFevre 
testified that he was "not sure he talked to [Topham] specifically about the barrels" in fact, he 
"probably [did] not" when he made the decision to eliminate concrete barriers from the proposed 
traffic control plan. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 91, In. 13 -pg. 92, In. 7 - Exhibit 7. The only 
discussion LeFevre had with Topham occurred after a change order had been requested; during the 
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execution and operation of the already formulated traffic control plan. Moreover, Topham did not 
mutually consult on the change order. On the contrary, he left the decision unilaterally to LeFevre 
based solely on the costs involved. LeFevre, and others, have testified LeFevre rejected the change 
order based on the costs. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 98 -100 - Exhibit 7. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #6: 
As part of UDOT's decision making process, Dyke LeFevre consulted with the Federal 
Highway Administration about the use of barrels rather than concrete barriers as channeling 
devices 
Plaintiff disputes this statement based on the deposition testimony of LeFevre. UDOT's statement 
implies the FHA was consulted on using plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. On the 
contrary, the FHA was not consulted on the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project 
during the initial decision or as part of the change order requested by Granite. See deposition of 
LeFevre, pg. 98, In 16 - In 21 - Exhibit 7. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #20: 
Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the use ofpre-cast 
concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT management personnel, 
including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and rejected the proposal based 
upon the same cost-benefit consideration that motivated the prior decision to use plastic 
barrels instead of concrete barriers. 
Plaintiff disputes this entire statement. There is no evidence that the July change order was reviewed 
by upper management. Furthermore, evidence illustrates it was a financial consideration which 
motivated the rejection. See deposition of Griffin, pg. 48, 50, In 17- 23 - Exhibit 12; and LeFevre, 
pg. 99 - Exhibit 7; also see letter dated 4/2/96 denying concrete barriers based on costs- Exhibit 2. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #21: 
Pursuant to the terms ofUDOT/Granite contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project, Granite 
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was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired in order to carry out 
the joint repair and slab replacement in the Lay ton-Clear field Project. 
Plaintiff disputes Granite had exclusive authority. Granite could only utilize the means and methods 
which satisfied the extensive, detailed traffic control plan put forth by UDOT. UDOT supervised 
controlled the means through financial approval/disapproval and the methods through UDOT 
personnel. Only UDOT had authority to alter the traffic control plan which dictated the specific 
methods of construction. 
UDOTs Alleged Fact #22: 
Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, UDOT allowed the contractor to select 
the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control plan would be implemented 
and enforced. 
Plaintiff disputes Granite had the authority to select implementation and enforcement. UDOT 
required their inspector, project engineer, etc. be involved at every level of execution. UDOT had 
the authority to instruct Granite personnel. 
UDOTs Alleged Fact #23: 
Granite's own personnel have acknowledged that, pursuant to he terms of the UDOT-
Granite contract, Granite could have providedpre-cast concrete barriers for the Layton-
Clearfield Project at is own cost, but chose not to do so. 
Plaintiff disputes the implication that Granite was liable for not using concrete barriers. Although 
UDOT gave Granite the authority to implement the change order if Granite would bear the costs, 
UDOT has acknowledged they never expected Granite would cover the costs of the concrete barriers. 
See deposition ofPaskett, pg. 43-44 - Exhibit 11. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #24: 
Granite's 3/20/96, 3/29/96 and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised concerns over the speed 
limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that the speed limit be reduced from 
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65 rn.p.k to 55 m.p.k throughout the construction zone. 
Plaintiff disputes UDOT's implication that the 55 mph reduced speed was Granite's creation. On 
the contrary, UDOT's traffic control plan was designed with a 55 mph speed limit but the speed limit 
was unilaterally increased to 65 mph prior to commencement of the project. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #26: 
On or about September 14, 1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident 
within the confines of the Lay ton-Clear field Project when his car left the traveled portion of 
the highway and entered into the construction zone where it collided with one or more holes 
created as part of the ongoing slab replacements. 
Plaintiff disputes UDOT's factual description of the accident. UDOT's statement that plaintiffs 
vehicle left the traveled portion of the highway implies plaintiffs vehicle left the lane of traffic. This 
is a highly disputed fact. UDOT failed to mark off their construction zone from the temporary lane 
of traffic and thus plaintiff contends his car was actually inside the white dotted traveling lane when 
his vehicle's tire dropped into the deep construction cut-out. See pictures attached as Exhibit 5. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DISPUTED FACTS PREVENT UDOT'S DISMISSAL 
A motion for summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances. 
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) Moreover, determining whether an act of 
alleged negligence qualifies as a discretionary function is "a fact-intensive inquiry that, by its very 
nature, is not particularly amenable to summary judgment". Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah 
App. 1999) citim Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) and Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City 784 P2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989). 
This case is particularly fact intensive since there are multiple acts of alleged negligence by 
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UDOT. Plaintiff has illustrated disputed facts as to how the decision was made to use plastic barrels 
on the Layton-Ciearfield project, and by whom. The deposition testimony of UDOTs former 
Regional Manager is contrary to the alleged "undisputed" facts made in UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Further, there are disputed facts pertaining to UDOT's refusal to follow 
recommendations presented by Granite. Moreover, there is contradicting testimony from UDOT and 
Granite employees regarding the anticipated speed limit, the responsibility of mis-placed plastic 
barrels, the failure to provide white line delineation and failure to implement mandatory buffer zones. 
A jury could determine one or more of these factual disputes was an operational act of negligence 
by UDOT. The case is set for ten days of trial with over 15 witnesses due to disputed facts which 
must be determined before liability can be assessed. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment fails 
to address any of the disputed factual issues of this case, other than their decision to use plastic 
barrels. Each negligence allegation, including the decision to use plastic barrels, involves disputed 
material facts which are within the province of the jury. In accordance with the disputed facts 
enumerated in pg. 1 - 8 of this memorandum, UDOT is precluded from summary judgment as a 
matter of Utah law. 
II. UNDER SECTION 63-30-98, UDOT'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS WAIVED 
AND THERE IS NO APPLICABLE EXCEPTION TO THEIR WAVIER OF IMMUNITY 
Plaintiff stipulates with UDOT's assertion that this case satisfies the first two prongs of the 
three prong test developed by the Utah Supreme Court for determining whether the governmental 
immunity act is applicable to a particular action. First, the construction of the Layton-Ciearfield 
Project is a governmental function under the Governmental Immunity Act. Second, under Section 
63-30-08, UDOT's governmental immunity is waived since this action is the result of an injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of a highway. Plaintiff disagrees with UDOT's 
application of the third prong of the test. The third prong of the test examines whether there is an 
exception to the government's waiver. UDOT alleges their actions were discretionary and thus they 
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qualify for the discretionary exception enumerated under Section 63-30-10(1). Plaintiff contends 
UDOT's actions were not discretionary and UDOT does not qualify for any exception. Plaintiff 
maintains UDOT is liable for the plaintiffs injuries because UDOT created an unsafe and dangerous 
condition on 1-15. 
A. Dyke LeFevre's decision to use plastic barrels versus concrete barrels was not a 
broad based discretionary policy decision 
Plaintiff alleges UDOT was negligent for using plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. 
The Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete barriers to protect the 
motoring public when performing construction cut-outs deeper than 2 inches. UDOT's personnel 
testified they are trained to follow the MUTCD. On the Layton-Clearfield project MUTCD was not 
followed. The initial decision to use, less expensive, plastic barrels was made by Dyke LeFevre, 
UDOT's regional one manager. UDOT alleges the decision was discretionary. Under Trujillo v. 
UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah App. 1999), LeFevre's decision to use plastic barrels versus concrete 
barrels does not qualify as a discretionary function. 
In Trujillo, the plaintiffs were injured in a highway construction zone without concrete 
barriers. The plaintiffs alleged UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers 
was negligent, as well as UDOT's failure to follow the traffic control plan and consider corrective 
action recommended by the contractor. The trial court granted UDOT's motion for summary 
judgment based on the "discretionary" exception. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding UDOT's actions and decisions were not discretionary. 
In the Trujillo case, UDOT relied on Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995); the 
same case UDOT is relying on in the present action. In Keegan, UDOT resurfaced a highway three 
times. Each time they resurfaced, they formulated a new traffic control plan and presented the 
revised plan to the FHA. When resurfacing, UDOT had to consider whether to raise the height of 
the concrete barriers. UDOT engaged in extensive measures, involving a significant number of 
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senior officials to formulate a broad based policy decision pertaining to the height of previously 
installed concrete barriers. First, UDOT hired a safety studies engineer to perform a study of 
accident rates in the area where the concrete barrier was erected. Second, the engineer compared 
those rates with other roads and compiled his various findings to create a comprehensive safety study 
report. The safety studies engineer concluded that leaving the barrier at it's current height would not 
adversely affect safety. Third, UDOT hired an engineer to perform a written cost-risk analysis based 
on the findings of the safety report. Fourth, UDOT's senior officials debated the issues presented 
by the expert reports. Fifth, UDOT presented the proposal to the FHA before carrying through with 
further re-surfacing. The court found UDOT's decision process was the "result of serious and 
extensive policy evaluation, judgment and expertise in numerous areas of concern", id at 625 citing 
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad, 842 P.2d 832,835 (Utah 1992). In the case at hand, UDOT failed 
to undertake the same extensive policy evaluation which was utilized in Keegan. UDOT's actions 
in this case are virtually identical to UDOT's actions inTruiillo. 
In Trujillo, UDOT alleged it's decision to use plastic barrels was made after weighing the 
relative risks and benefits. UDOT presented evidence of discussions between the project design 
engineer and UDOT's region one design engineer. UDOT also presented evidence that the plans and 
specifications were approved through a multi-level process; UDOT implied the decision was 
considered above the regional level. UDOT maintained they were not required to consult written 
studies and relied on Keegan, for the proposition that highway median design and lane separation 
are discretionary functions. The court disagreed. The court found the discussions between the 
project engineer and the regional one manager, along with the alleged higher-level discussions, did 
not rise to the immunized policy-making level. Unlike the facts of Keegan, UDOT did not hire 
engineers to study the safety concerns. UDOT did hold meetings with multiple high level policy 
makers. UDOT did not have written evidence of policy considerations, nor did not they submit the 
particular issue to the FHA. The court held the discretionary exception did not apply. 
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Similar to Trujillo, UDOT did not undertake intense scrutiny in this case. As in Trujillo, the 
decision was made between the project manager, who had never worked with concrete slab 
replacement and traffic before, and the regional one manager, who had been recently hired to the 
position. In Trujillo, a low-level unqualified employee designed the traffic control plan. In this 
case, UDOT's plans do not even identify the designer. Also similar to Trujillo, UDOT alleges a 
higher level of scrutiny took place but fails to establish the assertion with evidence. UDOT's motion 
for summary judgment implies LeFevre's affidavit proves he consulted Clint Topham in making the 
initial decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. On the contrary, in LeFevre's 
deposition following UDOT's submission of his affidavit, LeFevre admitted he had general 
discussions about the traffic control plan but he does not recall any specific discussions on the 
concrete barrier issue. This is identical to the facts in Trujillo, wherein UDOT illustrated the 
approval of the traffic plan underwent a multi-level decision process but their was no evidence, only 
suggestions, that the concrete barrier issue was discussed at the higher level. UDOT's actions in this 
case fit squarely under the Trujillo case. 
The evidence illustrates the decision to use plastic barrels did not involve multiple high level 
officials and supplemental studies resulting in a broad based policy decision. On the contrary, 
LeFevre admitted his decision to use plastic barrels was no different than the type of decisions he 
makes every day. He testified there was nothing special about his decision on this project, and in 
fact, it was part of his daily duties for UDOT. Under Keegan, the discretionary function exception 
"does not extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level . . . which 
concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of board policy factors." _Id. at 623 citing 
Carrol v. State, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (1972). The decision in this case was a typical operational 
decision, made by a regional manager after input from his project manager. Topham and Nielson 
approved the entire traffic control plan as a matter of procedure, but there is no evidence they were 
involved with the decision to use plastic barrels. Similarly, the FHA approved the entire project but 
12 
there is no evidence they took part or even consulted on the use of plastic barrels in the Layton-
Clearfield project. Moreover, there is no undisputed evidence that anyone, even LeFevre, undertook 
extensive evaluation of policy issues. It was only eight years after the decision that LeFevre alleges 
he privately weighed policy issues before making the decision. This is not enough to invoke the 
discretionary exception. Identical to Trujillo, UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels on the Layton-
Clearfield project, in opposition to the MUTCD guidelines, does not rise to the level of policy 
making discretion. 
1. UDOT's rejection of Granite's change order was part of the execution of the traffic 
control plan and was clearly operational. 
If the court where to find the original decision to use plastic barrels in violation of MUTCD 
was discretionary, the subsequent rejection of Granite's change order requesting barriers wras still 
non-discretionary. In Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished discretionary and non-
discretionary decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question involved the formulation of 
policy or the execution of an already-formulated policy, id at 623 citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 
517 , 5919 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, if the court were to find LeFevre's original decision (made 
before Granite became involved in the project) was a policy making decision, then clearly UDOT's 
decision to reject Granite's change order was an execution of that already-formulated policy. An 
execution of an already-formulated policy is non-discretionary. The execution of the traffic control 
plan was operational. Granite was complaining of the practicalities involved in the execution of the 
traffic control plan and Granite, as well as UDOT's project manager believed the safety concerns 
warranted replacing the plastic barrels with concrete barriers. The change order was rejected due to 
financial concerns. UDOT admitted they would have approved the change if Granite would have 
beared the expense. 
The change order was requested based on the daily operational problems Granite was having 
with the Layton-Clearfield project; there was no high level consideration or evaluation of broad 
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policy factors as required to be considered a discretionary function. Although LeFevre claims to 
have had a conversation with Topham about Granite's request, LeFevre testified Topham left the 
decision to LeFevre based on costs. The change order was not put in front of the FHA. Once again, 
there was no intensive review. The only written communication regarding the change order took 
place between Kent Nichols, UDOT's project engineer, and Granite. Thus, UDOT has failed to 
illustrate the rejection of Granite's change order was a basic policy-making level decision and UDOT 
is precluded from governmental immunity. 
B. UDOT's decision to open a second lane of traffic, in conflict with UDOT's traffic 
control plan, was an operational decision which is not subject to immunity 
UDOT's traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield project indicated only one open lane 
of travel during phase four of the construction because of the cut-outs in the road. Utilizing only 
one lane would have prevented vehicles from traveling directly adjacent to the open cut-outs. 
Plaintiff was injured when traveling in a second lane which should have been closed. Granite's 
engineer testified he was given the authority to open the second lane by UDOT's project engineer 
and/or inspector. 
UDOT's decision to open a second lane of travel, in violation of their traffic control plan was 
unarguably an operational decision. It was made by a low-level UDOT employee. There is no 
evidence the employee consulted upper management or weighed any policy factors. Thus, UDOT's 
operational decision to open a second lane is not subject to the discretionary exception. This act, in 
and by itself, precludes UDOT's dismissal, notwithstanding LeFevre's decision to forego concrete 
barriers. 
C. UDOT's failure to properly execute it's traffic control plan was operational 
UDOT's traffic control plan specified precautions that need to be implemented anytime two 
lane of travel were open on the Layton-Clearfield Project. UDOT's traffic control plan required the 
two travel lanes to be separated from the construction cut-outs by a solid white line, with a two foot 
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buffer zone followed by plastic barrels. The precautions were not implemented. Not only was 
plaintiff traveling in a lane which was intended to be closed, but it was a lane which was not 
delineated by a white line, a buffer zone or consistent plastic barrels as required by the traffic control 
plan. UDOT was aware of the traffic control plan violations but failed to take corrective action. 
UDOT' s personnel worked on the construction project daily. UDOT's agents were hired to supervise 
and assist Granite in executing UDOT's traffic control plan. UDOT negligently failed. 
UDOT alleges their negligent supervision amounts to "negligent inspection" under Section 
63-30-10(4). This exception holds the government immune from "failure to make an inspection or 
by making an inadequate or negligent inspection". Yet, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified in 
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, (Utah 1993) that this exception "most frequently 
arises when the entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building, fire, electric and 
other safety codes." Ld at 997. 
In Ericksen, a governmental construction inspector was inspecting the work of contractors 
on city property. The Utah Supreme Court distinguished between code-compliance inspections 
where a government employee inspects the property of a third party versus when a government 
employee is inspecting his own employer's property, not for code-compliance, but for compliance 
with contractual specifications. Id at 997-998. This distinction was reaffirmed in Nixon v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). The court found inspection of contractual obligations did not 
qualify for the exception under Section 63-30-10(4). Similarly, UDOT's project inspector was 
inspecting his own employer's property for compliance with contractual specifications, i.e. traffic 
control plan. Moreover, UDOT had more than just an "inspector" working on the Layton-Clearfield 
project. UDOT engineers and personnel worked on the project daily to assist in proper execution 
of the traffic control plan. There is no immunity for negligent supervision and negligent execution 
of a traffic control plan. UDOT's actions on the project site do not qualify under any exception and 
UDOT could be found liable under Utah law. 
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D. A jury could find UDOT exercised authority over Granite and determine UDOT is 
liable for Granite's negligence 
UDOT relies on Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999) to assert is not liable for 
Granite's negligence. However, there are several circumstances in which a jury is allowed to find 
an employer vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Plaintiff relies on 
Thompson to assert UDOT is liable under all, or one, of the following: 
1. UDOT is liable under the active participation standard 
"Under the 'active participation' standard, a principal employee is subject to liability for 
injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or 
asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. Thompson at 327 citing 
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973). In Thompson the Supreme Court relied on the 
Arizona case of Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 825 P.2d 5, (AZ 1992) for promulgating their 
adoption of retained control liability, under the "active participation" standard: 
"In Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the subcontractors's method of performing 
the work and instructed that a quicker but less safe method be implemented. A worker was 
injured as a direct result of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's 
method. The court concluded on the basis of these facts, that the general contractor exercised 
sufficient control over the means use in performing the contracted work to subject it to 
retained control liability." Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 at 328 (Utah 1999) 
Similarly, UDOT interfered by having Granite open two lanes of traffic even though it was clearly 
a less safe method. The plaintiff was injured as a direct result of that dangerous condition created 
by UDOT's direction. Accordingly, UDOT exercised sufficient control over Granite to subject 
UDOT to retained control liability. 
2. UDOT is liable for the failure to provide concrete barriers under Section 413 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 413 of the Restatement states: 
"Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to 
Contractor" 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
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recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical 
harm to other unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer 
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precaution, or 
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions. 
UDOT has implied that if the jury determines concrete barriers was the appropriate 
precaution, Granite is liable since UDOT later informed Granite they could use concrete barriers if 
Granite paid the expense. On the contrary, if the jury find it was negligent not to use concrete 
barriers than UDOT could be found vicariously liable for failing to provide in the contract that 
Granite use the special precaution, i.e. barriers. 
3. UDOT is vicarious liable for Granite under Section 416 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 
Section 416 of the Restatement of Torts, states: 
"Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions" 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others 
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them 
by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precaution, even 
though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise. 
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 329 (Utah 1999) 
UDOT hired Granite to perform work which created a peculiar risk of harm to the public. 
UDOT's attempted to dictate some special precautions in the contract, i.e. white lines, buffer zones, 
barrel placement, etc. However, UDOT can still be held liable for the physical harm to the plaintiff 
as a result of Granite's failure to take such precautions. Assumably, this explains why UDOT had 
several personnel overseeing the project; UDOT needed to ensure the special precautions of the 
traffic control plan were implemented. However, UDOT's personnel failed to properly supervise and 
implement those precautions. Under Section 416, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's 
failure to use reasonable care. 
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4. UDOT is vicarious liable for Granite under Section 427 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 
Section 427 of the Restatement of Torts states: 
"Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work" 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to other 
which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or 
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate, when making the contract, is subject 
to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take 
reasonable precautions against such danger. Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 329 (Utah 
1999) 
Similar to Section 416, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's negligence. 
Section 427 illustrates that, with or without special precautions, an employer can be held liable for 
an independent contractor when the work is inherently dangerous to others. With the large number 
of vehicle traffic on 1-15 and the anticipated 12 in. deep, 105 ft long and 12 ft wide cut-outs, UDOT 
had reason to know the work was inherently dangerous. UDOT is unable to escape their liability 
by transferring all negligence to Granite. 
CONCLUSION 
Multiple disputed facts prevent UDOT from prevailing on summary judgment. Moreover, 
none of UDOT's actions in this case were protected by the discretionary exception of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Also, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for the actions of Granite. 
Based on the foregoing issues, plaintiff respectfully requests the court deny UDOT's motion for 
summary judgment. 
DATED this /2 day of November, 2002. 
/ ^ K K p W A R J § \ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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LUNDELL. ^XAM BY WARD 
If they were working or not? j 
A If they were working. 
Q If they were working, they would close it 1 
down to one travel lane? 
A Correct. 
Q If they weren't working, they would open it || 
up and have two travel lanes? 
A Correct. 
Q And if they had two travel lanes, the 
inside travel lane would be directly adjacent to II 
where the hole is? II 
A Yes. 
Q Now, would there — well, as you look at 1 
both of those pictures, both on the left-hand side II 
and the right-hand side, there's a barrel only on one II 
side of the hole. Do you know why there wouldn't be | 
barrels on both sides of the hole? II 
A I don't know. j 
Q Did you ever see that as you would patrol || 
where the barrels would not be on both sides of the | 
hole? | 
A I don't recall. || 
Q Okay. But it would sinply be a natter of 11 
sone — do you know whether it was the UDOT employees II 
or the construction company employees coning along || 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY WARD 
1 and moving the barrels back and forth? 
2 A It was someone with the construction 
3 company that would do the barrels. 
4 Q Okay. And is it correct to assume that you 
5 would, at tines, visit with either the construction 
6 people or the UDOT people? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Both? 
9 A Mainly with the UDOT people. 
10 Q Did you have conversations with them about 
11 this area? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q what were the kinds of things that you 
14 discussed? 
15 A We let them know when ue had accidents and 
16 where they were at. We would oftentimes call them to 
17 let them know if we had barrels out in the road that 
18 ue had moved back, or if we had a problem, we would 
19 call them and advise them what we saw 
2 0
 Q So like sometimes when somebody might hit a 
21 barrel and knock it out or — 
2 2
 A Someone would hit a barrel and we would 
23 cone along and move it out of the road, or sometimes 
24 people would wipe out a whole row of them and we'd 
25 call and let DOT know that they'd been knocked down 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY WARD 
so they could call and have them replaced. 
Q Did you ever make any suggestions to either 
DOT or to the construction company that they night 
want to try different kinds of things besides the 
barrels out there? 
A Yes 
Q What kinds of things would you have 
suggested? 
A We discussed a barrier, concrete barrier 
Q Are those the things they call Jersey 
barriers? 
A Correct 
Q As I look at the hole in that picture, it 
looks to me like it's at least a foot deep. Did you 
ever have occasion to notice how deep they were? 
A I looked at then, but I don't think I ever 
actually measured then. They'd be a good 12 to IB 
inches deep. 
Q Okay. I wonder if I could have you draw 
the three lanes of traffic. Make one of then — put 
a couple of the concrete replacenent holes, and then 
draw the barrels in, just illustrative of how they 
would be placed when there were two lanes of traffic 
used. Could you do that on this piece of paper? Did 
I make nyself clear? 
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I A You just want like a hole where they 
don't know where they would have had a hole. 
Q It doesn't natter. It's just 
illustrative. Draw three lanes of traffic — and you 
can use this picture. Draw in a hole. It doesn't 
have to be to scale. I'n just really looking for — 
so that ue have something that shows how the barrels 
were placed. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: You know, I think I'n 
going to object as far as drawing in holes. I think 
he can certainly, based on his experience, tell you 
where the lanes — where the barrels were when he saw 
then in reference to the traffic channelization, but, 
you knou, beyond that, I think he's already testified 
that, you know, the holes he doesn't renenber 
specifically. 
Q (BY MR WARD) Well, you can use the 
Picture for reference. Just put in — well, you can 
use your own drauing. 
A I dreu one fron that night. Would that 
suffice as far as uhere the holes were at? 
Q Sure. But, see, you don't have the barrels 
Placed there, that I saw. 
A That's correct. 
Q So if you could just use that same drawing 
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WARD I probably have one. too 
CHRISTENSEN This is the last one I've 
got 
(Discussion off the record ) 
Q Can you show us off that drawing where Mr 
Johnson's — where you believe Mr Johnson's car 
first nade contact with any hole? 
A He first nade contact with the first hole 
that's shown on the diagram on the bottom 
Q Okay So that would be on the bottom of 
the diagram It appears to be, according to your 
diagram, the smallest hole 
A Yes 
Q Now, do you know what part of his car or 
wheel made contact with that? 
A I believe his left front tire went into 
that hole 
Q And was that hole the sane as, you know, in 
terms of depth, as the other holes? 
A Yes 
Q So the holes where they would replace the 
concrete weren't always uniform? They might be 
uniform in depth, but they night be longer or wider, 
depending on how much concrete had to be replaced? 
A Yes 
RENEE L STACY, CSR. RPR 
(801) 328-1188 25 
PAGE 26 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
LUNDELL, EXAM BY UARD 
Q So as you tried to put together how this 
accident happened, you think his left front tire went 
into that first small hole? 
A Yes 
Q Then what happened? 
A After going into that hole, the vehicle 
came out of that one and I believe the whole car went 
into the second hole that's shown there 
Q And that looks like about the biggest hole 
you have drawn on there Is that right? 
A Looks like it 
Q Now, once again, looking at that Deposition 
Exhibit 1 that I gave you, right there in front of 
you, that hole that you have drawn, although it's not 
the same diagram, would it be bigger or smaller than 
that hole that's shown on the left side of Exhibit 1? 
MR CHRISTENSEN Which one? 
MR UARD The left side of Exhibit 1 
MR CHRISTENSEN No I mean which hole? 
MR UARD I'm sorry The second — where 
he says the whole car went into it 
THE WITNESS These two? 
Q (BY MR WARD) Yeah 
A I think that would be smaller than the 
second hole on the diagram 
RENEE L STACY, CSR, RPR 
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1 Q So the second hole, going UP from the 
2 bottom of the diagram, that his car went into, would 
3 be bigger than the hole on the left side of Exhibit 
4 1? 
5 A Yes 
6 Q Okay What happened after his car went 
7 into the second hole? 
8 A It cane out of that second hole He went 
9 further down and again went into another hole which 
10 would be the third one on the diagram 
11 Q Did he appear to have control of the car? 
12 MR CHRISTENSEN Object To the extent 
13 that calls for speculation on the part of the 
14 witness. I'm going to object 
15 Q (BY MR UARD) And maybe there's no way to 
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25 
1 
know I don't know 
A It was going in a southbound direction 
Q Okay Do you start to see debris in these 
holes or things coming off the car? 
A Yes 
Q Uhat happens when he goes into the third 
hole? 
A As far as — I know he went through the 
third hole and came out of that one as well And the 
vehicle itself, just by looking at it, it would 
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LUNDELL EXAM BY UARD 
appear that it rolled at some point due to the damage 
on the vehicle 
(Discussion off the record ) 
(Uhereupon Deposition Exhibit No 3 was 
marked for identification ) 
Q You don't really know whether or not he 
went through hole number three all tires on the 
ground or if he rolled through hole number three or 
whatever happened? 
A Correct 
Q Okay Let me show you Exhibit No 3 and 
ask if that depicts his automobile as it came to rest 
on the freeway after the accident 
MR CHRISTENSEN You mean the bottom 
Picture of Exhibit No 3? 
MR UARD Yes 
THE UITNESS Yes 
Q (BY MR UARD) And isn't it true, officer, 
that you were actually driving by when this accident 
occurred? 
A I was driving northbound and saw the dust 
from an accident or a dust, and stopped and found 
the vehicle there 
Q Uas the dust in front of you or in your 
rearview mirror? 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY WARD 
A It was ahead of ne 
Q So Is it fair to say you were one of the 
first people on the scene? 
A I was the first one on the scene 
Q You were the first one on the scene And 
what did you find when you arrived? 
A I don't recall where the driver was, if he 
was in the vehicle or out of the vehicle I think he 
was out But what I found was this particular 
vehicle with substantial danage to it in the road 
It was actually blocking the southbound leftnost lane 
that was open to travel 
Q Is it fair to assune you nust have called 
an anbulance 
A Oh, yes 
Q And got hin sat down sonewhere or laid down 
sonewhere? 
A Yeah Ue — I do renenber having hin on 
the ground and looking that he had sone injuries, 
particularly to his legs 
Q Is it correct to assune that once you got 
hin nedically stable or taken care of, you then 
proceeded to investigate the accident? 
A Yes 
Q Is that when you went back and started to 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY WARD 
1 deternine which hole the car first went into and that 
2 type of thing? 
3 A Yes 
4 Q Did you — what, in particular, did you 
5 see, if you nade note of it or if you recall, that 
6 led you to believe he hit that first snail hole with 
7 his tire? 
8 A We found a tire track in it 
9 Q Did it appear to be fresh? 
10 A Yeah, it appeared fresh There were sone 
11 narkings ~ at the end of these holes uhere they have 
12 the rebar, there was danage to the rebar where he 
13 would have cone out of the hole 
14 Q Okay 
15 A Which would lead ne to believe that the 
16 vehicle had traveled through it, and that was 
17 substantial sized rebar that was danaged 
18 Q So if a tire went into those holes, not 
19 only did they have to deal with the depth of the 
20 hole, there was rebar sticking out, huh? 
21 A Yes 
22 Q Do you know of anything that prevented the 
23 contractor or UDOT fron placing covers over the 
24 holes? 
25 MR CHRISTENSEN Objection Lack of 
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LUNDELL. EXAM BY WARD 
foundation 
Q (BY MR WARD) You can answer 
A I don't know how they would cover these 
large holes 
Q Well, for instance if they had, oh steel 
Plates they could have set on top of the rebar. that 
would have forned a barrier so that the tire could 
have went over the hole and not down into it and into 
the rebar 
A I think if they had sone snaller sized 
holes that would work, but when their holes are 56 
feet long, I don't know that you could put a steel 
plate over it 
Q How long did you say? 
Fifty-six 
A hole was 56 feet long? 
Correct 
I didn't realize that Wow Okay Well, 
how long was the first hole he went into? 
A Just over 34 feet long 
Twelve- to IB-inch hole, 34 feet long? 
Right 
And the next one uas 56 feet long? 
Correct 
How about the hole after that? 
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1 A The third one wouid have been about 12 
2 feet, five inches long 
3 Q And then is there a fourth hole? 
4 A Yeah 
5 Q How long was it? 
6 A Ten feet, five inches 
7 Q The other accidents you said you saw during 
8 the tine construction was gc ng on there where cars' 
9 tires had gone into these hc*es, did they differ in 
10 any way fron the way this one happened? 
11 A I'n not sure I understand the question 
12 Q Well, in other words, was it basically 
13 sonebody driving along where their tire would drop 
14 into the hole and that would cause the car to lose 
15 control or careen off or sor-ethmg like that? 
16 A We had several the* had driven into the 
17 holes and sustained sone frcnt-end danage, yes 
18 Q Had you seen any rollovers like this 
19 resulting fron their tire gc ng into the hole? 
20 A I don't recall ar- -ollovers prior to 
21 this 
22 MR WARD Scott can I see the traffic 
23 control plan for just a secc^d? 
24 MR CHRISTENSEN I don't know that I 
25 brought it 
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LUKDELL, EXAM BY WARD 
1 (Discussion off the record ) 
2 Q (BY MR WARD) Did you ever see a traffic 
3 control plan for that area, trooper? 
4 A I did not 
5 Q So you don't really knou whether or not the 
6 placement of the barrels corresponded with the 
7 traffic control plan developed for that area? 
a A I don't know 
9 Q Were you ever told anything by either UDOT 
10 or the contractor as to why they did not use your 
11 suggestion or the other trooper's suggestion of a 
12 Jersey barrier versus just using barrels? 
13 MR CHRISTENSEN: To the extent that 
14 indicates that there were other troopers that nade 
15 that sane suggestion. I'n going to object to it as 
1G nischaractenzing this witness's testimony 
17 Q (BY MR. WARD) I misunderstood I thought 
18 you said you and others had made that suggestion. 
19 A I had made that to UDOT, yes. Others, I 
20 don't know 
21 Q I apologize Was there ever any response 
22 to you as to why they didn't use a Jersey barrier 
23 there rather than just these plastic barrels? 
24 A It was my understanding that it was a UDOT 
25 decision and part of it was money 
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Q It's cheaper to use the barrels? 
A Yes 
MR WARD: Okay. That's all I have. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR CHRISTENSEN: 
Q Trooper Lundell, I have a couple of 
questions I'd like to ask you about Did you see any 
evidence of any brake marks or skid marks before the 
vehicle apparently went into the lowest hole on your 
field diagram? 
A I didn't see any, no. 
Q Did you see any evidence that, in order to 
get into that first hole, that the car had to strike 
one of the traffic control barrels? 
A I know there was a barrel that had been 
hit, but where it was placed, I don't know There's 
that one, and there's one in the hole as well 
someplace 
Q Right I'm using your photographs, if you 
don't mind, because I noticed there appeared to be a 
couple of — let me show you two of these 
Photographs There might be more if you'll give me 
just a moment. 
A Sure. 
Q There appear to be two of the photographs 
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1 you brought with you. One of them shows the base of 
2 a barrel Is that what that is? 
3 A That would appear to be a base, yes 
4 Q And that base is actually in one of the 
5 holes; is that correct? 
6 A Yes 
7 Q And the other photograph appears to be just 
8 a close-up view of that 
9 A Yes 
10 Q Does that appear to you to be the result of 
11 something or someone moving the barrel into the hole? 
12 A On the base? 
13 Q Yeah 
14 A Generally, if you strike these barrels, the 
15 bases will stay on the ground and the barrels POP off 
16 the bases, so I don't know if that base had been on 
17 the road or knocked in I couldn't answer that. 
18 Q In Exhibit 2, I think it was, you drew in 
19 some typical barrels, if I understand correctly. 
20 A Correct. 
21 Q And those were on the seam — 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q — of the concrete, not in any of the 
24 excavations? 
25 A I know they had had barrels in some of the 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
holes, but I don't know if this particular area that 
night had any barrels particularly in the hole or 
not. It's possible 
Q Deposition Exhibit 1 shows some of the 
barrels on the seam, correct? 
A Yes, correct 
Q And it's not uncommon to have these barrels 
moved by vehicles striking them, is that — 
A That's correct. 
Q And there are time when, if it's just a 
glancing blow, the entire barrel and base will move, 
won't they? 
A Routinely, if that barrel is hit. it will 
disconnect and leave the base in the road. 
Q Have you seen occasions -- for example, on 
the left-hand photograph of Exhibit 1 seems to show 
one of the barrels that has been moved and it appears 
to be on its base. Is that correct? 
A I see one sitting in the road You mean 
this other one? 
Q Yeah, this one to the left 
A It would routine for them when they poured 
new concrete that they would place a barrel at the 
beginning so they wouldn't drive over the fresh 
concrete until it cured 
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LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
! Q So that was an additional barrel to the 
2 left of the channelization barrels? 
3 A That second one. Just looking at the 
4 picture it appears to be a different color or fresh 
5 concrete, and It was routine for then to place a 
6 barrel over the new stuff so their workers wouldn't 
7 run over it 
8 Q And on the right-hand side of Exhibit 1, is 
9 that a base still upon a barrel? 
10 A I think it's just a black — well — the 
11 bases are — yeah, it would appear to be a base with 
12 the barrel — you're looking towards the — 
13 Q Okay 
14 A — edge 
15 Q Now. in order for this — based on your 
16 reconstruction of the accident, would it have 
17 required this car to leave the travel portion, the 
18 narked travel lane to strike the hole, the first 
19 hole? 
20 A Yeah 
21 Q Now. in your accident report forn. you 
22 indicated on the second page of it — oh Let ne ask 
23 you another question first What was the weather 
24 like at the tine of this accident? 
25 A I don't recall I think it was — I nean, 
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LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
1 it was 4 00 in the norning so I think it was a clear 
2 night or sonething 
3 Q The reason I*n wondering ~ 
4 A The boxes are narked, but I couldn't tell 
5 you which box shows the weather 
6 Q The reason I'n wondering is it looks like 
7 there's water in the botton of these bases, and the 
8 weather in the picture — and I don't know when these 
9 photographs were taken 
10 A I don't know, either 
11 Q These color photographs, 
12 A I don't know I do not believe there was 
13 any water on the night of the accident 
14 Q That's what I was wondering 
15 A They were dry 
1G Q On the second page of your report you 
17 indicated that the est mated travel speed of the 
18 Johnson vehicle was 70 niles an hour, correct? 
19 A Yes 
20 Q And the posted speed was what? 
21 A Posted speed was 65 
22 Q Now, as I understand it. that's — the 
23 naxinun speed — the posted speed is the naxmun 
24 speed under best conditions, correct? 
25 A Yes 
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1 Q And you have an additional speed underneath 
2 the posted speed of 50 niles an hour, is that 
3 correct? 
4 A Right 
5 Q What did you intend by that? 
6 A They did post advisory speed linits through 
7 this project that were posted at 50 They were the 
8 orange advisory speed but they still had the 65 
9 speed linit signs as well 
10 Q Fron a law enforcenent perspective, at 4 30 
11 in the norning in a construction zone, is 70 niles an 
12 hour an appropriate speed? 
13 A Yes and no 
14 Q What's the yes part of it? 
15 A Is it appropriate? It would depend on what 
16 you think your abilities to drive are 
17 Q Do you think it's a safe speed to be 
18 traveling in that left-hand lane? 
19 A No 
20 Q Did you ever have an opportunity to speak 
21 with the driver of the vehicle about what happened? 
22 A Briefly, yes 
23 Q At the scene? 
24 A Yes 
25 Q And what did he tell you at the scene? 
1 
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN 
1 A He said he was just driving along, and the 
2 next thing he knew, he hit one of the holes and lost 
3 control 
4 Q Now you indicated that you had sone 
5 concerns about using concrete barriers 
6 A Yes 
7 Q Were the plastic channel control devices 
8 were those typical lane channelizations in 
9 construction that you'd see on the freeways four 
10 nonths before then? 
11 A No 
12 Q Were there both Jersey barriers and — 
13 A Prior to this project, on the project prior 
14 to this one in the south end m Centerville, they 
15 actually had a wall divider 
16 Q Now if they use Jersey barriers those 
17 would have to be placed to the left of the traffc 
18 sean if you're looking at the right-hand picture in 
19 Exhibit 1, correct? 
20 A Yes 
21 Q And they would have had to have been placed 
22 to the right of the sean on the left-hand picture of 
23 Exhibit 1 correct? 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
Yes 
Now. would there have been roon enough for 
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Utah Department of Transportation 
P.O. Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
March 20,1996 
1111 Brickyard R 
Post Office Box 30 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0 
Telephone (801) 486-2 
Fax (801) 487-1 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: Project No. IM -15 - 7 (191) 332 and Pin No. 19 
South LaytontoSR-193 
Kent: 
As discussed in the preconstruction conference for this project, we would like to 
propose the use of precast concrete barriers to channel traffic and protect our workers, UDOT 
emloyees overseeing the project and the traveling public. These barriers would be used in lieu 
of the plastic drums and channelizing devices on the traffic control phases in the plans and 
specifications. The speed limit in this section of 1-15 has been raised from 55 MPH, at the time 
of bid in September 1995, to 65 MPH. Our concern is for the safety of our workers and UDOT 
employees. Traffic would be very close to their work and they would be virtually unprotected 
without the concrete barrier. 
Attached is a rough sketch of how we propose to place the barriers in three phases and 
use asphalt crossovers \n the median at the south end of the project and end approximately at 
station 660+00 at the north end. From station 660+00 northward to the end of the project, work 
would be accomplished with drums and traffic control as outlined in the drawings and 
specifications. This would be required due to the excessive elevation difference between the 
northbound and southbound lanes at that portion of the project. 
The barrier footage was calculated by installing barrier through the entire project 
northbound and southbound. In Phase II and Phase III approximately 18,500 If of barrier would 
be removed to allow an area approximately 1320 foot in length at each offramp and another 
1320 foot at each onramp. The traffic would be channeled through the on and off ramps with the 
use of plastic drums. UDOTs traffic engineers will need to specify what might be needed at 
these locations. We would propose message boards at each end of the project to advise the 
motoring public that some phases will have an express lane that will not have an exit 
throughout the entire project and that they will have to travel in mandatory lanes to be able to exit 
1-15 between Kaysville and Clearfield. 
In evaluating this plan, we would change our schedule from the one proposed at the 
preconstruction meeting,ie., working Saturday through tuesday double shift; to working seven 
days per week behind the protection of the concrete barrier. This would reduce the calendar 
weeks that traffic control would be restricting lanes from 35 weeks to 20 weeks. A savings of 
105 days. However, it would take much fonger to set, move and remove the concrete barrier. 
We estimate an additional 40 days that would need to be added to the contract time. There 
would still be a net savings of 56 days that traffic would not be disrupted, provided that the repair 
quantities do not overrun. Using concrete barrier would eliminate the problems with peak traffic 
hours by providing two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times. 
Attached is a breakdown of the estimated cost to change to concrete barriers on this 
project. It has been assumed that all the concrete barrier is stockpiled and available at UDOPs 
District 1 Yard. We also request, whether this proposal is accepted or not, that throughout this 
project the speed limit be reduced to 55MPH, as it was when the project was originally bid If 
you have any questions please call me at 231-5780. We need a decision as soon as possible so 
we can advise our subcontractors and suppliers when work will begin on this project. 
Memorandum UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANS PORT ATI Of 
Region One 
DATE: March 21,1996 
TO: Dyke LeFevre, P.E. 
Region One Director 
FROM: Kent Nichols 
Project Engineer 
SUBJECT: Project No. INI -15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Attached you will find a proposal from Gibbons and Reed Company to use precast barrier to 
channelize traffic and provide protection for the project workers, department personnel, and the 
traveling public. 
Based on this proposal the confractor would start his operations in the median area. The inside 
lane on both the northbound and southbound lanes would be closed off with barrier and the 
drainage modifications, shoulder work, and concrete repair on the inside lanes would be 
completed. 
The northbound traffic would then be moved onto the inside lanes with the inside lane of the 
southbound lanes being used as an 'express' lane for the north bound traffic. Openings for the 
various off ramps would be provided. The concrete rehabilition on the two outside northbound 
lanes and outside northbound shoulder work would proceed. 
When the work on the northbound lanes was complete the south bound traffic would be shifted 
into the median area and work on the two outside southbound lanes and outside southbound 
shoulder would be completed. 
The estimated cost to use control plan would be $714,275.00. The cost savings through 
reduction in the amount of some bid items together with elimination of some items be 
approximately $173,800.00. The estimated additional cost would be $540,475.00. 
There is an overwhelming feeling among the people who wil l be involved in the contract that 
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration. I share that feeling and 
recommend that this proposal be given serious consideration. 
Attachment: 4 sheets 
cc: Region File 
Project File 
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction 
E1BB0I1S SL HEEO COmPfiny SINCE 1915 
1111 Brickyard Road 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429 
Telephone (801) 486-2411 
March 29, 1996 
Fax (801) 487-1603 
Utah Department of Tianspoitation 
P. O. Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: Project No. IM - 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No. 19 
South Lay ton to SR-193 
Dear Kent: 
Following discussions in Tuesday's meeting at UDOT's District One office, we 
propose the following traffic control plan for this project. We propose to start the project 
using the outside shoulder phasing as per the contract drawings. During this phase the 
outside shoulders on die entire project will be excavated and replaced with asphalt. Once the 
asphalt shoulders are replaced, precast barrier would be hauled from stockpiles at the District 
One yard and installed per die attached drawing. Phasing die work with piecast barriers 
allows for two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times. This would eliminate the need 
for peak and off-peak work requirements on the 1-15 portion of the work and allow us to 
work more hours to complele the project. The traffic crossovers would be located at the 
same locations as proposed in our March 20, 1996, letter. The work north of station 
660+00 would be completed behind drums. 
This project allowed a contract completion of 140 work days. Starting the project on 
April 15, 1996, and allowing 140 woik days @ 5 days per week would complete the project 
November 4, 1996, after subtracting the holidays during this period. Using the pLecast 
barrier option we can complete the work by October 7, 1996, a savings of 28 days. This 
savings means 28 less days that UDOT would not have inspectors on die project and 28 less 
days the traveling public would be subjected to constricted traffic flow. 
Utah Department of Transportation 
March 29, 1996 
Page Two 
Attached is a breakdown of the cost associated with this proposal. There would be a 
considerable cost savings if UDOT had die three CZ Attenuators in stock. This savings 
would be $78,000.00. An additional savings of $67,200.00 could be recognized if the 
crossovers could remain in the median for future projects to the north or to the south of this 
project. Temporary stiiping will be paid for at the contract unit price. We have not allowed 
for drainage in the median at the crossover locations. 
If this proposal is approved, we will commit to a final completion date of September 
30, 1996. In die event we do not complete the work by this date, we would expect 
liquidated damages of $2,070.00 per calendar day, per section 108.9 of die 1992 Standard 
Specifications. We would expect any weather related shutdown of the work to be added to 
diis completion date on a day for day basis. We would also expect a bonus of $2,070.00 per 
calendar day for each day we complete prior to September 30, 1996. 
As we have mentioned in other letters, our concern on diis project and the reason for 
diis proposal is the safety of our workers, UDOT employees and the traveling public. We 
also request diat the speed limit throughout diis project be reduced back to die 55 MPH 
speed limit as it was at the time this project was bid regardless of whether or not you accept 
diis proposal. 
Please review diis plan and proposal and let us know your intent as to a decision by 
April 3, 1996, so we can plan our work and our subcontractors. If you have any questions, 
please call Grant Fowkes or myself. 
Sincerely, 
Gimom & REED COMPANY 
Lindsay / 
CL:sp 
Michael O Leavitt 
Governor 
Thorn is R. Wirne 
ExccuUivc Director 
Dyl<e M Lc Fcvre, VE. 
R« gton (Jut Director 
Apiil 2, 1996 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
REGION ONE 
169 North Wall Avenue 
PO Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah B44I2 2580 
(801) 399 5921 
Fax (801)399 5926 
Cointms 
Glen E. Br 
Chin 
Todd G We 
J imcs G La 
Ted D L. 
I W M C 
Gibbons & Reed Company 
1111 Brickyard Road 
Post Office Box 30429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84130-0429 
Att: Chuck Lindsey 
Subject. PiojectNo IM-15-7(191)332 andPinNo. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Change in Traffic Control Plan 
Dear Chuck: 
I have reviewed the cost bieak down in your letter of March 29, 1996 with Dyke LeFev.e 
Co>2°2 ' " * StanC'S ^  d06S "^  ^  that WG C0Uld «* » ^ 
In o.der lor us to justify the p.oposal for a change in the uaffic control plan using user cost 
U 0 000 , T , ^ a"8e W°Uld ^ t0 « * * tW° C0nditi0ns- D be j« *» -ng of 
$450,000 o, below, and 2 time savings must be at least a 50 days time saving, whichls
 w hat we 
discussed during our initial conversations on this proposal. 
4::s,S'e door on ",is proposai and • « * " - i t e *» ™»«» «*»*, i,™ 
1 Couc.ele Barrier, (load haul, inslall,
 m 0 Ve, and return lo Region One yard) We believe that 
the cos. of this , em could be reduced. During one of our conversations I sur-geste to ve 
consrc er borce Account on this item, and most likely a lump sum item would be „ „ 
acceptable to our management people 
2 Crossoveis Wc would suggest that you review the p.ices for Granular Boirow and 
Untieated Base Course material. We believe that the cost to install tins material in the cross 
overs would less expensive than in the shoulder areas. 
or 
Page 2 
April 2, 1996 
3. Message Boards,
 CouId be eliminated ta t h e advanced wamers would remai„ as „ r i g i n a l l y 
Respectjiilly; 
Kent A. Nichols, 
Project Engineer 
cc: Region One File 
Dyke LeFevre, Region One Director 
Utah Department of Transportation 
P.O. Box 12580 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: Project No. IM - 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
Dear Kent: 
April 11, 1996 
1111 Brickyard Roe 
Post Office Box 304< 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-04$ 
Telephone (801) 486-241 
fax(801)487-16C 
We have reviewed UDOT correspondence dated April 2, 1996 and in our judgement 
we can not meet the ciiteria established by UDOT to justify a change in the traffic control 
plan. 
The net cost of the change itemized in our letter dated March 29, 1996 could be reduced 
to approximately $ 572,832 by reducing the cost of 5410 ton of 8" UTBC to $ 12.70 per ton, 
leaving the crossovers in place and eliminating the message boards. If UDOT were to provide the 
CZ Attenuators another $ 78,000 could be eliminated. 
However, Gibbons and Reed Company can not reduce the time savings beyond the 28 
days or alter the other conditions proposed in its letter dated March 29, 1996. 
At this point, Gibbons and Reed will proceed with the original traffic control plan 
established by UDOT. We lemain available to continue discussions concerning this matter. 
Sincerely, 
GIBBONS & REEDJCGMPANY 
I* 
leeoris & HEEU comnmj SINCE W 
1111 Brickyard Roc 
Post Office Box 304' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 04< 
Utah Department of Transportation July 2, 1996 
P.O. Box 12580 Telephone (801) 486 24 
Ogden, Utah 84412 Fax(801) 487-16C 
Attention: Kent Nichols 
Re: IM-15-7(191)332, 1-15 South Layton to SR-193 
Kent: 
We have had numerous close calls on this project with vehicles coming into the work 
zone. Last early this morning we had a vehicle go through the drums on the south end of the 
project on the north bound lanes and drove into and through a full depth slab replacement that 
had just been excavated. Minutes before we had workers installing dowels in this area. We 
were fortunate not to have workers In the area at the time of the accident. The traffic control 
plan along with the speeds people are driving on 1-15 have put our people and UDOT employees 
in jepordary every night. This has been a concern of ours before this project ever started and 
have made recommendations to change the traffic plan to a safer situation with barrier. We 
have also asked for the speed limit to be reduced to 55 MPH, which was the speed limit at the 
time this job was bid, which we were told could not be done. Safety of workers has been ignored 
and dollars has been the guiding factor. 
We request that the peak hour schedule be adjusted one hour earlier in the mornings 
and a half an hour longer in the afternoon to allow us to work strictly days starting Monday July 
8,1996. By shifting our workers to a daytime operation we will avoid the traffic problems we are 
experiencing at night and it will be less confusing for the traveling public during night time hours. 
Please let us know as soon as possible as to the changes in off peak hour work hours. 
We do plan to change our night crew to days beginning Monday. 
Memoranaum UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Region One 
DATE: July 2,1996 
i< TO: Dyke LeFevre, P.E. 
Region One Director 
THRU: Stan Nielsen, P.E. 
Region One Construction Engineer 
FROM: Kent Nichols 
Project Engineer 
SUBJECT: Project No. INI -15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19 
South Layton to SR-193 
As you are aware we have had serious problems with control of traffic and providing safety for 
our contractors worker as well as our personnel. The traffic is traveling the posted speed limit 
which is 65 M.P.H. and this adds to our anxiety level. It must be noted that at the time the 
contract was advertised and awarded the speed limit was 55 M.P.H. I believe that it is in our 
best interest to post the speed limit back down to the 55 M.P.H. for the duration of this project. 
Early this morning we had workmen installing dowels in a section of full depth repair. 
Fortunately they left the site of the work to get more dowels, shortly after they left the site a car 
knocked down two barrels and was into the work zone. The car ran into the full depth hole and 
the momentum of the vehicle was arrested almost completely by its impact with the open face 
of the concrete slab. The vehicle did have sufficient momentum to carry it out of the hole but it 
came to rest on top of the of the slab on the edge of the hole. There is no doubt that we would 
have had people killed but for the fact they were temporarily out of materials. 
Because of the type of work we are doing, that is small partial depth repairs, the work is slow 
and tedious. And it is made even slower by the fact that we are doing the work at night. With 
the near miss that we had last night the contractor is formally requesting that we make the 
following minimum changes: that, 1) the restricted peak time hours in the morning be reduced 
by one hour in the morning and the peak time hours in the afternoon be reduced by one half 
hour (preferably one hour), and 2) the speed limit be reduced to 55 M.P.H. as discussed above. 
The contractor feels that he must work in the daylight hours to make the job site safer. 
There is an over-whelming feeling among the people who are involved in the contract that 
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration, i share that feeling and 
recommend that the proposal to use precast barrier and cross-overs be reviewed and given 
serious consideration. 
The contractor has hand delivered a letter, copy attached, which echos my sentiments with 
regards to the conditions on the project. 
This letter will be followed by a Change Order, specification change, to reduce the peak hour 
restrictions. The contractor is going to be hard put to complete this project on schedule if some 
way isn't found to increase productivity. 
Attachment: 1 sheet 
cc: Region File 
Project File 
Clint Topham, P.E., Deputy Director 
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
• * * 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS 
& REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants, 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 12th 
day of June, 2000, commencing at the hour of 2:10 p.m., 
the deposition of KENT A. NICHOLS, produced as a witness 
at the instance and request of the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action before the above-named Court, was 
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Gridley Ward & 
Shaw, 849 West Hillfield Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah. 
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Civil No. 970700411 PI 
Deposition of: 
KENT A. NICHOLS 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
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(Witness reviewed document.) 
A The three-foot section applies to the work that 
apparently would have occurred on the outside shoulder. 
Q Okay. And does the two-foot buffer section 
apply to the work that occurred on the center lane, 
inside? 
A That's true. 
Q And that buffer is after the barrels? In other 
words, you would have your construction zone, you would 
put your barrels on the edge of the construction zone, 
and then have a two foot--I'm sorry--you put your barrels 
there and then two feet would be--in front of the barrel 
would be the buffer zone, or do you put the barrels out 
two feet from the construction zone? 
A The barrels would be two feet from the edge of 
the travel lane. 
Q The barrels would be two feet from the edge of 
the travel lane? 
A That's correct. 
20 Q Is that right? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q How would the travel lane be delineated? 
23 A With paint striping. 
24 Q So if I understood what you are saying, you 
25 J would have--this will be the outside travel lane. That 
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would be the striping. And then let's make this line the 
construction zone line. Okay? 
Now, my question is let's say you are 
going--you are heading to the top of the page or 
heading--do you see what I'm saying? You are driving 
this way--
A Sure. 
Q --like this. So as I understand it, what you 
said is the barrels would be two feet into the travel 
lane from--or no, you said the barrels would be two feet 
away from the marked line of the travel lane. So there 
would be a marked line like this and then the barrels 
would be two feet from that marked line? 
A There would be a marked line, but it wouldn't 
be dashed like you just wrote it. It would be solid on 
that inside. 
Q Solid, and then the barrels would be two feet 
from that? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
be from 
A 
face of 
Yes. 
Toward the construction zone? 
Toward the construction zone. 
So it would be like this. How far would they 
the construction zone, the barrels? Two feet? 
Well, the construction zone could be on the 
the barrels actually. 
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Q So it would look like that. You would have one 
travel lane here. Let's put travel lane, one travel lane 
here. Is that correct? 
A That's--
Q You would have a solid line, correct? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And then you would have barrels two feet from 
that solid line? 
A That's right. 
Q And then the construction zone can start from 
basically anywhere from where those barrels are in, 
correct? 
A Including the position of the barrels 
(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.) 
Q What we have just talked about I have tried to 
draw out and it's now marked Exhibit 2. Would that be an 
accurate representation of how you should put those 
barrels on a two-foot buffer zone? 
A That's the way I would interpret it from the 
plan, yes. 
Q And the plan--does the plan dictate where if 
the barrel should be on the edge of the construction zone 
or five feet from it? Or does it make any comment about 
that at all? 
A These plans here don't appear to me to show 
31 
1 is heavier. And by that point in time, the holes should 
2 have already been filled in? 
3 A That's true. 
4 Q And you know, don't you, for a fact that that 
5 didn1t occur? 
6 A That did not occur. 
7 Q Does the contract allow you to fine them for 
8 not adhering to the contract? 
9 A Not that I recall. 
10 Q What can you do when you have a major 
11 contractor who is not adhering to the terms of the 
12 contract that affects the safety to the motoring public? 
13 What can UDOT do? 
14 A I don't really know. I have never been put in 
15 that position before. 
16 Q Did you report to your superiors that, "Hey, 
17 they are not doing what they are supposed to do"? 
18 A No. 
19 Q You don't remember that? 
20 A At least I don't remember that I did. However, 
21 I did have several conversations with them about this. 
22 And so I guess the answer would be yes, because I did 
23 have conversations with my supervisor about this, my 
24 direct supervisor, and his supervisor. 
25 J Q Were there any instructions passed down to you 
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to pass 
A 
on to Granite? 
indicated 
Q 
right? 
A 
Just do it the 
In other words, 
Uh-huh. 
way 
go 
the 
back 
specifications 
and tell them to do it 
Q Yes? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you convey your concerns to the project 
manager for Granite, either Mr. Lindsay, Chuck Lindsay 
or--
A I believe Chuck would have been--I believe 
Chuck would have been in this particular area which is 
the southbound lane--
Q Right. 
(Witness reviewed photograph.) 
A It might have been Jim by then. I'm not right 
sure which one would have been in charge at that point. 
Q Would it be fair to say, though, Mr. Nichols, 
that whichever one it was, you did talk to them about 
your concerns? 
A Yes, we talked to them. 
Q Is it fair to assume that they assured you they 
would go ahead and straighten it out? Or did they just 
tell you, "Tough luck, this is the way it's going to be"? 
52 
1 Q Have you been involved in projects that have 
2 done concrete slab replacement before like this? 
3 A Not like this one, no. 
4 Q Where there has been any concrete slab 
5 replacement at all? 
6 A Only on a project that wasn't in traffic. 
7 Q So you didn't worry about having open holes 
8 or--
9 A Not on that job. 
10 Q Are you a member of AASHTO? 
11 A UDOT is. 
12 Q Do you read their journals and review their 
13 publications? 
14 A I very seldom see them. 
15 Q What sources do you rely on for your 
16 information in helping you to appropriately review 
17 traffic control plans? Do you understand my question? 
18 In other words, what is the source of your knowledge that 
19 allows you to review traffic control plans for propriety? 
20 A Reference to the MUTCD manual. 
21 Q Is that all, just that? 
22 A Basically that's the key manual. 
23 Q Tell me roughly where you would point me to in 
24 the MUTCD manual about dropoffs. 
25 A I would have to look it up myself. 
47 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
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VS. 
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1 I control, 
2 I Q. Tell me a little about that eight-hour class. 
3 I What do they teach you in there? 
4 A. The distance for signs that we put up, you 
5 know, for the space in between the signs and length of 
6 our tapers for our barrels. Just the things for 
7 safety and that. 
8 Q. What kind of text do they refer you to? 
9 A. There's a manual, Manual Uniform Traffic 
10 Control Devices, MUTCD. 
11 Q. Anything besides that? 
12 A. Not that Ifm familiar with right now. 
13 Q. Do you believe you have a working knowledge 
14 of the MUTCD? 
15 A. Yes, a rudimentary one, yes. 
16 Q. Have you had any training on what kinds of 
17 I safety standards to follow when you have a pavement 
18 | dropoff next to travel lanes? 
19 I A. Just what's in our plans and our special 
20 I provisions. 
21 I Q. And that would be basically what's in the 
22 MUTCD? 
23 I A. As far as I know. 
24 I Q. Do you have any understanding of different 
25 I standards to use depending on the depth of the 
11 
TAMMY SIEBERT * CSR, RPR 
1 dropoff? 
2 A. Just what I have read in the prints. 
3 Q. Tell me what you understand about different 
4 depths of dropoffs. 
5 A. Well, according to the prints, if there's 
6 over a six-inch dropoff, itfs supposed to be barrier 
7 wall and if it's less, we have other standards, 
8 Q. What's a barrier wall? 
9 A. Concrete barrier. 
10 Q. Did the standards talk about any kind of a 
11 buffer zone? 
12 A. I couldn't tell you honestly right now off 
13 the top of my head. 
14 Q. How about striping delineation? 
15 A. According to the prints on the project, we 
16 was supposed to stripe the outside shoulder for the 
17 delineation of the outside lane while we move traffic 
18 over to the shoulder of the road. 
19 I Q. Are you talking about the plans on the 
20 I specific project we are here about? 
21 I A. Yes. 
22 1 Q. I'm talking generally MUTCD, is there any --
23 I A. Just all I'm familiar with right now are the 
24 | plans that we used on that particular job. 
25 | Q. And you had an opportunity to review those? 
12 
TAMMY SIEBERT * CSR, RPR 
1 barrels. And that!s what controlled it. 
2 Q. (BY MR. WARD) Let me back it up. You 
3 testified earlier that the standard next to a dropoff 
4 of more than six inches was to use jersey barriers. 
5 A. Yes, according to sheet four. 
6 Q. Exactly. So if jersey barriers weren't used 
7 and barrels were used because it was cheaper and yet 
8 the state knew and Granite knew that jersey barriers 
9 really were the industry and national standard for 
10 those kind of dropoffs, whose responsibility is it to 
11 supply the barriers? Is it the state's responsibility 
12 to make sure Granite does it or is Granite allowed to 
13 make an economic decision that they won't do it 
14 because it's cheaper? 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Objection, that assumes 
16 facts not in evidence. 
17 THE WITNESS: That wasn't Granite's decision 
18 or ours on our level. 
19 Q. (BY MR. WARD) I understand. I guess what 
20 I'm saying is, have you ever been in a situation 
21 before -- let's see if I can flesh this out so I 
22 understand what you're telling me, where you know that 
23 there's a standard and the contractor says, well, I 
24 want to do that and the state says, well, go ahead, 
25 but it's your cost, not ours. Would you then expect 
43 
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the contractor to go ahead and do it or is the 
contractor excused from doing it because the 
contractor thinks it's too expensive? 
A. No. As far as I understand things, the 
contractor, regardless of the cost, is required to do 
what specs call for. 
Q. That makes sense to me too. So I guess my 
question is, if you thought jersey barriers were 
required and that was initially contemplated and 
somehow it gets changed in the mix there and barrels 
start being used, did you have the authority to order 
them to use injury barriers? 
A. No. 
Q. Because the bid involved the use of barrels? 
A. They bid it as barrels. And like I said 
before, the prints came out with barrels and that's 
what we did and we was within specifications by using 
barrels. The choice not to use barrier wall came from 
either Salt Lake down to the main office from our 
region headquarters, that was way beyond. We couldn't 
have forced them to use barrier walls even if we 
wanted them after the prints came out and they bid it 
as barrels. 
Q. That's what I think you have explained to me. 
The ultimate decision was made by the state? 
44 
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safety manager in the region* 
Q. Did Mr. Smith come and say, hey, Phil, I have 
investigated this thing and it appears as though they 
were putting those barrels right on the seam rather 
than giving a little buffer zone here. I want you to 
get on those guys and make sure they don't do that 
anymore. 
A. I can't recollect whether he did or not. 
It's been three years ago. 
Q. I can represent to you that the Granite 
Construction people said that nobody ever told them to 
change the traffic delineation markers they had there. 
So you wouldn't have told them to do that? 
A. No. 
Q. So you don't disagree with that 
representation on their part that nobody from UDOT 
ever told them to change anything. 
A. No. 
Q. There were apparently some other accidents 
out there similar, people entering in the holes. I 
have been told about not only my accident, but at 
least two other incidents where people went into the 
holes. Were you familiar with those? 
A. Vaguely familiar with one that happened down 
on the south end down by the Kaysville interchange 
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October 8, 2002 11:20 a.m. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
DYKE LeFEVRE, 
called as a witness, by and on behalf of 
the plaintiff, having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WARD: 
Q. Would you state your full name, please? 
A. Dyke LeFevre. 
Q. Are you presently employed by UDOT? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you retired? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you retire? 
A. July of 2000. 
Q. What was your position with UDOT when you retired? 
A. Region one director. 
Q. How long had you been in that position? 
A. Since '95. 
Q. Did you work for UDOT before that time? 
A. Yes, 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
For how long? 
Total of 39 years. 
What was your position when you first started? 
1 I Q. It appears that the work area extends in several 
2 I lanes, correct? 
3 A. Two lanes, plus a buffer. 
4 Q. You haven't reviewed the special provisions 
5 applicable to this contract, have you? 
6 A. Not for five years. 
7 Q. Would this be one of those areas if there was a 
8 question, that might be something that the contractor would 
9 take to the field engineer? 
10 MR. WARD: Asks him to speculate. How would he 
11 know what the contractor would do? 
12 Q. (BY MR. CHRISTENSEN) We have been talking about — 
13 A. The interpretations of the things is probably 
14 between the project engineer and the contractor. 
15 Q. If the contractor then agreed with the 
16 interpretation of the field engineer, there wouldn't be any 
17 need to start that process of requesting change orders, et 
18 cetera, et cetera? 
19 A. If they were to follow it. 
20 Q. Are you aware of any documentation generated by the 
21 State in response to Granite's request for the use of 
22 concrete barriers, a formal written response to their 
23 request, whether it was considered a change order or not? Do 
24 you know whether the State ever wrote a letter following your 
25 meeting with Granite? 
38 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A. I don't know. Mr. Nichols was instructed to, but I 
don't know if he ever wrote one. It would have been up to 
him to write it, because the request came through him and he 
would be the one to answer it. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's all the questions I have. 
Thank you. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JACOBSON: 
Q. The only thing I wanted to clarify was back at the 
start when you were asked how long you had been a region one 
director. You said since 1995. It seems like it was my 
recollection you also operated in that capacity at some prior 
time period; is that correct? 
A. '89 — part of '89 and part of '90, I was the 
regional director, and then I went to the State 
preconstruction engineer from '90 to '95. Five years prior 
to that time, I was the director of region four or district 
18 four from '85 to '89, the fall of '89. 
19 MR. JACOBSON: That's all I have. 
20 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. WARD: 
22 Q. Mr. Nielson testified that it is not infrequent 
23 that contractors will come in with change orders and use 
24 those change orders to request money to inflate their profits 
25 on the job. Would you agree with that? 
39 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
ICONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS 
REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I - V, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO. 970700411PI 
VOLUME II— DEPOSITION 
OF: DYKE LeFEVRE 
Held November 5, 20Q2 
REPORTED BY: 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
<D®PY 
Volume II, deposition of DYKE LeFEVRE, taken on 
behalf of the Plaintiff, at 635 25th Street, Ocfden, 
Utah, commencing at 1:10 p.m. on November 5, 2002, 
before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah, pursuant, to Notice. 
* * * * 
REPORTING SERVICES INC 
3 3 3 S O U T H RIO C R A N D E SUITE F 
S ^ T t AI^ CF CITY UTAH 8 4 1 0 1 
(801) 3 2 8 i 188 / 1 8 0 0 DEPOMAX 
FAX 3 2 8 1189 
LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
1 Q Okay. 
2 J MR. JACOBSON: Are you referring to any of 
3 those elements, including the actual completion of 
4 the work? 
5 Q (BY MR. WARD) With the caveat being -- you 
6 obviously hired Granite to complete the work. I 
7 understand that. 
8 A But to do the construction? 
9 Q Right. 
10 A But I can't recall if we hired anybody to 
11 do any design, that I can remember. 
12 Q Or outside supervision, other than --
13 nobody else? 
14 A I don't recall any. 
15 Q You didn't hire anybody at any time to do 
16 any safety studies? 
17 A Oh, we do, but I can't remember if we did 
18 anything on this project. 
19 Q Well, if you would have, you, I assume, 
20 would have put that in your affidavit, wouldn't you? 
21 A Not that I can remember that we did. 
22 Q So that's why you didn't put it in your 
23 affidavit? 
24 A Right. 
25 Q Okay. So in the design and supervision, 
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MR. JACOBSON: What review --
MR. WARD: I do not have to preview my 
questions to you. 
MR. JACOBSON: What review are you claiming 
he's done? 
MR. WARD: He's talking about paragraph 
nine. 
MR. JACOBSON: What review are you claiming 
he's done? 
MR. WARD: Well, review or development. He 
talks about "worked together with officials of the 
Federal Highway Administration." I want to find out 
about what they worked together on. I'm entitled to 
find that out. 
Q So my question is: As you see this 
document in front of you, the last page of that 
Exhibit No. 5 of what's part of the special 
provisions, who is the person referred to there where 
it says "prior approval by the engineer" in the first 
paragraph? Is that the project engineer? 
A The project engineer is the final on all 
proj ects. 
Q Well, so is that -- it doesn't say what 
type of engineer, construction engineer or project 
engineer, so should we assume project engineer? 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
A He has to approve it, but if there's things 
that he is not sure of, he goes to a higher engineer, 
but he's the one that finally has to say yea or nay 
because he's the one that's managing the project. 
MR. JACOBSON: And let me just object to 
that question and answer. You're asking him to 
interpret what's in this document. This is a 
document that was in your possession prior to his 
deposition. It has nothing to do with what's 
mentioned in the affidavit. 
MR. WARD: I'll show you what it has to do 
with. 
MR. JACOBSON: If you didn't go there last 
time, that's your own fault, but that is going well 
beyond the scope of this deposition. 
MR. WARD: Then you can ask the judge to 
strike it if you think that's the case. 
MR. JACOBSON: I'm making my objection for 
the record. 
MR. WARD: I understand. 
Q Look down at Phase 4. Now, isn't that the 
Phase 4 
Q 
A 
that's referred to in the Exhibit 
MR. JACOBSON: Same objection. 
(BY MR. WARD) At least part of 
I assume it is. I -- you know, 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
erization? 
Yeah. 1 
Okay. Now --
I guess I should have said yes, not yeah. 
That's okay. That's fine. In paragraph 
18, you say, In response to Granite's proposals, I 
considered the same safety, cost and time factors 
that had been considered previously, and ultimately I 
concluded that the safety and time considerations 
could not justify the additional financial costs that 
UDOT would be forced to incur if it accepted 
Granite's proposal. As a result, the proposal was 
rejected. Correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, do I understand the criteria that 
you've used here, this "I considered the same safety, 
cost and time factors," to be that the contract 
called for the phasing to be done in a particular way 
and that the traffic control plan was a safe way to 
do that, as both shown in Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 here, 
and that your consideration was, since it was agreed 
upon and was safe to begin with, if they're worried 
about it not being safe, then it's been their problem 
and they need to pay to correct it, not the State. 
Is that your thinking, as shown in paragraph 18 where 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
too, because he's the one that's also, you know, 
agreeing to what they are. 
Q Pretty fair to say he relies on all his 
regional directors? 
A He does. Shortly after that project, I 
think he quit signing plans and the regional 
directors started to sign them. 
Q Yeah, I bet. 
A It wasn't because of that. It's just that 
he said, well, you guys are the ones that's really 
responsible and you're making a decision. You're 
telling me it's okay. Why don't you just go ahead 
and sign it. 
Q Which bring up a question. You know, you 
refer to this traffic control plan and you referred 
to the initial one, or you referred to it as a 
proposed traffic control plan, but I think you 
testified what was proposed wasn't really what ended 
up the same thing --
A Yes. 
Q -- in the plans and specifications and 
everything, but as we've looked through this, we see 
no signature anywhere. Is that common that you guys 
would make up a traffic control plan and nobody owns 
up to who did it? How does that happen? And I'm not 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
referring just to this sheet. We've looked through 
every sheet. Nobody can find who developed that 
traffic control plan. 
A Generally a designer is supposed to sign 
this sheet, but I see there's no signature on it. 
Q So do we know for sure it was done by UDOT? 
A Well, I couldn't say it was a hundred 
percent, but I'm fairly sure that's -- the designer 
assigned to that project was a UDOT designer. 
Q Okay. So there's no way this was done by 
Granite Construction? 
A No. 
Q Because you have to get approval of the 
FHWA? You have to develop the traffic control plan? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Well, can Mr. Nichols decide to use 
plastic barrels instead of concrete Jersey barriers, 
or does it have to go to you? You said this one went 
to you, but does it have to? 
MR. JACOBSON: Objection. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to object. 
This is well beyond what I understood the scope of 
the deposition was. Those questions were -- even 
though I don't have my transcript of Mr. LeFevre's 
deposition, I have a pretty clear recollection that 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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these were issues that were addressed there. I think 
this is inappropriate. 
MR. JACOBSON: Join in the objection. 
THE WITNESS: A change in the traffic 
control plan would have to go to a designer -- not a 
designer. A safety person. 
Q (BY MR. WARD) I'm not asking about a 
change. 
A And then to me. I may not write the letter 
back and say I agree that Nichols has to make the 
final letter, but somebody above him would probably 
say, okay, we can go do that. 
Q I'm not asking about a change. I'm saying, 
in the development of the plan -- forget about any 
change order. In this development of this plan, did 
you have to come up with the idea to use barrels or 
could Nichols have said, well, I think, as we're 
doing this, we ought to use barrels? Or maybe one of 
your other construction engineers. 
A They could have suggested it. 
MR. JACOBSON: Same objection. 
Q (BY MR. WARD) So it wasn't necessarily 
your idea to use -- the affidavit seems to imply it 
was your idea to use -- but at least to me -- that it 
was your idea to use plastic barrels. What you're 
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saying is it was UDOT's idea? 
A UDOT's idea. 
Q It could have been anybody? A construction 
engineer? 
A It could have. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to object. 
Q (BY MR. WARD) Nichols, correct? 
A It could have been Nichols. It could have 
been many -- one of many. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN; I'm going to object that 
the affidavit, paragraph 13, indicates that the final 
decision to include plastic barriers was made by the 
witness. You know, this is getting back into areas 
that were clearly discussed in the first deposition. 
MR. WARD: That brings up a good point. I 
need clarification. 
MR. JACOBSON: I don't think the affidavit 
states whose idea it was, I mean, who came up with 
this initial concept. This affidavit addresses 
decisions. 
MR. WARD: That's why I asked the 
question. 
MR. JACOBSON: So you're asking questions 
that aren't issues 
MR. WARD: They're bought up by the 
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decision to include plastic barrels rather than 
concrete barriers in the proposed traffic control for 
the Layton-Clearfield project was made by me after 
consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham." 
So my question is: Does that refer to this 
issue of the request from Granite, hey, we want it 
now. We've got this project going. We want to 
use -- that you went to Topham and asked him about 
that, or is this the initial decision before you ever 
let the contract? 
A This had been the initial decision before 
the contract was let. 
Q Okay. So you remember specifically going 
and talking to Mr. Topham about whether to use 
plastic barrels? 
A What -- as the district director -- you 
know, I'm not sure I talked to him specifically about 
the barrels. What I talked to him is the project is 
ready to go 
on. 
Q R-
words, what 
sign off on 
and I 
ight. 
you're 
a proj 
everything and loo 
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and say, Is it okay for me to use plastic barrels on 
this project to Clint Topham, did you? 
A Probably not, but, you know, he asked me, 
Is there any concern you have with the project or 
anything I should know about? 
Q Right. And you didn't have any? 
A I didn't have any. 
Q And that was based upon a plan that had 
been developed and the sequencing that had been 
developed? 
A Yes. 
Q When you had discussions with the FHWA 
about developing this traffic control plan that you 
referred to in your affidavit here, how specific were 
they in this sense? Did you ever talk about barrel 
placements? I mean, does the traffic control plan --
other than roughly show where the barrel placements 
are to be, did you ever talk specifically about how 
far apart they'd be or how big they'd be or what 
they'd look like? 
A I don't think that would have ever come up 
because 
in a di 
Q 
A 
the amount of orange 
fferent document. 
Okay. 
And it's 
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talking initially, do you mean before the project was 
let out to bid? 
MR. WARD: Yes. 
Q Before the project was let out to bid, you 
talked over the use of the barrels with who? 
A With --
Q I mean, I know - - you told me that your 
underlings, Nielsen, guys like that, work with FHWA. 
My question is: Do you remember talking over the use 
of barrels versus barriers with anybody besides your 
own people, your own -- Nichols and your engineers 
and stuff like that? 
MR. JACOBSON: Objection. Asked and 
answered? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Q (BY MR. WARD) Okay. That's fine. I 
wanted to make sure. So, now, when Granite comes 
into the 
you talk 
picture and then makes their request, did 
it over with -- their request, did you talk 
it over with the FHWA? 
A 
Q 
Topham? 
A 
Q 
Not that I recall. 
Do you remember talking that over with 
Yes. 
And his response was? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
having to 
LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
What is the cost. 
Okay. 
Do we have money to make it? 
Okay. And so you're left, once again, 
-- I guess that's why you say you 
with 
considered. You're told, if you can afford it, it's 
up to you, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Correct? 
A If I could have found a way to afford it 
and keep the cost and time factor of the project, I 
probably could have made that decision, but where it 
involved extra cost, it probably would have had to go 
back clear to the commission to even be considered. 
Q Well, now, every change order involves some 
cost adjustment, doesn't it? 
A It does, but not to the volume or amount 
that it would in this one. 
Q So is there kind of a trigger that takes 
you to the commission? Why -- like you say, I 
considered this. You didn't go to the commission on 
this because you felt the money was too high or --
I'm not sure what you're saying. 
MR. JACOBSON: Objection. 
THE WITNESS: I knew the costs were too 
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high. 
MR. JACOBSON: We're going way beyond the 
affidavit. 
MR. WARD: No, I'm not. It's about why it 
was just him that considered it. 
MR. JACOBSON: Why he didn't go to the 
commission? 
MR. WARD: Yeah, right. 
MR. JACOBSON: There's nothing in the 
affidavit about that. 
MR. WARD: It says "I considered." He says 
he didn't consult with anybody, and that's my 
question. Why? 
MR. JACOBSON: I made my objection. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I, as a UDOT engineer, 
made that decision. 
Q (BY MR. WARD) I understand. But you 
mentioned money, that you felt that you couldn't make 
that decision because it was so much you'd have to go 
to the commission. Is there a number? I mean, if 
it's more than 100,000, you don't feel comfortable 
trying to make that decision unilaterally? 
A When it gets close to a million dollars you 
have to. Where are you going to come up with the 
money? 
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MR. WARD: If it is, we can strike it. 
Q Go ahead and tell me if you recall that. 
A I know we went back and asked if there was 
a reduction. There's two things we asked, if there's 
a reduction in the cost you're proposing, and also a 
reduction in the time that you could do the project. 
Q (BY MR. WARD) And that proposal was 
carried by Mr. Nichols to --
A Yes. 
Q -- the Granite -- okay. Did you get any 
written report or anything from Mr. Nichols about 
that cost-benefit analysis and what had transpired? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Is it fair -- in paragraph 15 you say --
A Which one? 
Q Paragraph 15. "My duties as the Region One 
director required me to balance the safety factors, 
cost factors and other factors on every project, 
including the Layton-Clearfield project, in order to 
ensure that the projects were completed as safely as 
possible and as fast as possible and to ensure that 
all 
aval 
of th. 
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statement 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
1 was? You say "My duties as the Region One director." 
2 in other words, isn't the very thing you did here 
3 what you do every day on a daily basis? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q There wasn't anything unusual or 
6 outstanding about your involvement in this project 
7 versus any other project, was there? 
8 A No. 
9 Q It was the kinds of things you do as part 
10 of your daily duties every day? 
11 A Yes. If the designers come in and say this 
12 project is going to cost $3 million more than was 
13 anticipated, why, and what do we have to do to get it 
14 back in the money that we have available. 
15 Q And so you start your work? You start 
16 talking to people, you start looking for ways to save 
17 money, you start making this analysis about do we 
18 want to spend this much for this or can we afford to 
19 get by with that? That's your job, right? 
2 0 A Yes. 
21 Q Not only was that your job, it was every 
22 region director's job, wasn't it? 
23 A That's true. 
24 Q So as I understand part of your analysis 
25 that you made here regarding time -- you mentioned 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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that a couple of times here. The use of the concrete 
barriers, a negative for their use was that they're 
more time consuming to use; is that right? 
A Concrete barriers generally requires more 
time to take them down and put them up. 
Q And particularly in a case here where, at 
night during off-peak hours, you wanted to run one 
lane, and then during the day during peak hours, you 
wanted to run two lanes. You found it to be 
impractical and unfeasible that you'd be moving 
concrete Jersey barriers back and forth; is that 
right? 
A That would be very difficult to do. 
Q And is that part of your analysis that you 
did here? 
A Yes, it would be. 
Q Okay. I wonder about this. You said in 
paragraph 19, "Although UDOT rejected Granite 
Construction's requests for additional funding for 
concrete barriers, there was nothing in UDOT's 
contract with Granite Construction which prevented 
Granite Construction from using concrete barriers at 
Granite Construction's own expense." 
They would have had to request a change 
order, wouldn't they? 
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A They would have. 
Q Are you saying by that that you guys would 
have approved that? 
A If they'd have shown us how they could have 
done it in the time frame that we wanted and within 
the cost factor we already had, we'd probably have 
approved it. 
Q Well, okay. In other words, if they would 
have paid for it? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And then shown that it could be done safely 
and expeditiously? 
A Yes. 
Q And it's your testimony that they never 
came back and made that proposal to you? 
A They did not. 
MR. WARD: I think that's all I have, Mr. 
LeFevre. Thank you. 
MR. JACOBSON: If you could send that 
deposition to my office and then I'll get it to Mr. 
LeFevre to read and sign. 
THE WITNESS: What is this? 
MR. WARD: This is your consent to -- if 
these guys won't settle this case with me, that 
you'll come to trial. 
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108.4.2 Construction Sequence: Construction operations shall proceed in order, phase by 
phase, as detailed in the Traffic Control Plans. Any alteration to the Traffic Control Plan 
phases or sequence of work must have prior approval by the Engineer. The construction 
sequence is listed below: 
108.4.2.1 PHASE 1. The outside lane and shoulder is closed, long term traffic 
control for Roadway Excavation of existing asphalt shoulder, regrading and 
replacement of the shoulder with Asphalt Concrete. 
Bridge rehabilitation work that can be completed during this phase can begin. 
108.4.2.2 PHASE 2. Short term traffic control is used to close the center lane, outside 
lane and shoulder. The work operations are restricted during peak hour traffic flows 
since only one traffic lane will be maintained. Roadway Excavation of shoulder and 
replacement with Asphalt Concrete can continue. Full-Depth and Partial-Depth Repair 
work in the outside lane can proceed during this phase. 
108.4.2.5 PHASE 3. Long term traffic control is used to close the center lane, inside 
lane and shoulder and shift traffic onto the outside lane and shoulder. Temporary 
Traffic Paint is used on the outside shoulder to create the second traffic lane. 
Shoulder and inside lane work of Partial-Depdi Repair, Full-Depth Slab Replacement, 
Surface Grinding, Crack and Joint Sealing can be completed during this phase. 
108.4.2.6 PHASE 4. Short lerm traffic control is used to close ail three lanes and 
maintain one lane of traffic on the outside shoulder. Center lane work of Partial-Depth 
Repair, Full-Depth Slab Replacement, Surface Grinding, Crack and Joint Sealing can 
be completed during this phase. After all work is completed in this phase and after 
proper concrete cure time is attained, the permanent Pavement Markings can be placed 
and traffic allowed to travel on the rehabilitated pavement. 
108.4.2.6 PHASE 5. Individual Bridge rehabilitation work can proceed according to 
the traffic control plans. 
REVISED 09/19/95 2X 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
* * * 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS & 
REED COMPANY, and JOHN DOES 
i-v, 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF: 
JIMMIE KEYES 
Civil No. 970760411 PI 
COPY 
Judge Thomas L.Kay 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of June, 
2000, the deposition of JIMMIE KEYES, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the Plaintiff herein, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before JAMIE ROBINSON, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 10:06 a.m. of said day at the 
offices of GRIDLEY WARD & SHAW, 849 West Hillfield Road, 
Suite 202, Layton, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to 
notice. 
REPORTING SERVICES, INC. 
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Q. That would be -- I don!t understand. I said 
would that hole constitute construction activity whether 
there was workers there at that moment or not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So it would need proper delineation, wouldn't 
it? 
A. (No oral response.) 
Q. If the plan says when you have that hole 
there you've got to have more than one lane of traffic. 
I'm asking who gave you authority to have two lanes just 
because you didn't have workers there? 
A. That was -- the hole was not in the third 
lane next to the one lane. 
Q. No, my question was who gave you the 
authority to open another lane of traffic on the basis that 
since you didn't have workers there there was no 
construction activity? 
A. UDOT. 
Q. Who from UDOT told you that? 
A. It would be the inspector. 
Q. So that's Mr. Paskett? 
A. Possibly. 
Q. Possibly? You talked to him; it wasn't me. 
Who was it? 
A. There was two inspectors on the project. 
JAMIE ROBINSON, CSR, RPR 
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Q. So it would either be Paskett or who was the 
other one? 
A. Kevin Griffen. 
Q. So you know that evening that, in fact, there 
were two lanes of traffic open that this accident happened; 
right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you know that the lane of traffic my 
client was traveling in literally buttressed up against 
that hole -- in fact, there were four of them, one over 55 
feet long, the others 15, 20, over a period of 400 feet on 
the freeway, that that lane of traffic buttressed right up 
against that hole. Were you aware of that? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Were you aware that there was no delineation 
mark on the pavement? 
A. There was barrels. 
Q. Right. I said mark on the pavement, no 
delineation striping to show where the hole started and 
where the travel lane ended? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Now there were barrels, apparently, so many 
feet; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you know where those barrels were placed? 
JAMIE ROBINSON, CSR, RPR 
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Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs oait QEC I B86 
in Construction M6 Maintenance Work Zones 
Chitf, Construction and Maintenance Oivislon AJITO? . HHO-31 
Office of Highway Operations 
Regional Federal Highway Administrators 
Regions 1-10 
Oirect Federal Program Administrator 
One of the problems noted during our 1986 construction reviews and work 
zone safety reviews involves pavement dropoffs adjacent to construction and 
maintenance activities. These dropoffs include, those created by pavement or 
bridge deck removal work, shoulder excavations, and the placement of new 
layers of pav.ement. When not properly addressed, dropoffs may lead to an 
errant vehicle losing control resulting in property damage, .injury, and 
possibly death. It was found that many States do'not have any policy or 
guidelines addressing this hazardous situation/ With the growing nunber 
of 3R/4R projects, there is potential for. dropoff incidents to increase 
significantly. 
To address this concern, information has been compiled and used to develop 
steps to mitigate potentially hazardous dropoffs. These suggested procedures 
are based on findings from recent research, current policies and guidelines 
fran a nunoer of States, and consideration of construction operations. The 
information presented here is not Intended in any way to represent policy or 
to serve as a directive of the FWA, nor does 1t represent or promulgate any 
new standard. Instead, this Information 1s to provide guidelines to States 
in the development of their own dropoff policy. 
Any dropoff 1s considered hazardous, but those greater than 2 Inches, left 
overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential. 
For such situations, oat or a combination of the following mitigating measures 
1s recommended; 
1. Specify that the contractor schedule resurfacing or construction 
operations such that no dropoff Is left unprotected overnight, or, 
as a minimum, limit the length of the dropoff and the period of 
exposure. 
2. If feasible, place steel plates to cover an excavation or trench. 
A wedge of material around the cover may be required ]n order to 
assure a smooth transition between the pavement and the plate. 
Warning signs should be used to alert motorists of the presence 
of steel plates particularly when the plates are on the travel 
lanes. 
era •-! 
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3. Place a wedge of material along the face of the dropoff. The wedge 
should consist of stable material placed at a 3:1 or flatter slope. 
Warning signs may be needed in advance and throughout the treatment. 
Pavement markings or markers are useful In delineating the edge of 
the travel Ian*. 
4. Place channelizing devices along the traffic side of the hazard and 
maintain a 3-foot wide buffer between the edge of the travel lane and 
the dropoff. The ro1n1mutt spacing of the devices \n feet should be, at 
most, twice the speed 1n miles per hour. Dropoff warning signs should 
be placed in advance and throughout the dropoff treatment. 
5. Install portable concrete barriers or other acceptable positive barriers 
with a 2-foot buffer between the barrier face and the traveled way. 
An acceptable crashworthy terminal or flared barriers are required at 
the upstream end of the section. For nighttime use, the barriers must 
be supplemented by standard delineation devices, 1.e.f paint, 
retroreflectlve tape, markers, or warning lights. 
For dropoffs greater than 6 inches, recommendation 5 is strongly suggested 
if recommendations I or 2 are not feasible. Speed reduction measures need 
to be considered particularly for recommendations 4 and 5. Although these 
mitigating measures are directed to nighttime conditions, dropoffs must also 
be properly addressed during daylight operations* 
We recognize that there may be so*e reluctance by the States to develop a 
dropoff policy or guidelines. The .primary concern that has been stated in 
the past is that the development of such a policy would increase the 
potential for tort liability actions. It has however also htw stated that 
the existance of properly developed policies and conformance to those 
policies can 1n fact provide the. State with a good defenst aoainst tort 
liability. More Important however, 1s that such policies will provide 
greater protection from accidents and Injuries for th* motorist. 
We strongly encourage yog to work with the States on the development of such 
policies. If any further information or technical assistance 1s%needed, 
please contact us at your convenience* 
$^\ K b B* Myers 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
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VS. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS 
REED COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 970700411 PI 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
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DEPOSITION OF: 
KEVIN GRIFFIN 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of July 2000 the 
deposition of KEVIN GRIFFIN produced as a witness 
herein at the instance^of the plaintiff herein, was 
taken before,TAMARA P. SIEBERT, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, commencing at the hour of 11:00 of said day at 
the offices of GRIDLEY, WARD & SHAW, 849, W. Hillfield 
Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah. 
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1 I A. It would yes, definitely stop someone from 
2 | going into a hole. 
3 | Q. Exactly. It's my understanding, you 
4 | testified earlier, you think it was a money issue as 
5 | to why Granite didn't do that. 
6 I A. That's correct. 
7 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: Is why Granite didn't do it 
8 or why the state didn't recommend it? 
9 THE WITNESS: Why the state didn't recommend 
10 it. 
11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: There was a difference. 
12 Q. (BY MR. WARD) That's going to be my next 
13 question. Apparently, the state, as I have been told, 
14 Granite went to the state and said we think we should 
15 use jersey barriers there. Were you aware of that? 
16 A. Yes, sir. 
17 Q. And this testimony is that high-ups in the 
18 state said, "Well, we are not paying for it. Go ahead 
19 and use it if you want, but you have got to pay for 
20 it." Were you aware of that? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. So nobody disagreed that that was a good 
23 thing to do, they just disagreed on who should pay for 
24 it; right? 
25 A. It was a finance issue. Basically, what 
48 
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1 recommendation from the Federal Highway 
2 Administration. 
3 A. It's recommended that they do that, it's not 
4 saying it has to be. 
5 Q. Isn't that a safety recommendation? 
6 A. If it actually states that, yes. 
7 Q. They weren't doing it just so everybody had 
8 to spend more money, they were doing it to protect the 
9 motoring public, weren't they? That's the 
10 recommendation. 
11 A. You are always saying it's just to protect 
12 the motoring public. A lot of times it's actually 
13 there to protect the workers. 
14 Q. Both then, I think that's true, the workers 
15 and the motoring public. 
16 A. Uh-huh. 
17 Q. So tell me what other reason besides the 
18 finances that you know of that the state didn't say to 
19 Granite, yeah, you're right, let's go ahead and use 
20 those jersey barriers. 
21 A. None that I know of. 
22 Q. It was money? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And don't you agree that the jersey barriers 
25 would have been safer? 
50 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH, 
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, 
JOHN DOES l-V, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 
UDOT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A^. * *fi ^ 1 ^ " V / N ^ f A A AAA 
Civil No. 970700411 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendant Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT'1), through counsel, submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of 
UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, and for those 
U^GfiBiSTiiiOT c 0 U R i 
!to!3 3 : •]! 
reasons stated in UDOTs opening summary judgment memorandum, UDOT respectfully 
asks the Court to grant UDOTs motion by dismissing all claims against UDOT as a matter 
of law. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following paragraphs are numbered to correspond to fact paragraphs 1-20 on 
pages 1-4 of plaintiffs summary judgment opposition memorandum: 
1. Although the precise facts surrounding the accident are not directly relevant 
to the issues raised in UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, it should be noted that 
Trooper Lundeirs deposition testimony and accident report estimate plaintiffs speed at the 
time of the accident as 70 mph rather than 65 mph. (Lundell Depo. at p. 38, plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1; Accident Report, UDOTs Exhibit 19). 
3. UDOT acknowledges that the speed limit on 1-15 was raised from 55 mph to 
65 mph between the time the Layton-Clearfield project was let out for bid, and the time 
Granite actually commenced work on the project. That increase in speed limit was 
mandated by the Utah legislature following the lifting of federal restrictions that prevented 
individual states from having speed limits in excess of 55 mph. UDOT also acknowledges 
that Granite made requests to have the 65 mph speed limit reduced after construction on 
the Layton-Clearfield project had commenced. While the posted speed limit remained 65 
mph at the time of plaintiffs accident, an advisory speed limit of 50 mph had been posted 
on orange signs throughout the construction zone prior to plaintiffs accident. This 50 mph 
2 
advisory speed limit was posted and in effect at the time of plaintiffs accident. (Lundell 
Depo. at pp. 38-39, plaintiffs Exhibit 1; Accident Report, UDOTs Exhibit 19). 
4. For purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT does not dispute 
plaintiffs claim that the traffic control plan called for a solid white line to separate traffic 
from the construction zone. If this matter proceeds to trial, however, UDOT contends that 
the evidence will show that no solid white line was called for under UDOTs proposed 
traffic control plan. 
5. For purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT does not dispute 
plaintiffs claim that certain aspects of the traffic control plan were not followed on the night 
of plaintiff's accident. As UDOT makes clear in its summary judgment arguments, 
however, it was not UDOTs responsibility to implement or monitor the traffic control plan, 
and any failure to do so cannot be attributed to UDOT. Furthermore, if this matter does 
proceed to trial, UDOT contends that the evidence will contradict all or part of plaintiffs 
allegations that the traffic control plan was not followed. 
6. While UDOT acknowledges that it had personnel on the project site on a 
daily basis, it disputes the allegation that UDOTs personnel were "supervising" the 
construction work. There is nothing in the evidentiary cites provided by plaintiff which 
indicates that UDOTs personnel were "supervising" Granite. 
Plaintiffs evidentiary cites also do not support plaintiffs allegation that "UDOT took 
no corrective action." The cited excerpts of Kent Nichols' testimony plainly state that Mr. 
3 
Nichols reported his concerns to his UDOT supervisors, and then went back to Granite's 
representatives with instructions to do the work as required by the specifications. (Nichols' 
Depo. at pp. 51-52, plaintiffs Exhibit 4). It should also be noted that the cited excerpts 
from Mr. Paskett's deposition refer to UDOTs actions following plaintiffs accident, and Mr. 
Paskett simply testified that he can't remember if UDOT took any corrective action at that 
time. Since that testimony pertains to UDOT's conduct after the subject accident, it is not 
relevant to the issues raised in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
7. UDOT disputes plaintiffs allegation that the "Manual Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete barriers to divide construction from the motoring 
public if there over a six-inch drop off in the pavement next to travel lanes." This allegation 
is not supported by the evidentiary cites contained in plaintiffs summary judgment 
opposition memorandum, and more importantly, plaintiff has failed to cite to any specific 
provision of the MUTCD that contains such a requirement. Therefore, this allegation 
should be entirely disregarded by the Court. 
UDOT acknowledges that UDOT Region I Director Dyke LeFevre made the decision 
to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield project, and 
that the use of barrels was a less expensive alternative than concrete barriers. UDOT 
disputes any insinuation, however, that cost was the sole factor behind Mr. LeFevre's 
decision. There is undisputed evidence in both Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony and 
affidavit that several factors, including safety, project completion time, and cost, all 
4 
factored heavily into the decision to use plastic barrels. (LeFevre Affidavit U 14, UDOT 
Exhibit 1; LeFevre Depo. at pp. 103-104, plaintiffs Exhibit 7) 
8. UDOT disputes any suggestion that Mr. LeFevre was not qualified because 
he "had only recently been hired as the Region One [Director]" in 1995. Plaintiff fails to 
mention the fact that prior to Mr. LeFevre's appointment as Region One Director in 1995, 
Mr. LeFevre had also served as the Region One Director from 1989-1990, and had also 
served as the Region Four Director from 1985-1989. When Mr. LeFevre retired from 
UDOT in July of 2000, he had worked at UDOT for a total of 39 years. (LeFevre Depo. 
at pp. 3, 39, plaintiffs Exhibit 7) 
Plaintiffs suggestion that Mr. LeFevre "did not consult any of his UDOT superiors 
or the FHA regarding his initial decision to use plastic barriers" is a gross misstatement of 
the undisputed evidence. Mr. LeFevre stated very plainly in his affidavit and in his 
deposition that Clint Topham and the FHA were consulted. (LeFevre Affidavit ^ J16, UDOT 
Exhibit 1; LeFevre Deposition at pp. 60-62, 67, 76, 91-93, plaintiffs Exhibit 7 and UDOT 
Exhibit 20).1 
9. Plaintiff seizes on a snippet of Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony to attempt 
1
 The Court should not be confused by Mr. LeFevre's testimony on pages 92-93 of his 
deposition wherein he stated that UDOT's discussions with the FHA (or FHWA) did not 
go so far as to address specific barrel placement. Mr. LeFevre made it very clear that 
an issue such as proper barrel placement is something that is standard for all projects, 
and therefore, does not need to be addressed by the FHA. There is nothing in this 
portion of Mr. LeFevre's testimony, however, that contradicts his other deposition and 
affidavit statements that the FHA was directly involved with the decision to use plastic 
barrels rather than concrete barriers. 
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to create the impression that UDOT did not study the safety issues surrounding the use 
of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. Nothing, however, could be further from 
the truth. The excerpt of Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony cited by plaintiff simply states 
that Mr. LeFevre cannot remember if UDOT hired any "outside" or "independent 
contractors" to be involved with the design of the proposed traffic control plan. The 
question being posed by plaintiffs counsel was whether anyone other than the FHA or 
UDOTs own design engineers was involved in the design of that traffic control plan. 
(LeFevre Depo. at pp. 58-61, UDOT Exhibit 20). It has been well established that UDOTs 
own personnel and the FHA were heavily involved in evaluating the safety issues 
surrounding the use of plastic barrels. 
It should be noted that plaintiff has once again erroneously suggested, without any 
evidentiary support, that the "MUTCD mandated concrete barriers." 
10. UDOT acknowledges that the names of the UDOT engineers who designed 
the proposed traffic control plan are not noted on the actual plans. That fact, however, is 
not material to the issues raised in UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. Plaintiff never disputes the fact that Mr. LeFevre is the UDOT official who 
made the final decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. Instead, 
plaintiff attempts to cloud the issue by suggesting that Mr. LeFevre may not have initially 
come up with that idea on his own. UDOT has never suggested that Mr. LeFevre was the 
one who initially recommended the use of plastic barrels. The key factor for purposes of 
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UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is the fact that Mr. LeFevre was the one who made 
the final decision. That fact is undisputed. 
13. Plaintiff erroneously states that Granite's proposal was "denied by UDOTs 
Project Engineer, Kent Nichols." While the 4/2/96 letter cited by plaintiff was signed by Mr. 
Nichols, that letter states very clearly that Mr. Nichols had discussed the proposal with 
Region One Director Dyke LeFevre, and that Mr. LeFevre rejected the proposal. 
Plaintiff also attempts to create an issue by suggesting that Mr. Nichols lacked 
experience with this type of construction project. UDOT contends that Mr. Nichols' 
experience is in no way material to UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, and is nothing 
more than a red herring thrown in by the plaintiff. 
14. Plaintiff completely ignores the undisputed facts by suggesting that "there is 
no evidence" that "other supervisors," besides Mr. LeFevre, were involved in the decision 
surrounding Granite's change order request. Mr. LeFevre stated in his deposition that he 
specifically remembers discussing Granite's change order request with UDOT Deputy 
Director Clint Topham, and that Mr. Topham gave his input on the decision. (LeFevre 
Depo. at pp. 98-99, plaintiffs Exhibit 7). Mr Topham acknowledged this fact in his own 
deposition, testifying that "the request came and I conferred with [Mr. LeFevre] about it and 
we decided that we would not do it." (Topham Depo. at p. 31, attached hereto as UDOT 
Exhibit 21) 
15. Plaintiff attempts to suggest that "there was never a formal response to 
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[Granite's] proposed change order." Once again, this is nothing more than a red herring. 
While there may not have been a written response to Granite's request, it is undisputed 
that UDOT rejected the request. (LeFevre Affidavit fl 18, UDOT Exhibit 1; Topham Depo. 
at p. 31, UDOT Exhibit 21) 
18. Plaintiff claims that UDOTs field engineer or inspector gave Granite authority 
to open two lanes of traffic during off-peak hours if there were no workers in that part of 
the construction zone. For purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT does 
not dispute that fact. It is important to note, however, that Jimmie Keyes deposition 
testimony, which is the only evidence cited by plaintiff in support of this fact, does not state 
that UDOT expressly authorized two lanes of traffic on the night of plaintiffs incident, or 
that UDOT authorized Granite to set up the barrels in the manner plaintiff has alleged 
occurred on the night of plaintiffs accident. In fact there is no evidence that UDOT ever 
authorized Granite to open two lanes of traffic in any manner other than that specified for 
peak hour traffic in the traffic control plan. 
19. UDOT contends that the U.S. Department of Transportation ("USDOT") 
memorandum, dated 12/1/86, is not material to the issues raised in UDOTs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Mr. LeFevre and Mr. Topham both testified that the 12/1/86 
memorandum is nothing more than a recommendation issued by the USDOT for purposes 
of assisting the individual states in formulating their own policies. (LeFevre Depo. at pp. 
24-27, UDOT Exhibit 20; Topham Depo. at pp. 10-11, UDOT Exhibit 21). That point is 
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made clear by the memorandum itself which states: 
The information presented here is not intended in any way 
to represent policy or to serve as a directive of the FHWA, 
nor does it represent or promulgate any new standard. 
Instead, this information is to provide guidelines to States 
in the development of their own dropoff policy. 
(12/1/86 USDOT Memo., plaintiffs Exhibit 11) (emphasis added). 
20. See UDOTs response to plaintiffs Fact No. 5 above. 
The following paragraphs are numbered to correspond to the fact paragraphs 
contained in UDOTs opening summary judgment memorandum and plaintiffs response 
to those facts at pages 5-8 of plaintiffs summary judgment opposition memorandum: 
3. Plaintiff attempts to dispute the fact that upper UDOT officials made the 
decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield 
project. Curiously, however, plaintiff also acknowledges that Mr. LeFevre was the one who 
made this decision. There can be no question that Mr. LeFevre, as the Region One 
Director, was one of the uppermost UDOT officials. Furthermore, it has been well 
documented in the preceding paragraphs and in UDOTs opening summary judgment 
memorandum that UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham was also involved in deciding 
whether to use plastic barrels on this project. 
5. Plaintiffs attempt to dispute UDOT Fact No. 5 is based on several gross 
mischaracterizations of the evidence. First, Mr. LeFevre plainly testified that he not only 
9 
discussed the proposed traffic control plan with Clint Topham, but that Mr. Topham 
actually signed off on the plans, thereby giving his written approval. (LeFevre Depo. at pp. 
85-86, 91-92, UDOT Exhibit 20). Second, as was discussed earlier, Mr. Topham was 
directly involved in the consideration and rejection of Granite's proposed change order. 
(LeFevre Depo. at pp. 98-99, plaintiffs Exhibit 7; Topham Depo. at p. 31, UDOT Exhibit 
21). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to dispute that testimony. Finally, it is 
entirely incorrect to suggest that the decision to reject Granite's proposal was "based 
solely on the costs involved." Mr. LeFevre has repeatedly stated that several key factors, 
other than financial cost, were also weighed heavily in the decision to use plastic barrels. 
(LeFevre Affidavit fflj 14,18, UDOT Exhibit 1; LeFevre Depo. at pp. 95-96,103-104, UDOT 
Exhibit 20) 
6. Plaintiff erroneously attempts to suggest that the FHA was not involved in the 
decision to use plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. The only evidence cited 
by plaintiff, however, is a snippet of Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony where he states 
that the FHA was not involved in UDOTs decision to reject Granite's proposed change 
order after the project had already commenced. The undisputed evidence clearly 
shows, however, that the FHA was directly involved in the decision making process that 
occurred during the original development of the proposed traffic control plan, including the 
decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. (LeFevre Affidavit fflj 10-12, 
UDOT Exhibit 1; LeFevre Affidavit at pp. 60-62, 67, 76, UDOT Exhibit 20) 
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20. See UDOTs responses to plaintiffs Fact No. 14 and UDOT Fact No. 5, both 
of which are discussed above. 
21. Despite plaintiffs attempt to dispute UDOT Fact No. 21, plaintiff has failed 
to provide any evidentiary support for his response. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, UDOTs Fact No. 21, which was properly 
supported by evidence in the record, must be deemed admitted for purposes of UDOTs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
22. Plaintiffs response to UDOT Fact No. 22 likewise lack's any evidentiary 
support, and therefore, UDOTs Fact No. 22 must also be deemed admitted for purposes 
of UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
23. Although, UDOT has pointed out the fact that Granite could have decided to 
use concrete barriers at its own cost, UDOT has never alleged that Granite was expected 
or required, either under the contract or otherwise, to furnish concrete barriers. 
24. See UDOTs response to plaintiffs Fact No. 3 above. 
26. UDOT acknowledges that the facts surrounding plaintiffs accident are 
disputed. The Court should note, however, that the description of the accident contained 
in UDOT Fact No. 26 was simply intended to provide the Court with a general 
understanding of the facts surrounding the accident. The precise facts surrounding the 
accident, and any dispute surrounding those facts are not material to the issues raised in 
UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
In plaintiffs response to UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff has 
attempted to avoid summary judgment by suggesting that there are disputed facts which 
preclude summary judgment. In an attempt to support this argument, plaintiff has grossly 
distorted the deposition testimony offered by several witnesses, and has completely 
ignored other key pieces of undisputed evidence. UDOT urges this Court to look closely 
at the evidence cited by the parties. In doing so, the Court will see that those facts which 
are material to UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment are, in fact, undisputed, and that 
those facts weigh heavily in support of UDOTs Motion. 
In addition to those undisputed facts, the legal arguments advanced by the parties 
also strongly suggest that the claims against UDOT should be dismissed as a matter of 
law. 
I. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HIS CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT 
ARE NOT BARRED UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
EXCEPTION. 
The parties are apparently in agreement as to the legal standard applicable to the 
discretionary function exception of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The only issue 
which the Court must resolve is whether the facts of this case fall within the holding of 
Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995), or Truiillo v. UDOT. 986 P.2d 752 
(Utah App. 1999). Not surprisingly, plaintiff has argued that the facts of this case mirror 
those found by the Utah Court of Appeals in Trujillo. UDOT contends, however, that the 
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present case is easily distinguishable from Truiillo, and that the holding of Keegan must 
apply. 
The primary distinction between the present case and Truiillo is the amount of 
evidence presented to this Court establishing that the discretionary function exception is 
applicable. As was noted by the Utah Court of Appeals in Truiillo, the record presented 
to the court "contained] no evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically 
singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process." 986 
P.2d at 756. In the present case, however, there is overwhelming undisputed evidence 
showing that not only was the traffic control plan singled out, but also that the key issue 
of whether to use plastic barrels or concrete barriers was singled out and scrutinized by 
UDOT engineers, FHA officials, and finally upper UDOT management, including UDOT 
Region One Director Dyke LeFevre who made the final decision. Furthermore, after the 
project commenced, that issue was singled out for a second look, and once again, upper 
UDOT management analyzed the various safety, cost, and time factors involved with using 
barrels and barriers before deciding to stand by their initial decision. 
Plaintiff has not disputed the fact that the barrel versus barrier issue was scrutinized 
and ultimately decided by Mr. LeFevre. Instead, plaintiff has attempted to argue that Mr. 
LeFevre was not an upper UDOT official making discretionary function types of decisions, 
but rather someone acting on the operational level. Such an argument completely ignores 
the undisputed facts of this case. Mr. LeFevre was UDOTs senior most official for all of 
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Region One. His decision regarding the use of barrels took into account not just the 
operational factors that would be of concern to project engineers and contractors, but also 
the financial cost factors, safety factors, and public impact factors that are at the heart of 
the discretionary function exception. UDOT and plaintiff both agree that these are the 
types of issues Mr. LeFevre, as the Region One Director, was forced to deal with on a 
daily basis. 
In support of UDOTs argument that Mr. LeFevre was acting at the policy making 
level rather than the operational level, UDOT obtained a copy of the appellate brief filed 
by UDOT in Keegan for purposes of evaluating what level of decision making had occurred 
in that case where the Utah Supreme Court found that the discretionary function exception 
was applicable. (Relevant Portions of UDOTs Brief in Keegan are attached hereto as 
Exhibit 22). In Keegan, the only evidence presented to the Court in support of UDOTs 
claim that the discretionary function exception would apply was evidence that a UDOT 
safety studies engineer had conducted a safety study, and that the project design engineer 
had prepared a cost-benefit report based on that safety study. (Keegan Brief at pp. 7-9). 
There was no evidence, however, that anyone superior to the safety studies engineer or 
project design engineer was involved in the analysis or decision process, and there is 
certainly no evidence that the analysis or decision made it all the way to the Region 
Director who supervised those engineers. 
Since the facts in Keegan were found by the Utah Supreme Court to be sufficient 
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to warrant a summary judgment in favor of UDOT, there can be no question that UDOT's 
analysis and decisions surrounding the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield 
project rose to the policy making level that falls squarely within the discretionary function 
exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY BASIS FOR HOLDING 
UDOT LIABLE FOR A FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED 
TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN OR MONITOR GRANITE'S WORK. 
Although though plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to suggest that UDOT played 
an active role in the implementation of the traffic control plan, plaintiff has failed to present 
any evidence to dispute the contract language or the deposition testimony of UDOTs and 
Granite's employees which clearly establishes that Granite alone shouldered the 
responsibility of implementing and monitoring the traffic control plan on the Layton-
Clearfield project. Since there is absolutely no evidence suggesting that UDOT had any 
involvement in the implementation or monitoring of the traffic control plan, UDOT cannot 
be held liable for any alleged failure to follow the traffic control plan on the night of 
plaintiffs accident. 
III. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY BASIS FOR HOLDING 
UDOT LIABLE FOR GRANITE'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE. 
Finally, plaintiff does not dispute that Granite was hired by UDOT as an 
independent contractor on the Layton-Clearfield Project. Despite this undisputed fact, 
plaintiff has attempted to argue that UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's 
alleged negligence because UDOT allegedly controlled Granite's employees and 
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operations. The only evidence offered in support of this argument is the fact that UDOT 
had inspectors and engineers on the project site on a daily basis. That fact alone, 
however, falls woefully short of establishing that UDOT was controlling Granite. 
Both plaintiff and UDOT have relied on Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 
1999) to support their respective positions. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
as follows: 
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the 
employer must have retained at least some degree of control 
over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough 
that he has merely a general right to order the work 
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which 
need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe 
alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually 
reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the 
contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to 
operative detail. 
]d at 327 (emphasis added). In the present case, UDOTs daily involvement on the 
Layton-Clearfield Project amounted to little more than monitoring and inspecting the 
construction work being done by Granite. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence disputing 
the fact that Granite was free to use the means and methods it desired to fulfill its 
obligations under the contract. 
Since UDOT did not exercise control over Granite's means and methods of work, 
UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for those reasons stated in UDOTs opening 
summary judgment memorandum, UDOT respectfully asks this Court to grant its Motion 
for Summary Judgment by dismissing the claims against UDOT with prejudice and as a 
matter of law. 
DATED this 1 Y day of November, 2002. 
STRONG & HANNI 
rayner 
tobson 
Defendant UDOT 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
plan 
and 
that 
sheet. Do you remember 
A 
3 . 
Q 
Yes, we looked at . 
looking at that before? 
it last time. Phase 4 
And my exact question is going to be: Was 
document -- I know it's 
control 
you 
"inc 
many 
it? 
ref 
not the whole traffic | 
plan, but is that part of the document that \ 
erred to in paragraph 
luded a proposed traffic 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It was part of thoi 
Yes. 
Which is what, 6? 
Yes. 
Yes, they were. 
So 7 would be just 
seven when you said 
control plan"? 
se plans, you mean? 
a one document out of 
, but was one of the documents that was part of 
A 
marked 
plan 
[ next 
Q 
Yes. One page, essentially. 
MR. WARD: Okay. Now let's mark this. ! 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 8 was ! 
for identification. ) 
In the development 
well, let me ask you 
of that traffic control 
this: You say in the 
paragraph, paragraph eight, "Throughout the j 
various 
several 
phases of the Layton -Clearfield project, 
levels of UDOT personnel were involved in the 
RENEE L. STACY, 
(801) 328-
CSR, RPR 
-1188 58 
LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
decisions, design, supervision" -- I'll just leave it 
at that. That's paragraph eight, okay? 
Now, my question is: Was there anybody 
involved in the design and supervision and completion 
of the work, other than UDOT personnel? 
A Oh, Federal Highway Administrations have 
input. The district designers have input. 
Q What are district designers? 
A Those are the people that really put the 
thing together. 
Q They don't work for UDOT? 
A They do. 
Q Well, then they would constitute UDOT 
personnel. 
A Yes, they'd be UDOT personnel. 
Q My question --
A But there's different levels of UDOT 
personnel that get involved. 
Q I understand, but my question is: Did 
anybody besides UDOT personnel get involved in that? 
Did you hire any outside third independent 
contractors to do anything or to evaluate anything or 
design anything or develop anything? 
A On this particular project, I can't totally 
recall, but I don't think so. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 59 
LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
Q Okay. 
MR. JACOBSON: Are you : referring to any of 
those elements, including the actual completion of 
the work? 
Q 
obviously 
(BY MR. WARD) With the caveat being -- you 
hired Granite to complete the work. I 
understand that. 
A 
Q 
A 
do any de 
Q 
nobody el 
A 
Q 
But to do the construction? 
Right. 
But I can't recall if we hired anybody to 
sign, that I can remember. 
Or outside supervision, 
se? 
I don't recall any. 
You didn't hire anybody 
any safety studies? 
A 
anything < 
Q 
other than --
at any time to do 
Oh, we do, but I can't remember if we did 
on this project. 
Well, if you would have , you, I assume, 
would have put that in your affidavit, wouldn't you? 
A 
Q 
affidavit 
A 
Q 
Not that I can remember that we did. 
So that's why you didn't put it in your 
p 
Right. 
Okay. So in the design 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, 
(801) 328-1188 
and supervision, 
RPR 
60 
fo¥s 
LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
what you do is, once you've got a design and you know 
what you want to do, that's when you go meet with the 
FHA, correct? Or FHWA, whatever they're called. 
A There's several meetings with the FHWA. 
There's kind of a preliminary meeting when you go 
concept; this is what we want to do. And we discuss 
that and then we go back and develop it into design 
plans, and then it goes back to the -- you know, for 
another review with all the people involved and say, 
"Is this what we had in mind," and they all agree. 
Q And anywhere in the process you've just 
described would you have already reached the stage 
shown in Exhibit 6? Would you have ever had this 
kind of specificity prior to the project --
A Oh, yes. This thing was -- there's that 
level of meeting before the plans go out. 
Q Okay. Because you're looking for aid from 
them? They have to be intimately involved? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now --
A Yeah. Since they provide the money, they 
have a little bit of say. 
Q So is it fair to say, then, in terms of 
paragraph eight, not only were several levels of UDOT 
personnel involved, but several levels of FHWA people 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 61 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
were involved? Or do you do all that work and then 
go to them? 
A We do the work and then go to them. 
Q Well, that's kind of what my question was. 
You develop the plan? 
A Yes. 
Q And you go to them. You don't go to them 
and say, "Here's our idea. Why don't you draft 
something"? 
A No. They don't do any designing. They 
recommend and --
Q Review? 
A And review, yeah. 
Q Okay. So that's -- I want to make sure I 
understand. Only the UDOT people are involved in 
what you show in paragraph eight? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now, I have pulled out, without 
going through the full book that you call the blue 
book, and I guess what I want to -- well, first what 
I want to ask you is: Would you develop --by you, I 
mean UDOT. Would UDOT develop the table of contents 
and then run this by the FHWA, or does the FHWA get 
involved in the special provisions? You understand 
what I'm saying? 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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having --
these twc 
Q 
that you 
seeing the whole document, just seeing 
>, I'd say it probably was. 
Okay. Now, you say, as I understand it, 
develop these documents and you take them to 
the Federal Highway Work Administration and there's a 
give and take, and the ultimate product is the 
combination of your efforts and the Federal Highway 
Administration's efforts; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
l us as exh 
Yes. 
Would these documents that are in front of 
Libits right now, would they have been part 
of what you referred to as working together with, 
being developed with, in paragraph nine of your 
affidavit where you say you worked with officials of 
the Federal Highway Administration to develop a 
i proposed 
A 
Q 
traffic control plan? 
Yes. 
Okay. Now, in Phase 4 it says short-term 
traffic control is used to close all three lanes and 
maintain 
shoulder. 
one lane of traffic on the outside 
Is that what is shown in Deposition 
Exhibit No. 7? 
Q 
MR. JACOBSON: Same objection. 
(BY MR. WARD) Doesn't it show all three 
lanes closed, one lane on the outside shoulder open? 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR • 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
testified about this, but if this plan were 
changed, 
engineer 
A 
Q 
means of 
it had to be done through the proj< 
in writing? 
Yes. 
You say in paragraph ten that the 
traffic channelization throughout 1 
to be 1 
set 
primary 
:he 
project was something which underwent substantial 
scrutiny and was ultimately decided by UDOT 
management and FHA officials. Now, are you 
about - -
about bef 
is this -
when the 
A 
referring 
Q 
's upper 
talking 
is this a point in time where you're talking 
ore you've ever even let it out for bid, or 
- are you talking about -- is this 
contractor came back? 
the time 
No. This would be before it was awarded. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Which paragraph 
to? 
MR. WARD: Ten. 
(BY MR. WARD) In your experience 
are you 
-- well, 
do you understand that the reason the traffic, by 
your safe ty engineers, was run out one lane from the 
cutoff was for safety purposes, that UDOT was giving 
up a lane of travel for safety purposes? 
MR. JACOBSON: Let me just object 
beyond the scope of the affidavit here. 
Going 
MR. WARD: Well, no, it isn't. He's 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
Q (BY MR. WARD) And that reason was because 
your involvement in decision making regarding barrels 
and Jersey barriers was specifically oriented towards i 
their use in this specific project designated in 
Exhibit 
A 
Q 
in every 
A 
Q 
6, correct? 
That's correct. 
And so it wouldn't be something applicable 
situation? 
No. 
And so it doesn't have to go above you for 
a decision, does it? i 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
For this thing here? 
Right. 
No. 
I mean you didn't violate any rule by not" 
asking somebody else, can I use Jersey barriers 
versus p 
A 
Q 
anybody, 
A 
Q 
A 
those pi 
lastic barrels or --
No. 
You didn't have to go to the governor or 
did you? 
No. 
You made that decision? 
I did. As you noticed on the front of 
ans, Clint Topham, as the state engineer, 
signed those, so he has to know about those things, 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
too, because he's the one that's also, you know, 
agreeing to what they are. 
Q Pretty fair to say he relies on all his 
regional directors? 
A He does. Shortly after that project, I 
think he quit signing plans and the regional 
directors started to sign them. 
Q Yeah, I bet. 
A ' It wasn't because of that. It's just that 
he said, well, you guys are the ones that's really 
responsible and you're making a decision. You're 
telling me it's okay. Why don't you just go ahead 
and sign it. 
Q Which bring up a question. You know, you 
refer to this traffic control plan and you referred 
to the initial one, or you referred to it as a 
proposed traffic control plan, but I think you 
testified what was proposed wasn't really what ended 
up the same thing --
A Yes. 
Q -- in the plans and specifications and 
everything, but as we've looked through this, we see 
no signature anywhere. Is that common that you guys 
would make up a traffic control plan and nobody owns 
up to who did it? How does that happen? And I'm not 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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decision to include plastic barrels rather than 
concrete barriers in the proposed traffic control for 
the Layton-Clearfield project was made by me after 
consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham." 
So my question is: Does that refer to this 
issue of the request from Granite, hey, we want it 
now. We've got this project going. We want to 
use -- that you went to Topham and asked him about 
that, or is this the initial decision before you ever 
let the contract? 
A This had been the initial decision before 
the contract was let. 
Q Okay. So you remember specifically going 
and talking to Mr. Topham about whether to use 
plastic barrels? 
A What -- as the district director -- you 
know, I'm not sure I talked to him specifically about 
the barrels. What I talked to him is the project is 
ready to go and I feel comfortable with what's going 
on. 
Q Right. And I understand that. In other 
words, what you're saying is, when we're going to 
sign off on a project, I go in and say I reviewed 
everything and looked -- everything looked good, and 
if he has concerns, he asks it, but you didn't go in 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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and say, Is it okay for me to use plastic barrels on 
this project to Clint Topham, did you? 
A Probably not, but, you know, he asked me, 
Is there any concern you have with the project or 
anything I should know about? 
Q Right. And you didn't have any? 
A I didn't have any. 
Q And that was based upon a plan that had 
been developed and the sequencing that had been 
developed? 
A Yes. 
Q When you had discussions with the FHWA 
about developing this traffic control plan that you 
referred to in your affidavit here, how specific were 
they in this sense? Did you ever talk about barrel 
placements? I mean, does the traffic control plan --
other than roughly show where the barrel placements 
are to be, did you ever talk specifically about how 
far apart they'd be or how big they'd be or what 
they'd look like? 
A I don't think that would have ever come up 
because the amount of orange and stuff on a barrel is 
in a different document. 
Q Okay. 
A And it's standard. 
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Q 
place, ei 
business 
you were 
A 
Q 
they'd be 
what's in 
saying he 
But 
ther 
there is going to be agreement in some 
by understanding, by normal custom and 
or by written document, as to what barrels 
talking about there and --
Yes 
" 
• 
approximate size and how far apart 
? Might be — 
MR. 
the 
MR. 
's h 
JACOBSON: This has nothing to do with 
affidavit. 
WARD: Well, it's got to do with his 
ad discussion with developing the 
i traffic control plan. 
placement 
MR. JACOBSON: There's nothing about barrel 
, size of barrels. 
MR. WARD: It's the traffic control plan 
I'm asking him about and the specificity --
question 
questions 
affidavit 
MR. 
MR. 
and 
MR. 
JACOBSON: Then why did you --
WARD: Can I finish? You ask me a 
then interrupt my answer. 
JACOBSON: Why didn't you ask those 
during his last deposition? 
MR. 
MR. 
• 
MR. 
WARD: I didn't have the affidavit. 
JACOBSON: And it's not in the 
WARD: Yes, it is. 
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that, Scott, and that's why we're doing this depo 
now. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I disagree. 
MR. WARD: That's the way it goes. 
Q So here's what I'm saying to you: You 
didn't have specificity discussions with the FHWA 
about the types of barrels, how far apart they'd be, 
where they'd be placed, those kinds of things? 
A No. That would not be part of the 
discussions with the FHWA. 
Q That's developed internally through your 
own standards? 
A That's standards that go beyond this 
particular project. The spacing and tapers and stuff 
is another standard altogether. 
Q But it's an established standard? 
A It is, yes. 
Q That the FHWA understands? 
A It's kind of an established standard 
throughout the country. 
Q Okay. 
A It's more than just UDOT. 
Q When you did what you say here -- once 
again in paragraph 18 -- you said, I considered the 
same safety, cost and time factors that had been 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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considered previously. You're referring to -- this 
is now after the request by Granite? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, did you go through the same analysis 
as you did initially when you say I considered the 
same safety, cost and time factors? Was anything 
different, other than Granite was now specifically 
requesting through a letter that they be given money 
for Jersey barriers? 
A Well, the other different thing is, is if 
we use barrels, how do we modify the traffic control 
plan to provide --
Q If you use barriers, you mean? 
A Or barriers. Excuse me. If you use 
barriers for the traffic to get through the project, 
especially in a Phase 4 mode, and so we have to 
analyze that, and if we change to a concrete barrier, 
a different traffic control plan altogether would 
have had to have been developed and there would have 
been a cost and a time involved in construction and 
the whole works. 
Q Now, did you -- you just -- you don't say 
here that you've discussed with the FHWA. This is 
something you did on your own, right? 
A Yes. 
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was? You say "My duties as the Region One director." 
in othe 
what yo 
A 
Q 
r words, isn't the very thing you 
u do every day on a daily basis? 
Yes. 
did here ! 
There wasn't anything unusual or j 
outstanding about your involvement in this project 
versus 
A 
Q 
of your 
A 
project 
anticip 
back in 
Q 
talking 
money, 
want to 
get by 
A 
Q 
region 
A 
Q 
any other project, was there? 
No. 
It was the kinds of things you 
daily duties every day? 
Yes. If the designers come in 
is going to cost $3 million more 
ated, why, and what do we have to 
the money that we have available. 
do as part j 
and say this 
than was 
do to get it j 
And so you start your work? You start 
to people, you start looking for ways to save 
you start making this analysis about do we 
spend this much for this or can we afford to 
with that? That's your job, right? 
Yes. 
Not only was that your job, it 
director's job, wasn't it? 
That's true. 
was every 
So as I understand part of your analysis 
that you made here regarding time -- you 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
mentioned 
103 
/ of? 
LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD 
that a couple of times here. The use of the concrete 
barriers, a negative for their use was that they're 
more time consuming to use; is that right? 
A Concrete barriers generally requires more 
time to take them down and put them up. 
Q And particularly in a case here where, at 
night during off-peak hours, you wanted to run one 
lane, and then during the day during peak hours, you 
wanted to run two lanes. You found it to be 
impractical and unfeasible that youfd be moving 
concrete Jersey barriers back and forth; is that 
right? 
A That would be very difficult to do. 
Q And is that part of your analysis that you 
did here? 
A Yes, it would be. 
Q Okay. I wonder about this. You said in 
paragraph 19, "Although UDOT rejected Granite 
Construction's requests for additional funding for 
concrete barriers, there was nothing in UDOT's 
contract with Granite Construction which prevented 
Granite Construction from using concrete barriers at 
Granite Construction's own expense." 
They would have had to request a change 
order, wouldn't they? 
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1 will have her mark. 
2 (The reporter marked Deposition Exhibit 2.) 
3 Q. (BY MR. WARD) This is Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, 
4 Mr. LeFevre. It is a memorandum — a copy of a memorandum, a 
5 letter to the Regional Federal Highway Administration clear 
6 back in 198 6 having to do with the guidelines for mitigating 
7 pavement dropoffs and construction zone and maintenance work 
8 zone. You understand what a pavement dropoff is? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. You understand that as shown on Phase 4 there were 
11 going to be cutouts in the center lane of this project? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Those cutouts would be as deep as 10 to 12 inches, 
14 as wide as a full lane of traffic, some 30 feet long, some 60 
15 feet long. Just varied, depending on how much concrete 
16 needed to be replaced. 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. You understand that would be considered a pavement 
19 droppoff? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. If you would look at this letter that was sent out 
22 to everybody in 1986. 
23 Have you had a chance to read that exhibit? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Is there anything in there you would disagree with 
24
 /0^1 
as a safety principle? 
A. Probably not. 
Q. That is a guideline for when you have pavement 
dropoffs in excess of certain inches, right, two inches, six 
inches, whatever? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In this case, the pavement droppoff was in excess 
of six inches that our client went into, and it says that the 
strongly-recommended situation is that you install portable 
concrete barriers or other acceptable positive barriers with 
a two-foot buffer zone between the barrier face and the 
travel portion of the road. You would agree with that as a 
principle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In this case, why you didn't think that was going 
to be applicable is the Traffic Control Plan shows you 
wouldn't be traveling next to an open cutout? 
A. That's correct. 
(The reporter marked Deposition Exhibit 3.) 
Q. (BY MR. WARD) Let me show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 3, which is a picture of the center cutout and 
barrel placement in accordance with the Traffic Control Plan 
where they reduced it to one lane of traffic so there is an 
actual lane between the cutouts and the travel lane. You can 
see that? 
oc 
1 A, Yes. 
2 Q. That is appropriate, correct, according to the 
3 plan? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Let me represent to you what actually occurred on 
6 the night of this accident was that the Granite traffic 
7 control person took the barrels that closed it down to one 
8 lane and simply moved them over and lined them up with the 
9 cutoff. Actually putting barrels in the cutout rather than 
10 any kind of a buffer zone, but actually putting them in the 
11 cutout and then ran traffic right next to the cutout. That 
12 would be a violation of the Traffic Control Plan, wouldn't 
13 it? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. That would be unsafe, wouldn't it? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. That would be something you would never approve, 
18 correct? 
19 A. Correct. 
20 Q. That would be something you would not allow your 
21 field engineer to approve, either, correct? 
22 A. If he knew about it, yes. 
23 Q. Yes, you wouldn't allow it? 
24 A. I wouldn't allow it. 
25 Q. Does the State have guidelines that differ from 
26 fO 6?f 
1 Exhibit 2 as regards to pavement dropoffs? 
2 A. No. They are guidelines, and we try to follow them 
3 as best we can. 
4 Q. They are federal guidelines and, if I understand 
5 the contracts, you get money from the federal government. 
6 And as part of the strings attached to that, they require you 
7 to follow their guidelines; is that correct? 
8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I object. I think that calls for 
9 a legal conclusion. 
10 THE WITNESS: Guidelines are recommendations. It 
11 doesn't mean we have to follow them. 
12 Q. (BY MR. WARD) I assume you try to be consistent 
13 with safety as much as possible? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. There may be some instances where you vary? 
16 A. Right. 
17 Q. You can't vary too much or they won't approve the 
18 project? 
19 A. Right. They already approved this project. 
20 Q. They already approved it based on Exhibit 1? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. If they were to change it, it would have to be in 
23 writing? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Approved by you and the Federal Highway 
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TOPHAM, EXAM BY WARD 
changed unilaterally by the contractor; it must be 
through written agreement with the State, correct? 
A I'd say that would depend on the contract. 
If the contract says that, that would be the case. 
Q Yeah. Okay. I want to show you a 
memorandum from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation. It was sent out in 1986. What was 
your position in 1986 with UDOT? 
A '86. 1986, I was the engineer for planning 
and programming. 
Q Okay. So you may well have seen this. If 
you'd take a moment and look at Exhibit 1. 
A (Time lapse.) Okay. 
Q Fair to say that that document refers to 
standards that should be followed with pavement 
dropoffs depending on the depth of the pavement 
dropoff? 
A It refers to that, but I think you need 
to — when I was at UDOT, I would have read this 
second paragraph here where -- I think it's the 
second paragraph -- where it says that -- and this is 
consistent with what I said earlier, that the feds 
don't develop these standards. The states develop 
the standards and the feds give input to that. 
In this second paragraph here, it says this 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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is to serve -- this is -- this information presented 
here is not intended in any way to represent policy 
to serve as a directive of the FHWA, nor does it 
represent or promulgate any new standard. Instead, j 
it is information provided to the states, and then 
they take that information and decide whether to 
adopt a standard based on it or not. 
Q Okay. Now, this was in 1986. Do you know 
if at any time since 1986 the State has adopted the 
same or similar standards for pavement dropoffs? 
A Don't know that. 
Q What if I were to tell you that the 
contract that controlled this situation that we're 
here about today, according to -- your project 
engineer testified that that same standard applied, 
that anything below six -- I'm sorry -- any change in 
the pavement dropoff in excess of six inches required 
either the use of Jersey barriers to separate it from 
traffic flow or it be covered, as recommended in that 
manual, so that a car couldn't go into that hole. 
Would that surprise you? 
A I wouldn't -- I just wouldn't know. 
Q Okay. 
A Just wouldn't know. 
Q Would you believe that would be a good 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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Now, this accident happ< 
ng that I'm here about, < 
that that was the off-p< 
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one lane open, correct, 
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! lane and 
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and it's been 
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I could keep two lanes open. I don 
to that. 
Q 
A 
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Q 
But by looking --
By looking at this plan 
it being one lane during 
't know the answer 
, I would say that 
the off-peak hours. 
And it shows a separation -- it shows --
those little dots, I assume, are 
what you 
A 
Q 
seem to b 
which wou 
LeFevre -
cutouts. 
would assume, too? 
(Witness nods.) 
the barrels. That's 
And it shows a separation. Those barrels 
e kind of in the middle 
Id be, according to -- I 
- some six to eight feet 
of the second lane, 
think it was Mr. 
away from the 
And you know what I mean by cutouts? 
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it out as 
Q 
he said, 
an offer. 
And in an affidavit filed by Mr. LeFevre, 
"I concluded that the safety and time 
considerations could not justify the additional 
financial 
it accept 
Granite's 
correct? 
A 
costs that UDOT would be forced to incur if 
ed Granite's proposal," indicating that 
proposal was that UDOT pay for it, 
Do you remember that? 
Yeah. Well, there was a request come --
that I considered, and I donft know whether -- I 
assumed it was -- that Granite was -- well, I know 
that Granite was involved with it. I don't know all 
of those 
Q 
A 
workings. 
Sure . 
But the request came and I conferred with 
Dyke about it and we decided that we would not do it. 
Q Okay. Mr. LeFevre went on to say that 
several factors were considered in his decision to 
stay with 
lists is 
motoring 
the first 
factors? 
A 
Q 
plastic barrels, and the first factor he 
the safety of project workers and the 
public, so you would agree that that, if not 
, it's certainly one of the most important 
Uh-huh. 
Okay. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CYNTHIA L. KEEGAN, Personally 
and as the Personal Representative 
of the Estate of David J. Keegan 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants and 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEES (PART I) AND OPENING BRIEF 
OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AS CROSS-APPELLANTS (PART II) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(Supp, 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of 
governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) does not infringe upon any 
substantial right protected by the open courts provision of Utah 
Const., Art. I, § 11 (1991). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
West Vallev Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
2. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of 
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governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) , does not infringe upon any 
substantial right protected by the wrongful death action provision 
of Utah Const., Art. XVI, § 5 (1991). 
STANDARD OP REVIEW? This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
West Valley Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
3. Because no substantial right protected by the Constitution 
of Utah is implicated, the heightened scrutiny standard does not 
apply to the instant matter. The rational basis test does apply. 
Under the rational basis test, the burden was upon the plaintiff to 
prove the unconstitutionality of the damage cap found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) in light of the presumption of 
constitutionality afforded legislative acts. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
West Vallev Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
4. If this Court should conclude, unlike the trial court, 
that a constitutional right was impinged upon by the damage cap 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993), and that the burden of 
proof was therefore shifted to the State of Utah, the only proper 
disposition is to vacate the judgment appealed from and remand the 
matter to the trial court for further proceedings under the 
heightened scrutiny standard. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
w»i,f Vallev Citv Corp. ^ gait Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
5. The question of whether the damage cap found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) may constitutionally be applied to actual 
compensatory damages, as distinguished from damages for pain and 
suffering and punitive damages, was not raised by the plaintiff in 
the trial court. This Court should not address this issue for the 
first time on appeal. This is especially important where, as here, 
the plaintiff had the burden of presenting proof of the 
unconstitutionality of the statute in question. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
w»«h Vallev fHt-v Corp.
 V, fl»lr Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
6. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of 
governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993), does not violate the uniform 
operation of laws clause of Utah Const., Art. I, § 24 (1991). 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
w—f Vallev rj «-Y m m . v. Salt Lake Cc-untV, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
7. If the damage cap found in Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-34 
(1993) is found to be unconstitutional, it is not severable from 
the balance of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and this Court 
must strike down the act in its entirety, including those 
provisions waiving the absolute immunity of the State of Utah. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
West Vallev Citv Corp v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993) . 
8. The State of Utah and the Utah Department of 
Transportation were entitled to immunity from the present action 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1993) because the 
complained of actions these defendants were done in the performance 
of a discretionary function. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where, as here, a challenge to a denial 
of summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law, 
this Court accords no deference to a trial court's legal 
conclusions but reviews them for correctness. West Valley Citv 
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Utah 1993). 
9. Judge Wilkinson erred in denying the State of Utah and the 
Utah Department of Transportation's motion to have the jury 
determine the percentage and proportion of fault attributable to 
the Federal Highway Administration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-39 (1992). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness. 
West Vallev Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(Utah 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are 
set forth in the Addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Cynthia Keegan brought the instant wrongful death action 
alleging that the death of her husband, David J. Keegan, in a 
single car accident in Parley's Canyon was caused by the negligence 
of the State of Utah and the Utah Department of Transportation. R. 
2-6, 628-37. The State of Utah and the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that the alleged actions of the defendants were entitled to 
sovereign immunity as discretionary functions. R. 240-81. The 
motion was denied by the trial court. R. 404, 467-68. 
The State and UDOT also filed a motion to join the Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) for the limited purpose of having the 
proportion of fault attributable to the FHWA (a non-party) 
determined by the jury. R. 341. While this motion was initially 
granted (R. 404, 467-68), it was then denied by the trial court 
upon reconsideration. R. 576-78, 627. 
The jury, having found Mr. Keegan not to have been negligent, 
and the State of Utah and UDOT to have been negligent, awarded Mrs. 
Keegan special damages of $435,000.00 and general damages of 
$65,000,00. R. 902-904. The trial court reduced the judgment to 
$250,000.00 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) . R. 1000, 
1387-88. 
Cynthia Keegan has appealed the reduction of the judgment (R. 
5 
1406-07) and the State of Utah and UDOT have cross-appealed the 
denial of their motion for summary judgment and the denial of their 
motion to compare the fault of the FHWA. R. 144 5-46. 
STATEMENT OP RELEVANT PACTS 
This action arose from a single vehicle accident on January 9, 
1990. At approximately 7:30 a.m. that morning, plaintiff's 
decedent drove his 1972 Chevrolet Blazer east on Interstate 80 
through Parley's Canyon. A continuous concrete median barrier 
divided the east and west lanes of travel in the canyon. The 
Blazer left its lane of traffic, travelled up the concrete barrier 
and then slid on top of it for some distance until it collided with 
a concrete pillar that supported an overhead bridge. The driver 
died in the accident. R. 86-87. Plaintiff sued the State of Utah 
and the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) for the death on 
a negligence theory. She contended that the highway design and 
engineering standards required that a concrete median barrier be 32 
inches high with a 3 inch vertical rise at the base of the barrier. 
She argued that the concrete barrier in the canyon is substandard 
because it was 27 inches high and did not have a 3 inch vertical 
rise at the point of the Blazer's impact. She claimed that UDOT 
was negligent in failing to maintain the barrier in accordance with 
her version of highway and engineering standards. R. 88-90. 
In 1969, UDOT installed the subject concrete median barrier in 
Parley's Canyon. R. 258, 276. In 1975, there was a surface 
overlay project in the canyon. Such a project involves laying road 
surface material on the travelled lanes and on the inside shoulder 
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next to the barrier. R. 258, 280-81. In 1984, approximately 6 
years before the accident, UDOT began to plan and design a road 
resurfacing project for 1-80 in Parley's Canyon. R. 257. UDOT's 
project design engineer for the 1984 resurfacing job was Alex 
Badalian. R. 257. Mr. Badalian holds a bachelor's degree in 
engineering from the University of Utah and is a licensed 
professional engineer in the State of Utah. R. 256. 
In planning the resurfacing project, Badalian took sample 
measurements of the height of the concrete median barrier in the 
canyon. The height measurements ranged from 27 to 29 inches. R. 
259, 262. These measurements prompted him to request an 
engineering safety study to determine whether the median barrier 
should be raised before the road was resurfaced. The study 
specifically concerned the issue of whether the median barrier, 
which was anchored below the road surface, should be dug out and 
replaced with a new, taller barrier. R. 260, 262. 
The safety study was performed by Art Guerts, UDOT's safety 
studies engineer. R. 260-61. Mr. Guerts gathered and reviewed 
accident rate information for 1-80 and comparable roads and 
performed a statistical analysis of the rates. R. 270-72. Guerts 
concluded that UDOT could resurface 1-80 without having to raise 
the median barrier by replacing it. R. 263, 270-72. He concluded 
that if the resurfacing layer was tapered "to negligible thickness 
at the barrier," there would be M[n]o adverse safety effects as a 
result of this resurfacing." R. 271. Guerts proposed resurfacing 
without removing and replacing the existing median barrier. R. 
7 
271. 
After receiving the results of the safety study, Badalian 
prepared a cost-benefit analysis of the proposal to resurface 
without removing and replacing the existing median barrier. R. 
264. In preparing the analysis, Badalian determined that the cost 
of removing and replacing the existing barrier would be $750,000. 
The total amount allocated in the budget for the resurfacing 
project was $1.3 million. R. 264. 
This cost-benefit analysis was prepared in order to obtain 
Federal Highway Administration approval for UDOT's proposal. Since 
95V of the resurfacing project was funded with federal money, it 
was required that the federal government approve the proposal. R. 
264-69. The cost benefit analysis examined the safety advantages 
of removing and replacing the median barrier and balanced those 
with the financial cost and other disadvantages of doing so. The 
factors included in the analysis were: 
(1) The Guerts report that concluded, "No adverse safety 
effects are anticipated as a result of this resurfacing." 
(2) Removing the barrier would cause major disruption and 
inconvenience to the motoring public, which would have to be 
repeated in five or six years when an anticipated concrete overlay 
project was to begin. 
(3) Increased construction time for barrier removal could 
jeopardize completion of the project because of the short 
construction season in Parley's Canyon. 
(4) $124,500 would be saved by not removing the barrier in 
8 
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1984 and instead replacing the barrier when the future concrete 
overlay project was begun. 
(5) The 1984 overlay project would be feathered near the 
median barrier to avoid reducing the existing barrier height. 
R. 270-73. 
The Federal Highway Administration approved UDOT's proposal. 
R. 273. The resurfacing project was completed in 1984, and the 
overlay material was tapered to negligible thickness near the 
median barrier in the vicinity of the accident site. R. 277. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CYNTHIA L. KEEGAN, Personally : 
and as the Personal Representative 
of the Estate of David J. Keegan : 
Plaintiff and : 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : 
Defendants and : 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEES (PART I) AND OPENING BRIEF 
OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AS CROSS-APPELLANTS (PART II) 
PART I. RESPONSE BRIEF AS APPELLEES 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Neither the open courts provision nor the wrongful death 
provision of the Utah State Constitution is violated by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of immunity. No common 
law right of action existed against the State of Utah for the 
manner in which it maintained the public roads. For this reason 
these provisions are not implicated by the damage cap set out in 
section 34 of the act. 
Because no such substantial right is implicated, the 
heightened scrutiny standard does not apply. Instead the rational 
basis test applies. Plaintiff failed to go forward with her burden 
of proving the unconstitutionality of this statute, instead relying 
10 
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on her erroneous claim that the burden of proof had been shifted to 
the State of Utah. If this Court finds that the burden was indeed 
shifted to the State, it should remand this action to the trial 
court for further proceedings under the heightened scrutiny 
standard. 
This Court has already held that sovereign immunity does not 
violate the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution. A partial waiver of that absolute immunity does not 
violate the provision either. 
If the damage cap is found to be unconstitutional, it is not 
severable from the balance of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
and this Court must strike down the act in its entirety, including 
the waivers of the State of Utah's absolute immunity. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Keegan's state constitutional challenges to the damage cap in 
the Governmental Immunity Act must be considered in light of the 
history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the principle that 
the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. 
Sovereign immunity was a well-settled feature of American common 
law when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution. Madsen 
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983); QaUegps v, Miflvale 
Citv. 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (1972); Wilkinson v. 
State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913). Although not without 
its critics, e.g.. Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv, 100 Utah 573, 111 
P.2d 800, 804 (1941) (concurring opinion of Wolfe, J.), the 
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doctrine has nonetheless been applied continually by the courts of 
this state to immunize governmental entities from tort liability 
when carrying out a governmental function, absent any waiver of 
immunity. E.g., Ramirez v. Qgden Citv. 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 
463, 464 (1955), and cases cited therein; see also Condemarin, 775 
P.2d at 349 (separate opinion of Durham, J.); !£. at 370-71 
(separate opinion of Stewart, J.); id. at 383 (dissenting opinion 
of Hall, C.J.). 
In 1963, the Utah Legislature directed the Utah Legislative 
Council to study the effects of the waiver of governmental immunity 
enjoyed at common law upon the state, its political subdivisions, 
and municipal corporations. House Joint Resolution 21 (March 14, 
1963). A twenty-one member Governmental Immunity Committee of 
legislators, laypersons, and representatives of governmental units 
was formed by the Council at the legislature's direction and met 
monthly for two years. 36th Utah Legislature, Record of House 
Proceedings, February 11, 1965. The committee gathered data about 
liability insurance costs and availability, and prepared numerous 
working drafts of legislation. Report and Recommendations of the 
Utah Legislative Council 1963-65 at 45-46. 
In its final report, the Council recommended legislation that 
reaffirmed the doctrine of governmental immunity, but waived that 
immunity in certain exceptional circumstances where deemed required 
"as a matter of justice. M J£. at 48. The Council concluded that 
injury resulting from the negligence of governmental employees 
performing governmental functions was such an exceptional 
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circumstance, but it recognized that open-ended liability would 
endanger governmental operating budgets and substantially interfere 
with the governmental entities' ability to fulfill the functions 
required of government: 
Numerous citizens have been injured in their 
person and property by negligent acts of 
government employees and by the construction 
of public improvements. In many of these 
cases no recourse against the governmental 
entity has been possible. It was found that 
the present system works substantial injustice 
to citizens. There is a fear, however, among 
government officials, that to open the door to 
unrestrained claims would be too burdensome 
upon governmental funds. 
!£. at 46. Proposed legislation along the lines suggested by the 
Council, Senate Bill 4, the Governmental Immunity Act, was 
ultimately recommended for passage by the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary in January 1965. 1965 Senate Journal at 101. The 
Committee reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immunity needed 
to be modified in our modern society to do equity to injured 
citizens, but pointed out that the recommended bill empowered 
governmental entities to protect themselves by purchasing liability 
insurance. Id. 
At the bill's reading, copies of the Legislative Council's 
report were distributed. Bill sponsor Senator Charles Welch, Jr., 
recited numerous examples of personal injuries suffered at the 
hands of governmental employees negligently performing their duties 
where no compensation from the employer entity was possible because 
of the common law governmental immunity doctrine. He repeatedly 
stressed to his colleagues that the injuries incurred worked the 
13 
same hardship whether the negligent tortfeasor was a government 
employee or a private citizen. However, he also repeatedly 
recounted to them the experiences of California, Nevada, and 
Arizona in which many millions of dollars in claims were filed 
against governmental entities in the period after their state 
appellate courts had abolished governmental immunity as a common 
law doctrine, but before state lawmakers had a chance to adopt 
controlling legislation. Endorsing his bill's "middle of the road 
course" between absolute immunity and unlimited liability, Welch 
encouraged his colleagues to address the issue legislatively, 
before the Utah courts did, and to "open the doors" to suits 
involving injury "[bjut not to open that door wide open where it 
would be detrimental to the State or its subdivisions." 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965; 36th 
Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965. 
Injured persons would thus be protected by the waivers of immunity, 
while governmental entities and the public would be protected by 
the statutory limitation on the amount of liability. 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965. 
The record of legislative debate of Senate Bill 4 reveals that 
many legislators were skeptical about Welch's claim that this was 
only a partial opening of the litigation door. Some were concerned 
about the "real costs" of the bill, particularly the increased 
costs to entities for liability insurance coverage or for defending 
the rash of suits likely to ensue because of the waivers of 
immunity. Id., disc IV. Others were concerned that entities with 
14 
^ o ^ 
restricted mill levies or tax bases could not raise enough money to 
pay for insurance premiums or for large judgments. 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965. 
Senator Welch attempted to allay these fears by pointing out the 
bill's dollar limit cap on any judgment obtained where immunity had 
been waived. Id. Representative Bullock believed that some 
control would be provided by the presence on the jury of taxpayers, 
who would ultimately have to foot the bill. Id. Representative 
Buckner expressed his reluctant support of the bill, warning his 
colleagues, 
I would hate to see the door open too wide. 
But on the opposite side of the coin, I think 
we have very little choice facing us based 
upon the history of surrounding states and 
what has happened when a court test has gone 
to the supreme court and they have thrown out 
completely the governmental immunity. I think 
the people of this State are entitled to some 
defense and unless we get something like this 
on the books that's been studied for many 
years, I think we have some real problems 
facing us. 
Id. Several legislators remarked that many of their constituents, 
particularly those from sparsely populated counties and small 
municipalities, strongly opposed the bill and had urged them to 
vote against it. One legislator opposed the bill as "an automatic 
increase in property tax" by each taxing entity, while another 
suggested that they enact only that portion of the bill adopting 
absolute governmental immunity and not enact any waiver provisions. 
Id. 
Senate Bill 4 was, in fact, defeated in the House vote that 
took place after these discussions, with 31 votes in favor of 
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passage and 36 against. Id-; 1965 House Journal at 341. On 
reconsideration, Representative Harding, House sponsor of Senate 
Bill 4, told his colleagues the bill was defeated only because of 
a misunderstanding that it would bankrupt government entities with 
million dollar judgments. He referred them again to section 34 of 
the bill, which required a court to reduce any judgment to the 
dollar amount of the liability limit set by section 29, telling 
them there was no opportunity for a judgment in excess of that 
damage cap amount. Id. 
Noting that the bill was drafted by a committee with eight 
lawyers on it and recounting how a New Jersey School District had 
been bankrupted by one large personal injury judgment, 
Representative Prior rose in opposition to the bill, saying that 
supporters' representations about how minimal the increased costs 
would be "do not jibe with real experience." After pointing out 
that tort claims against the state of California had jumped from 
$4.71 million to $9.75 million in the year following judicial 
abolition of common law governmental immunity, Prior added, "Now, 
these are the things that our communities are fearful of that will 
bankrupt the subdivisions of our state[.]" ?d. 
Despite these concerns, the House nonetheless passed the bill 
by a 41-25 vote. 1965 House Journal at 343. The Governmental 
Immunity Act, went into effect July 1, 1966. 1965 Utah Laws, ch. 
139. In Section 3, the legislature adopted immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities "for any injury that may result from the 
activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the 
16 
^ < P ^ 
exercise and discharge of a governmental function," except as 
otherwise provided for in the Act. Immunity was waived for 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions on roads, highways and 
sidewalks, as well as for nonlatent defects in public structures 
and public improvements. 1965 Utah Laws, ch. 13 9, §§ 8, 9. 
Immunity from suit was also waived for injuries proximately caused 
by the negligence of government employees acting within the scope 
of their employment, with numerous exceptions to waiver. jEd. at § 
10. Senator Welch had repeatedly told his colleagues these 
exceptions in section 10 were specifically intended to protect the 
entities by retaining immunity in some circumstances. 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965, disc 
11. Political subdivisions of the State were authorized in Section 
27 to impose taxes to pay judgments, or to settle or defend claims. 
Section 28 authorized entities to purchase liability insurance. 
Section 34 required a court to reduce to the amounts listed in 
Section 29 ($100,000 per injured person and $300,000 per accident) 
or to the amount of any insurance coverage in excess of those 
figures, any judgment obtained in an action for which immunity had 
been waived by the Act. 
Section 29 was repealed by 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130, § 5, but 
its liability limitations were incorporated into reenacted section 
34, which was rewritten essentially into the form it took at the 
time of Keegan's judgment, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989). In 
the reenactment process, the personal injury damage caps were 
raised to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident by 
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Substitute House Bill 289. 1983 Utah Laws, ch. 130, § 3. House 
Bill 289's increase in the liability limit from that in effect 
since 1965 was described as intended to "reflect more fairly 
current recovery levels." 1983 General Session, Governmental 
Immunity Act Amendments, Explanation Material, para. 2 [on file in 
the bill file at Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel]. 
According to the bill's sponsor, Representative Gayle 
McKeachnie, this and other 1983 amendments to the Governmental 
Immunity Act were negotiated as a package deal by the League of 
Cities and Towns, the Association of Counties, representatives from 
the Attorney General's Office and higher education, and plaintiffs' 
attorneys. 44th Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, 
February 24, 1983, disc I. 
Six years later, in Condemarin v. Univ. HQSD.. 775 P.2d 348, 
366 (Utah 1989), Justices Durham, Zimmerman, and Stewart reached 
the limited holding that the $100,000 damage cap imposed by 
sections 63-30-29 and -34 before 1983 was "unconstitutional" as 
applied to limit recovery from the University Hospital in a medical 
malpractice action. Although a majority could not agree on which 
constitutional provision was violated by the damage cap in that 
case, as discussed below, the starting point for the three 
concurring justices' heightened scrutiny under both the equal 
protection and due process provisions was the open courts guarantee 
in article I, § 11. 
Last year, in McCorvey v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 225 Utah Adv. 
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Rep. 3, 6-7 (Utah 1993) four Justices of this Court (Hall, C.J., 
with whom Howe, J., concurred, and Stewart, J., with whom Durham, 
J., concurred) (Zimmerman, J. concurred only in the result) agreed 
that the damage cap, when applied to the governmental function of 
maintaining the public roads, did not violate the open courts 
guarantee of article I, § 11 and did not invoke the heightened 
scrutiny standard under the uniform operation of laws provision of 
article I, § 24. Justices Stewart and Durham dissented from the 
Court's holding that the damage cap did not violate article I, § 
24. 
I. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NO COMMON LAW RIGHT 
TO RECOVER FROM THE STATE AND UDOT, THE 
PARTIAL WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, UP TO 
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGE CAP, DOES NOT 
IMPLICATE A RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE OPEN COURTS 
PROVISION 
Utah's open courts provision, Utah Const, article I, § 11, 
states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
In Berrv ex rel. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Co.. 717 P.2d 670, 
680 (Utah 1985), this Court established a two-part test to 
determine whether a statute can limit or eliminate a common law 
right of action or remedy consistent with due process and the open 
courts provision. But the initial question must always be whether 
the cause of action or remedy being sought by the plaintiff existed 
at common law. Although the open courts provision protects a 
person from being "arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies 
designed to protect basic individual rights," i£. at 675, it does 
not create new remedies or new rights of action that did not exist 
at common law. "Consequently, Article I, § 11 worked no change in 
the principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not 
unconstitutional under that section." Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 
627, 629 (Utah 1983); Brown v. Wiahtman. 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 
366-67 (1915). 
An injured person had no common law right of action against, 
or remedy from, a governmental entity performing a governmental 
function. McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 225 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1993) . Since the adoption of the open courts 
provision worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, 
this Court has held that legislatively adopted sovereign immunity 
itself does not violate the open courts provision. Madsen v. 
Borthick. 658 P.2d at 629 (adopting the reasoning in Brown v. 
Wichita State Univ.. 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24 (1976)); 
eccprd Feal v, PPKehve, 611 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Okl. 1980); 
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County. 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 
(1957) (no remedy protected by open courts provision since 
government immune at common law for negligence occurring in the 
performance of a governmental function, such as maintenance of 
highways); &&& also Wright v. Colleton County School Disfcr-. 301 
S.C. 282, 391 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1990) (open courts provision is not 
a guarantee of full compensation to all injured) . As the courts in 
20 
' * < * > 
j^dsen v. Borthick and Brown v. Wichita State—VnjversjtY 
understood, a broad reading of the open courts provision as 
protecting rights or remedies that did not even exist when the 
constitution was adopted would prohibit retention of governmental 
immunity even for governmental functions, grown, 547 P.2d at 1024. 
Under Madsen. a person injured in the course of a governmental 
entity's performance of a governmental function simply has no 
"right" that is constitutionally protected by the open courts 
provision from legislative infringement. 
Keegan claims that somehow the enactment of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act itself abrogated sovereign immunity and 
created new common law causes of action that had never before 
existed. This claim is contrary to this Court's decision in 
Madsen. Indeed, it is contrary to this Court's decisions in 
McCorvev and Condemarin v. Univ. HOSP., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) . 
A majority of this Court in Condemarin never ruled that the 
damage cap statute was unconstitutional as applied to governmental 
functions for which the entity would have been immune at common 
law. As Justice Durham stated in the lead opinion, "there is no 
fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from governmental 
entities performing governmental functions." Cpnflemarjn* 755 P.2d 
at 352 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
Condemarin involved application of the damage cap to limit 
liability of the University Hospital for medical malpractice. 
Precisely because the operation of this hospital was not considered 
a governmental function, a majority concluded the Cpntiemerin 
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plaintiff had a common law right to recover from the governmental 
entity for negligently inflicted injuries, a right that was 
infringed by the damage cap. Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 357-58 
(opinion of Durham, J.); ici. at 372 (opinion of Stewart, J.) ("The 
test also identifies where the constitutional right of a person to 
have a remedy for personal injury begins under Article I, section 
11 of the Utah Constitution as against a governmental agency, and 
where the governmental right to immunity from such lawsuit stops"). 
This Court's decision in McCorvev expressly declared that: 
Because no right existed at common law to 
recover from the state for injuries arising 
out of the state's maintenance of public 
roadways, the legislature is free to limit the 
state's liability in that area without 
implicating the open courts clause and its 
concomitant heightened scrutiny. 
225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. Indeed, even the dissent in McCorvey 
reached this same conclusion. 
I agree that Article I, section 11 does not 
guarantee a right to sue the state when it 
acts in a governmental function, . . . 
As stated, the right to sue the state when it 
performs a governmental function, as 
constitutionally defined, does not implicate a 
right protected by the open courts provision 
of Article I, section 11. 
225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The 
maintenance of public roads is a governmental function. As such, 
neither absolute immunity nor the partial waiver of immunity to the 
amount of the statutory damage cap implicates a right protected by 
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. For this 
reason the trial court was correct when it rejected the plaintiff's 
open courts challenge to the damage cap of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
/ O JP^r ^ -^ 
34 (1993). This Court should therefore affirm the 
constitutionality of the damage cap. 
The same result should be reached on plaintiff's claims under 
Utah Const., Art. 1, § 10. Section 10 does not create rights or 
remedies any more than the open courts provision in section 11 
does. The right to jury trial in section 10 applies only to cases 
cognizable at common law when our constitution was adopted. Zion's 
First Nat'l Bank v. Rockv Mt. Irrigation. 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990). 
Here, section 63-30-34 cannot violate the section 10 right to jury 
trial where there would have been no right of action at all at 
common law against a governmental entity discharging a governmental 
function. Furthermore, the damage cap in section 63-30-34 merely 
sets the outer limits of a governmental tort victim's remedy in a 
legislatively created cause of action. It does not deny access to 
the courts, and it does not prevent the jury from finding the facts 
and assessing a plaintiff's damages, which is the crux of the right 
to jury trial. Wright. 391 S.E.2d at 569-70; Bovd v. Bulala, 877 
F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, section 63-30-34 does not deny 
plaintiffs in Keegan's circumstances a right to jury trial 
protected by article I, section 10. 
II. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NO COMMON LAW RIGHT 
TO RECOVER FROM THE STATE AND UDOT, THE 
PARTIAL WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, UP TO 
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGE CAP, DOES NOT 
IMPLICATE A RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE WRONGFUL 
DEATH PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Utah's wrongful death provision, Utah Const, article XVI, S 5, 
states: 
The right of action to recover damages for 
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injuries resulting in death, shall never be 
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall 
not be subject to any statutory limitation, 
except in cases where compensation for 
injuries resulting in death is provided for by 
law. 
As is the case with our constitution's open courts provision, 
this section was never intended to create new causes of action, but 
instead to prevent the abrogation by the legislative branch of 
those causes of action that existed at the time of its enactment. 
In Garfield Smelting Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 53 Utah 133, 178 
P. 57 (1918), this Court explained: 
In view, therefore, that the Constitution 
clearly prohibits the Legislature from 
abrogating the "right of action," it becomes 
necessary to inquire what that right was and 
who enjoyed it at the time the Constitution 
was adopted by the people of this state. As 
we have seen, the Constitution says "the right 
of action" shall not be abrogated; hence the 
right referred to must be deemed to be the 
right ag it then existed and not merely an 
abstract right. 
178 P. at 59 (emphasis added). In Jones v. Carvel 1. 641 P.2d 105, 
107 (Utah 1982), this Court pointed out that the reason for this 
constitutional provision was the "uncertainty of the law, at least 
in other states." I&u £££. algp Berrv ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Co.. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985) (the plain meaning of 
the provision is to prevent the abolition of the right of action 
for a wrongful death); ftalan v. Lewis. 693 P. 2d 661, 667 (Utah 
1984) (provision is directed at preventing the Legislature from 
abolishing a right of action for wrongful death, whether in a 
wholesale or piecemeal fashion). 
Even a brief glance at the right to file a wrongful death 
action as it existed at the time of the enactment of the Utah 
Constitution demonstrates that such a cause of action did not 
include a right to sue the State of Utah. 
Sovereign immunity was a settled feature of the common law 
when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution. At the time 
Utah Const., Art. XVI, § 5 (1991) was drafted, and for many 
subsequent years, the state had absolute immunity at common law and 
could not be sued without its consent. See Campbell v. Pack. 389 
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1964); Bingham v. Bd. of Educ, 223 P.2d 432, 
435 (Utah 1950); State v. Dist. Court. Fourth Jud. Dist.. 78 P.2d 
502, 504 (Utah 1937); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n. 70 
P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1937); Decorso v. Thomas. 50 P.2d 951, 952 
(Utah 1935); Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913). 
Since there was no common law right to recover any 
compensation for death from the state, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 
(1993) does not infringe on a right that is protected by Art. XVI, 
§ 5. That provision does not apply to wrongful death actions 
against the state. Plaintiff's only "right" to recover from the 
State is an action for damages as authorized and limited by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
In urging this court to reach the opposite result, plaintiff 
relies on Yearance v. Salt Lake Citv. 24 P. 254 (Utah 1890), for 
the proposition that a governmental entity could be sued for the 
creation of an unsafe condition in a street. What plaintiff fails 
to consider is that Yearance. while not so stating in the decision 
because it was not at issue, relied upon a statutory waiver of the 
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absolute immunity of the city for maintenance of the public roads. 
This point was made clear in Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv, Ill P.2d 
800 (Utah 1941). 
This court is committed to the doctrine that 
the duty to repair or construct streets within 
its corporate limits is a governmental one and 
that in the absence of a statute no liability 
devolves on a municipality for the defective 
condition of its streets. As stated in Hurley 
v. Town of Binaham, supra [63 Utah 589, 228 P. 
215) : "The right to institute an action in 
this class of cases [injury caused by 
obstruction] is purely statutory. It did not 
exist at common law, and therefore the 
conditions precedent fixed by the statute 
which confers the right must be complied with, 
or the action fails." 
Ill P.2d at 802 (citations omitted) . Indeed, this Court cited both 
flj-blpck and Hurley in its recent decision of McCorvev v. Utah State 
Dep't of Transp., 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 n.2.6 (Utah 1993) for the 
proposition that: "At common law, both the municipalities and the 
state were immune from lawsuits based on the negligent maintenance 
of public roads." 
This Court has routinely applied the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity to wrongful death actions, as well as to all other types 
of actions. £e^, e,gt, Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 842 P. 2d 832 
(Utah 1992); Loveland v. Orem Citv Corp. . 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987); 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Serv. . 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983); 
Madsen v. State. 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978); Eptina v. State. 546 P.2d 
242 (Utah 1976); Emerv v. State. 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971). 
Keegan sets great store by the fact that Utah Const., Art. 
XVI, § 5 (1991) does not contain an express exception for suits 
against government entities. This argument is without merit in 
that it misconstrues the purpose and effect of the constitutional 
provision. Keegan could just as well argue that sovereign immunity 
does not apply to the open courts provision of the constitution 
because that provision too lacks any express exception for that 
doctrine. 
Article XVI, Section 5 seeks to preserve a statutory cause of 
action that the writers of our state constitution were concerned 
might be abolished at some future point by the legislature. It did 
not create any new rights; instead, it protected those that already 
existed. Yet no right existed at common law to sue the State of 
Utah. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity is just as 
applicable to wrongful death actions as it is to all other actions 
against governmental entities when the entity is performing a 
governmental function. The trial court correctly rejected the 
plaintiff's wrongful death provision challenge to the damage cap of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) . This Court should therefore 
affirm the constitutionality of the damage cap. 
III. BECAUSE HO SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY 
THE CONSTITUTION OP UTAH IS IMPLICATED, THE 
RATIONAL BASIS TEST, AND NOT THE HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY STANDARD, APPLIES IN THIS ACTION 
Legislative enactments are generally afforded a strong 
presumption of constitutionality, Mt. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991); Citv of Monticello 
vt Cftrj-stensen, 788 p.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990); gt;at;e ex rel t pjvT 
Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 
(Utah 1990) . The heavy burden of overcoming that presumption and 
proving a statute's invalidity is on the party challenging it. 
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Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 
1991>- Mt. States Tel, & Tel. Co.. 811 P.2d at 187; Blue Cross g. 
Blue Shield of Utah v. Stat*. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); see 
&lga Ejo Vjjgta QH, R d „ 786 P. 2d at 1349-50. Presumptive 
constitutionality dissipates and the burden thereby shifts, 
requiring the opposing party to prove the constitutional validity 
of the challenged statute, only where it impinges on a fundamental 
or specially protected interest. £ejg. Citv of West Jordan v. nt-aft 
State Retirement pdt, 767 P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 1988) (article I, § 
24 analysis); Rjo Vista Qjl K.d., 786 P.2d at 1350 (dictum re due 
process analysis); see also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring) (once infringement of interest protected by open 
courts provision is shown, burden of proving statute does not 
violate due process in article I, § 7 is on proponent of its 
validity); i£. at 363 (opinion of Durham, J.) (due process 
analysis; state failed to make necessary showing of need for, and 
reasonableness of, damage cap). 
Unlike the Cpnflemarin, plaintiff, however, persons injured by 
a governmental entity performing a governmental function have no 
right to full recovery for personal injuries that is specially 
protected by the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
At most, an individual in this latter group has a statutorily 
created interest in recovering from the governmental entity only up 
to the amount of the damage cap. Because this interest is neither 
a fundamental right nor a substantial one specifically protected by 
the constitution, the damage cap statute was presumed 
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constitutional and the burden remained on Keegan to prove its 
invalidity. 
Both the decision of this Court in McCorvey. 225 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 6 and the dissent agreed on this point. ?<l. at 6-7. 
flcCorvev is of special note because it not only dealt, as does the 
instant action, with a damages suit against UDOT concerning the 
maintenance of public roads, but also because McCorvey raised 
almost identical claims that section 63-30-34 is unconstitutional 
as have been presented by Keegan in the present action. This 
Court's decision in McCorvey expressly rejects these same arguments 
because McCorvey, like Keegan, failed to meet his burden of proving 
that the statute was unconstitutional (but instead relied on a 
false claim that the burden was upon UDOT to prove the statute to 
be constitutional). 
As the trial court correctly noted, McCorvey's 
contentions must be considered in light of the 
presumption of constitutionality afforded 
legislative acts. If a statute does not 
impinge on a fundamental or specifically 
protected interest, the legislation's opponent 
has the burden of proving unconstitutionality. 
In this case, McCorvey has failed to meet his 
burden of proving that the cap, which does not 
infringe on a fundamental right, is 
unconstitutional as applied to him. 
Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). The dissenting opinion of Justices 
Stewart and Durham reached the same conclusion as to which party 
had the burden of proof. 
While I agree that Article I, section 11 does 
not guarantee a right to sue the state when it 
acts in a governmental function, Article I, 
section 24 still applies, and the least 
restrictive standard of judicial scrytiny 
governs the determination of whether the cap 
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on damages is constitutional. . . . 
Thus, although a heightened scrutiny standard 
of judicial analysis does not govern the 
Article I, section 24 analysis, the rational 
basis standard of scrutiny does. 
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added). 
Keegan made no effort to carry her burden in the trial court. 
Instead, she merely asserted that the burden has shifted to the 
State of Utah and that the State had failed to meet its burden. 
Keegan relied solely on her erroneous reading of Condemarin as 
shifting the burden of proof onto the State to satisfy the two-part 
Berry test (not applicable in this case) by demonstrating the 
damage cap's reasonableness under due process or equal protection 
analysis. 
Section 63-30-34 provides a reasonable method for protecting 
taxpayers and governmental entities' operating budgets and assets 
from unpredictable catastrophic losses caused in the performance of 
governmental functions and a figure on which future losses can be 
actuarially estimated and planned for. It establishes a rational 
•limit on a governmental entity's liability that has been 
appropriately reached through competing interests' give and take in 
the democratic political process. It is the result of a 
legislative balancing of the desire to compensate with a realistic 
view of the taxing capacities of governmental units and the scope 
of potential governmental liability, in light of past actuarial 
experience and projected losses. 
In light of Keegan's failure to go forward in the trial court 
with any evidence or relevant argument and analysis to support a 
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contrary conclusion, i.e., that section 63-30-34 is 
unconstitutional under the applicable mode of analysis, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's conclusion that Keegan failed to 
overcome the presumptive constitutionality of section 63-30-34. 
On appeal, Keegan should not be allowed to shift the burden 
of proving the damage cap statute's constitutionality to UDOT. See 
Citv of West Jordan. 767 P.2d at 537. Nonetheless, if this Court 
goes on to examine the merits of the constitutional claims that 
Keegan merely asserts without applicable analysis, it will find 
that section 63-30-34 does not violate the due process or equal 
protection rights of persons injured during the discharge of a 
governmental function. 
IV. IP THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 
63-30-34 SHIFTED TO THE STATE OF UTAH, THE 
ONLY PROPER DISPOSITION IS TO VACATE THE 
APPEALED FROM JUDGMENT AND REMAND THIS ACTION 
TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
UNDER THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY STANDARD 
Pursuant to this Court's decision in McCorvev v. Utah State 
Dep't of Transp.. 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993), the trial court 
appears to have been correct in determining that the plaintiff had 
the burden of coming forward with proof to show the alleged 
unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) . For this 
reason the State of Utah did not have a duty to defend the statute 
by putting forth evidence of the actual legislative purpose behind 
the statute and a reasonable factual basis for asserting that the 
means chosen in the statute rationally serve its intended ends as 
it would have if the heightened scrutiny standard applied to this 
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action. Lee v. Gaufin, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (Utah 1993); 
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 356, 368, 373. 
If this Court determines, for the first time on appeal, that 
the burden of proof did indeed shift to the State of Utah for 
whatever reason, the State has had no opportunity to go forward and 
meet its burden because the trial court did not conduct this 
"heightened" level of constitutional scrutiny. The normal workings 
of the judicial process, as well as basic fairness and due process, 
would therefore require this Court to vacate the judgment appealed 
from and remand the case at that point to the trial court for 
further proceedings in light of the belated conclusion that the 
burden of proof has for some reason shifted. 
It would be disingenuous for this Court to shift the burden of 
demonstrating the statute's reasonableness to the party who did not 
have that burden in the trial court, and then rule against that 
party for not satisfying the newly imposed burden. Such a practice 
would also disregard the proper role of the trial courts in finding 
facts based on evidence presented and in declaring the protections 
afforded by the state constitution. 
At a minimum, if this Court determines that the burden of 
proof is shifted, it should remand this matter to the trial court 
so that the State of Utah and UDOT can present evidence, the trial 
court can engage in appropriate factfinding, and the trial court 
can make an initial ruling on the reasonableness issue under the 
heightened scrutiny standard. 
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V. THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER AN 
ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIKE 
ON APPEAL 
At no time in the trial court did Cynthia Keegan raise the 
question of whether the damage cap found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
34 (1993) could constitutionally be applied to actual compensatory 
damages, as distinguished from damages for pain and suffering and 
punitive damages. This issue has been raised by this Court, sua 
sponte, for the first time on appeal. 
Because the plaintiff failed to raise this claim in the trial 
court, this Court should not address the issue for the first time 
on appeal. In Espjnal y, gaU frafre gj^y pfl, of gfluc,, 797 P.2d 412 
(Utah 1990), the plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim for the 
first time on appeal. In refusing to consider that claim, this 
Court explained: 
Appellants' first claim is that the 
realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the 
liberty to control their children's education. 
This claim was raised for the first time on 
appeal. With limited exceptions, the practice 
of this Court has been to decline 
consideration of issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. We therefore do not address 
this claim. 
Id. at 413 (citations omitted) . The limited exceptions to the 
general rule referred to in Espinal deal with cases in which the 
appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed plain 
error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P. 2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992) . &££ also State 
v. Brown^. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992); State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 
781 (Utah 1992). 
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It was the duty of the plaintiff to raise any and all defenses 
she had to the State of Utah's Motion to Reduce the Judgment in the 
trial court. Because this issue was not raised in the trial court, 
the defendants have had no opportunity to make a record to support 
the validity of this legislative enactment against such a 
challenge. It is disingenuous of the plaintiff to claim on appeal 
that the State has failed to present evidence to rebut this claim 
of unconstitutionality, when no such claim was raised in the trial 
court. 
While the State of Utah does not denigrate the importance of 
the question raised by the Court, the State does submit that a full 
and complete hearing on this issue must include the making of a 
proper record in the trial court so that the issue may be properly 
framed and prepared for the consideration of this Court. This has 
not been done in the instant case. For this reason the Court 
should follow its standard practice and decline to consider an 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
VI. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S 
PARTIAL WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, UP TO 
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGE CAP FOUND IN 
SECTION 63-30-34 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORM 
OPERATION OF LAWS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
"fa)11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
This provision has been interpreted as reflecting the "settled 
concern of the law that the legislature be restrained from the 
fundamentally unfair practice" of classifying persons in such a 
manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the 
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purpose of the challenged law are treated differently by it, to the 
detriment of the complaining class. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. 
fftate, 779 P.2d at 637. In examining a challenged statute for 
compliance with article I section 24, this court determines (1) 
whether the classification is reasonable; (2) whether the 
objectives of the legislative action are legitimate; and (3) 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the legislative 
classification and the legislative purposes. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield. 779 P.2d at 637; sje^  Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670-75 
(Utah 1984) . 
In applying this mode of equal protection analysis, general 
social or economic legislative enactments are given varying degrees 
of scrutiny depending on the nature of the complainant's affected 
interest. If the challenged statute impinges no fundamental right, 
or one that is specially protected by another state constitutional 
provision such as the open courts provision, the legislature must 
be given broad deference when this Court scrutinizes both the 
reasonableness of the legislative classifications and their 
relationship to legitimate legislative purposes. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 637. As this Court has stated, 
When considering challenges to matters of 
economic regulation that do not affect 
specially protected interests, we give 
deference to the legislature's judgment as to 
classifications needed to achieve the ends 
sought. To strike down such legislation, we 
must find that the means are not reasonably 
related to the achievement of a legitimate 
legislative purpose. 
City of West Jordan. 767 P.2d at 537 (citations omitted); ace also 
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j^ jke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group. Inc.. 438 U.S. 59, 
83-84 (1978) (statutory cap on liability for nuclear plant 
accidents is a classic example of economic regulation to which 
rational basis test applies). Because those injured by 
governmental tortfeasors performing governmental functions have no 
constitutional or specially protected right to recover fully, or at 
•11, from governmental entities, this deferential level of scrutiny 
is applicable to Keegan's challenge to section 63-30-34. The 
statute must accordingly be upheld under the uniform operation of 
the laws provision unless it is not reasonably related to the 
achievement of any conceivable, permissible legislative objective. 
£££ Plug Crogff ?P3 pjue Shield, 779 P.2d at 637; Baker v. Matheson. 
607 P.2d 233, 244 (1979) (sustain legislative classifications if 
facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the disparate 
treatment); £££ aJLss Rio Vista Oi) . 786 P.2d at 1350. 
With regard to the first step of the test for article I 
section 24 compliance, Keegan asserts on appeal that section 63-30-
34 creates three unreasonable and therefore constitutionally 
impermissible classifications: (a) between victims of governmental 
tortfeasors and nongovernmental tortfeasors; (b) between victims of 
governmental negligence and victims of governmental takings; and 
(c) between plaintiffs granted the ability to sue the sovereign 
whose damages are less than the $250,000 cap, and those similarly 
situated whose damages exceed the cap.1 
1
 The Court, sua sponte, has asked the parties to consider a 
fourth classification, whether the cap can be applied to actual 
compensatory damages, as distinguished from damages for pain and 
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The first classification is created, not by the damage cap 
statute, but by the principle of sovereign immunity itself as 
embraced by the Governmental Immunity Act and then partially 
waived. Sse Hale. 783 P.2d at 516; Brown, 547 P.2d at 1029, 
Keegan has neither claimed nor proven that governmental immunity 
for governmental functions violates any constitutional provision. 
Indeed, this Court has already held that the Governmental Immunity 
Act does not violate article I, section 24 by failing to completely 
waive absolute immunity for injuries arising from the performance 
of all governmental functions. Madsen v. State. 583 P. 2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1978); £££ also McCorvev, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; 
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363 (opinion of Durham, J.) (rejecting 
"extreme position" that naked existence of governmental immunity 
violates equal protection) . 
The Colorado Supreme Court also rejected a state equal 
protection challenge to governmental immunity that was aimed at the 
statutory damage cap for injuries arising out of governmental 
functions. Concluding, as this Court did in McCorvev. that there 
was no statutory infringement on a fundamental right, the court 
held that the statutory classification granting only limited 
recovery to victims of governmental tortfeasors had a reasonable 
basis in fact and was reasonably related to the legitimate 
governmental objective of providing fiscal certainty in carrying 
out the manifold responsibilities of government. Lee v. Colorado 
suffering and punitive damages. The consideration of this 
classification does not vary from that for the third classification 
raised by the plaintiff. 
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Dept. of Health. 718 P.2d 221, 226-27 (Colo. 1986). 
The statutory classification limiting the 
amounts recoverable against a public entity is 
based on real differences in fact between 
governmental and private tortfeasors. Public 
entities are responsible for providing a vast 
array of governmental services to the public 
and, as a result, are exposed to far greater 
liability and risks than a private individual. 
Moreover, the public entity, unlike the 
private individual, does not have the option 
of declaring bankruptcy or going out of 
business when subjected to tort liability, but 
rather must continue to carry out its 
responsibility to the public. The legislative 
decision to limit the public entity's 
liability . . . therefore, proceeds from 
actual differences in the magnitude and 
character of the functions assumed by public 
entities and in the effect of greater 
potential liability exposure on the public 
entity's ability to continue its governmental 
functions. 
14. at 227. Lee was recently reaffirmed in State v. DeFoor. 824 
P.2d 783, 787 (Colo. 1992), cert, denied. 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992), 
which held that the legislature could, consistent with the state 
and federal equal protection guarantees, statutorily waive 
governmental immunity for the maintenance of public highways while 
simultaneously limiting that recovery to a fixed dollar amount. 
DeFoor concluded that the damage cap was rationally related to the 
legitimate state interests of fiscal solvency and provision of 
essential services while minimizing taxpayer burden that would 
result from unforeseeable and unlimited tort judgments. Jg. at 
790; see Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 372 (opinion of Stewart, J.) 
(governmental immunity provides "protection to the public treasury 
and tax revenues against overwhelming losses so that the essential 
functions of government will not be imperiled"). 
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In short, as long as absolute governmental immunity can be 
legislatively retained without violating article I, section 24 
(frladsen v. State. 583 P. 2d at 94) the first challenged 
classification created by the Governmental Immunity Act's adoption 
and then partial waiver of that immunity is not unreasonable. 
peFoor, 824 P.2d at 795 (Rovira, J. concurring); Seifert v. 
Standard Paving Co.. 64 111.2d 109, 355 N.E.2d 537, 539 (1976), 
overruled on other grounds, fiossetti Contracting CQr V, Court; of 
Claims. 109 111.2d 72, 485 N.E.2d 332 (1985); Winston v, 
Reorganized School Distr. R-2. 636 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. 1982); 
Smith v, City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1986), appeal 
dismissed. 479 U.S. 1074 (1987); see also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 
388 n.70 (Hall, C.J., dissenting) (since legislature could retain 
absolute immunity for torts inflicted during discharge of 
governmental function without violating state equal protection 
guarantee, legislature can also constitutionally limit recovery 
where immunity has been partially waived). 
Keegan'e second classification also fails to show a violation 
of the uniform operation of laws provision. Section 63-30-34 (3) ' s 
exception of governmental takings of private property for public 
use from the $250,000 damage cap is merely reflective of this 
Court's holding that inverse condemnation suits are not subject to 
common law governmental immunity principles or to the Governmental 
Immunity Act and that article I, section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution is self-executing. Farmer's New World Life Ins. Co. 
v. Bountiful Citv. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.l (Utah 1990); Colman v. 
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Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630-35 (Utah 1990). Thus, the 
second classification complained of by Keegan is created by article 
I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution itself, not by the 
challenged statute. 
The third classification Keegan asserts is unreasonable is 
that between persons with damages less than the statutory liability 
limit and those whose damages exceed it. This argument was 
rejected in Seifert. 355 N.E.2d at 541, in which the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that, since the legislature had created the 
right of action of victims of government torts, it could set a 
maximum amount recoverable in that action without violating equal 
protection. 
With regard to those persons injured in the exercise of a 
governmental function, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act creates no 
deprivations. Instead, it grants a benefit equally by giving all 
such persons the ability to sue a governmental entity where no such 
action would otherwise exist. All governmental tort victims are 
likewise equally subject to section 63-30-34's limit on recoverable 
damages. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in the State's 
consenting to be sued for otherwise immune activity only up to a 
fixed amount. On the contrary, such a limit (which is, in effect, 
a legislative retention of immunity for an individual's damages 
greater than $250,000) is eminently rational in light of the 
magnitude and nature of the essential functions of government, the 
concomitant huge potential for governmental liability, and the 
effects of unlimited liability on the government's ability to 
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budget with some degree of certainty and to perform these functions 
with available revenues. Thus, the classification necessarily 
created by a damage cap of any amount is not an unreasonable one. 
Although not well articulated, Keegan seems to be contending 
that, once immunity is waived, any damage cap is per se 
unreasonable. In other words, "If I don't get to recover all my 
damages from a governmental entity, then other victims of 
governmental torts whose damages are less than $250,000 cannot 
constitutionally be allowed to recover all their damages either." 
Under such a view, the legislature can satisfy the uniform 
operation of the laws provision only by choosing between the 
extreme options of absolute immunity or absolute liability. This 
position is not only unsupportable as a matter of constitutional 
law, it also constitutes bad public policy. 
Forced to choose between retention of absolute liability and 
adoption of unlimited liability for injuries arising from 
governmental functions, the legislature would inevitably choose the 
former so governmental entities could budget with enough certainty 
to continue providing essential services, such as maintenance of 
public roads, police protection, firefighting, and prison 
operation. This would result in no compensation for any person 
injured in the government's discharge of a governmental function, 
putting the State of Utah back to the pre-1965 era, which the 
Governmental Immunity Act was expressly intended to rectify. In 
choosing partial waiver of absolute immunity, only up to $250,000, 
the legislature has created a classification that is not a 
41 
discrimination "with no rational basis," Mountain States Legal FnH 
y. Public Serv. Comm'n. 636 P.2d 1047, 1055 (Utah 1981), in light 
of the constitutional permissibility of governmental immunity 
itself and the Governmental Immunity Act's purposes. 
Keegan does not demonstrate how the statutory classifications, 
even if reasonable, nonetheless fails the second and third parts of 
the applicable equal protection test, either because the objectives 
of the legislative action are illegitimate or because there is no 
reasonable relationship between the legislative classification and 
the legislative purposes. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 637 P.2d at 
637. 
The Governmental Immunity Act is designed, and was 
deliberately intended, to balance two competing interests: the 
compensation of many victims of governmental tortfeasors who would 
otherwise have no recourse if the governmental entity was engaged 
in a governmental function, and the preservation of the public 
treasury from unpredictable, devastating judgments so that 
essential services can continue being provided. The damage cap 
serves these purposes and at the same time provides governmental 
entities with the ability to plan for and pay for government 
expenditures, which was also a major concern of the 1965 
legislature. gee Kennedy & Lynch, "Some Problems of a Sovereign 
Without Immunity, • 36 So. Ca. L. Rev. 161, 177-78 (1963). Only in 
this way could the legislature open the door, but not all the way, 
as the Act's proponents intended. 
The need to preserve the public treasury and the need for a 
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reasonable degree of fiscal certainty in risk management and 
budgeting for governmental functions without undue tax burdens are 
the legitimate purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act's partial 
waiver of absolute immunity only up to the damage cap in section 
63-30-34. DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790; Lee., 718 P.2d at 226-27; 
fitanhope. 280 N.W.2d at 719; Wilson. 753 P.2d at 1351-52. By 
limiting the liability of a public entity to a fixed amount, the 
Governmental Immunity Act "protects the public entity against the 
risk that unlimited and unforeseen judgments will deplete the 
public coffers and result in the termination or substantial 
curtailment of important governmental functions." peFoor, 824 P.2d 
at 790.2 As the Missouri Supreme Court has pointed out, the 
legislature has a rational basis to fear that full monetary 
responsibility for any and all tort claims entails the risk of 
insolvency or intolerable tax burdens. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328. 
Limiting recovery allows for "fiscal and actuarial planning 
consonant with orderly stewardship of governmental funds," id. , 
while permitting some recovery. 
The same conclusion about the legitimacy of the legislative 
purposes behind statutory damage caps on the liability of 
governmental entities performing governmental functions has been 
reached by numerous other courts that have likewise rejected state 
and/or federal equal protection challenges to them. E.g., Caulev. 
403 So.2d at 387 ($50,000 cap); Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 
2
 These are, of course, the same legitimate purposes served 
by the doctrine of governmental immunity itself. Condemarin. 775 
at 371-72 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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399 So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla. App.) , review denied, 411 So.2d 383 (Fla. 
1981) ($50,000 cap); Packard v. Joint School Distr., 104 Idaho 604, 
661 P.2d 770 (App. 1983) ($100,000 cap); Estate of Caraill v^ 
Rochester. 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704, 706-08 ($50,000 cap), appeal 
dismissed. 445 U.S. 921 (1979); Lienhard v. State. 431 N.W.2d 861, 
867 (Minn. 1988) ($100,000 cap); Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349, 
1352-53 (Okla. 1988) ($25,000 cap); Hale v. Portland. 308 Or. 508, 
783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989) ($100,000 cap) ; Lvles v. Philadelphia. 88 
Pa. Cmwlth. 509, 490 A.2d 936, 941 ($250,000 cap), aff'd. 512 Pa. 
322, 516 A.2d 701 (1985); Wright v. Colleton County School Distr.. 
391 S.E.2d at 570 ($250,000 cap); Texas Deot. of Mental Health v. 
Petty. 817 S.W.2 at 721) ($250,000 cap); Stanhope. 280 N.2d at 719 
($25,000); Sambs v. Brookfield. 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504, 514 
($25,000 cap), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).3 While Pfost 
v. State. 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495, 504-05 (1985) and White v. 
State. 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983) reach a contrary conclusion, it 
should be noted that both of these cases have been expressly 
overruled by the Montana Supreme Court in Meech v. Hillhaven W. , 
Jnc.. 776 P.2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989). 
Keegan contends that section 63-30-34's denial of full 
compensation to governmental tort victims with damages greater than 
$250,000 is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relationship to the 
Act's purposes. Since the Governmental Immunity Act deprives 
3
 See generally Anno., "Validity and Construction of Statute 
or Ordinance Limiting the Kinds or Amount of Actual Damages 
Recoverable in Tort Action Against Governmental Unit," 43 A.L.R.4th 
19, 29-34 (1986) and (Supp. 1993). 
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Keegan and other similarly situated plaintiffs of nothing, but 
instead only grants to all such persons equally the ability to sue 
and recover up to $250,000, there has been no deprivation 
triggering any but the most deferential scrutiny. 
To the extent the legislature may not enact economic or social 
legislation that creates remedies limited in some cases by 
irrational or arbitrary line-drawing, a statutory damage cap is a 
rational means of achieving the legitimate purposes of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, and this particular $250,000 cap is not 
arbitrary. gee free. 718 P.d at 228; Jetton. 399 So.2d at 399; 
Packard. 661 P.2d at 775. Keegan has failed to carry her burden of 
overcoming the statute's presumptive constitutionality by proving 
the contrary. 
As noted above, a damage cap is the only rational way to serve 
the competing purposes of the Utah Legislature's partial waiver of 
absolute governmental immunity for governmental functions. A fixed 
limit of liability at $250,000 is large enough to compensate most 
injured persons and serve the deterrent function of tort liability, 
while simultaneously protecting the public treasury from the risk 
of insolvency or unfeasible tax burdens that would result from 
catastrophic judgments. As the recent earthquake in San Francisco, 
floods in Chicago, and riots in Los Angeles demonstrate, there is 
already a hampered ability to predict the numbers of claims that 
will arise out of a governmental entity's efforts at flood 
management, bridge repair, and police protection, all governmental 
functions. 
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A damage cap provides a crucial element of needed certainty. 
It supplies a fixed amount on which to estimate future liability 
based on the best estimate of numbers of claims, thereby enabling 
governments to budget for the costs of self-insurance. In this 
way, it comprises a central part of the state's risk management 
program. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, risk 
management "requires that recovery be restricted at some finite 
level so that risk exposure can be projected and informed 
underwriting decisions can be made." Packard. 661 P.2d at 775. 
Yearly actuarial studies establish the maximum cost of liability 
for the next year, based on past loss experience and any visible 
trends in the numbers and types of claims filed, using the 
assumption that no claim will cost more than the $250,000 limit. 
Without a fixed dollar cap to cut off unlimited liability and 
define the actuary's worst case scenario, there is no way to 
project future losses realistically. In short, with no cap in 
place, budgeting for self-insurance and all other government 
expenditures could not be done with any tolerable level of 
certainty. 
In this regard the State of Utah, as a self-insurer, is no 
different than any private insurance company. It would be 
impossible for a private company to function without policy limits. 
Such limitations permit the private insurer to rationally project 
what its exposure will be and determine the premiums it will 
charge. Without a policy limit, the private insurer would be 
confronted with two equally undesirable options; either to raise 
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premiums inordinately to assure that sufficient funds will be 
available to pay the larger awards, or to await such a large award 
and then declare bankruptcy. The State of Utah cannot declare 
bankruptcy. Instead, the State of Utah would need to narrow the 
waivers of immunity that have been made, and reinstate the absolute 
immunity of the State. Otherwise the State would be unable to 
adequately budget the amount that will be necessary to pay awards 
made against the State, anymore than a private insurer could do so 
without the benefit of policy limits. 
The legislative history of 1983 Utah Laws ch. 13 0 shows 
clearly that the amount of Utah's current cap, far from being 
arbitrary, was reached through the difficult political process by 
compromises between competing interests. Utah's cap was, in fact, 
$15,000 above the average of current statutory limits on 
governmental entity liability in states whose legislatures have 
similarly acted to partially waive immunity only up to a fixed 
dollar amount at that time.4 Deciding whether to give up sovereign 
4Ala. Code § 11-93-2 (1975) ($100,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-
10-114 (1988) ($150,000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4012 (Supp. 
1990) ($300,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.28(5) (West Supp. 1992) 
($100,000); Idaho Code § 6-926 (1984) ($500,000 per occurrence); 
111. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1990) ($100,000); 
Ind. Code. Ann. §34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) ($300,000); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 75-6105 (1989) ($500,000 per occurrence); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000); Me. Rev. Stat, titl 14, § 
8105 (West 1964) ($300,000 per occurrence); Md. Code Ann. § 5-399.2 
(Supp. 1991) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988) ($100,000); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
466.04 (Supp. 1992) ($200,000); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 
1991) ($25,000 until July 1, 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.035 
(Supp. 1991) ($50,000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (Michie 1989) 
($300,000); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); 
Okla. Stat. Ann. titl 51, § 154 (West Supp. 1992) ($100,000); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 30.270 (1991) ($100,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
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immunity and, if so, whether and where to draw the line of maximum 
recovery is not a judicial function. As numerous courts have 
pointed out, it is the role of the legislature, not the courts, 
to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure 
to liability, the need to compensate citizens 
for injury, the availability of and cost of 
insurance, and the financial condition of the 
governmental units. It is the legislature's 
function to structure statutory provisions, 
which will protect the public interest in 
reimbursing the victim and in maintaining 
government services and which will be fair and 
reasonable to the victim and at the same time 
will be realistic regarding the financial 
burden to be placed on the taxpayers. 
gfrmfrs, 293 N.W.2d at 514; accord Leliefeld. 659 P.2d at 129; 
Stanhope, 280 N.W, 2d at 719. In short, it is not the province of 
the judiciary to second-guess elected officials' weighing of 
competing interests and their resolution of the difficult policy 
questions underlying a partial waiver of absolute governmental 
immunity up to a fixed dollar amount. See Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at 
512; Contiemarin, 775 P.2d at 377, 385, (Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
Finally, section 63-30-34 is not arbitrary merely because it 
precludes full recovery by those who, like Keegan's decedent, are 
the most seriously injured. Any damage cap will do so, precisely 
because it is intended to do so. A cap high enough not to exclude 
any member of this group from full recovery would, in fact, be no 
cap at all. In rejecting a federal due process challenge to a 
8557 (1982) ($500,000); R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Tex. Civ. Prac. 
& Rem. Code Ann. § 101.023 (West 1986) ($250,000); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
S 893.82(6) (West Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Wyo. Stat. S 1-39-118 
(Supp. 1991) ($250,000) . 
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statutory liability limit for injuries arising from operation of 
nuclear power plants, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that: 
whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of 
necessity, be arbitrary in the sense that any 
choice of a figure based on imponderables like 
those at issue here can always be so 
characterized. This is not, however, the kind 
of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise 
constitutional action. 
puke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoted in PeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790 
n.12. 
Likewise, Utah's recovery limit is not arbitrary, in the state 
constitutional due process sense, and it is reasonably related to 
achieving the Act's legitimate purposes. As the legislative 
history of the 1965 Governmental Immunity Act documents, partial 
waiver of immunity is the result of the legislature's balancing of 
the needs for essential, costly government services and reasonable 
tax limits with the perceived need for some compensation of injured 
tort claimants. Numerous other courts have also concluded, in 
rejecting state due process or equal protection challenges to 
similar statutes, that there is a rational relationship between a 
damage cap and the legitimate purposes behind partial waivers of 
absolute governmental immunity for some or all governmental 
functions. 
When dealing with a large budget, as does the State of Utah, 
it is often impossible to identify the particular "straw that broke 
the camel's back." And yet, in setting the damage cap, the 
legislative branch had to balance the available money and determine 
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how much could the State of Utah afford to set aside for 
compensating those injured by the actions of the State. This is 
the same budgeting process that the legislature uses to determine 
how much money should be expended in providing government services 
and fulfilling governmental functions. Money expended in one area 
must, of necessity, leave that much less to be spent for other 
worthwhile goals and objectives. In reviewing the funds available, 
the legislature has made a valid decision as to how large a partial 
waiver of its immunity that the State of Utah and its political 
subdivisions can afford. This legislative determination should be 
respected. 
For these reasons, the State of Utah and UDOT request that 
this Court affirm the trial court's ruling that Keegan has failed 
to prove that section 63-30-34 violates the uniform operation of 
laws provision of the Utah Constitution. 
VII. IP THE DAMAGE CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 IS 
FOUND TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT IS NOT 
SEVERABLE FROM THE BALANCE OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THIS COURT MUST 
STRIKE DOWN THE ACT IN ITS ENTIRETY 
If the Court accepts any of Keegan's constitutional arguments 
and holds that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) violates the Utah 
Constitution by limiting recovery by a person injured as a result 
of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental function, 
the Court must next consider the issue of severability. 
Where part of an enactment is unconstitutional, the 
severability question is primarily answered by determining 
legislative intent. Berry, 717 P.2d at 687 (Utah 1985); Salt Lake 
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rjt-y v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) . 
To do so, the appellate court asks whether the balance of the 
enactment, other than the portion struck down, can stand alone and 
serve its legitimate legislative purpose. Utah Technology Fin, 
rorp, v. Wilkinson. 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986); Berry. 717 P.2d 
at 687; State v. Green. 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, the Governmental Immunity Act legislatively 
adopted governmental immunity, then waived that immunity in some 
circumstances but capped the liability at a certain dollar limit. 
The statute was designed to waive immunity only partially by 
creating a limited cause of action. It is apparent from the 
structure of the Act itself, and from its legislative history, that 
the damage cap in section 63-30-34 is an integral part of this 
enactment and is, therefore, not severable. Salt Lake Citv v. 
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters. 563 P.2d at 791. It is indisputable 
that the Utah Legislature would not have enacted the Governmental 
Immunity Act and created a cause of action against governmental 
entities performing governmental functions (in sections 63-30-8 and 
-10) if, in doing so, it were subjecting governmental entities to 
unlimited liability. S££ Berry. 717 P.2d at 686 (entire Utah 
Product Liability Act struck down as inseverable where section 
setting forth statute of repose invalidated as unconstitutional). 
The waiver of immunity and damage cap provisions were enacted as a 
package and are inextricably interrelated. In such a circumstance, 
"it is not within the scope of the court's function to select the 
valid portions of the act and make conjecture the legislature 
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intended they should stand independent of the portions which are 
invalid." Salt Lake Citv v. Int'l Ags'n of Firefighters. 563 P.2d 
at 792. 
In any event, the legislative history of the Governmental 
Immunity Act rules out any such conjecture. The Utah Legislature 
plainly did not intend that a plaintiff in Keegan's position could 
have the benefits of the Act's waiver provisions without also being 
subject to the recovery limitations in section 63-30-34. Standing 
alone, the waiver of immunity portions of the Act cannot stand 
independently and serve the legislature's purposes. Berry. 717 
P.2d at 688. Accordingly, the balance of the Act must be struck 
down if this Court holds that the Utah Legislature may not, 
consistent with the Utah Constitution, prohibit one injured in the 
course of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental 
function from recovering, in a statutorily created right of action, 
all the damages attributed by the jury to the responsible entity. 
Without any valid statutory waiver of governmental immunity 
and statutory creation of a right of action, Keegan's ability to 
sue or recover from UDOT in this case is controlled by the common 
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the common law, there is 
no right of action to recover anything from a governmental entity 
for injuries arising out of public highway maintenance, a 
governmental function. McCorvev v. Utah state Dep't of Transp., 
225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, the judgment 
entered in this case against UDOT must be vacated, and Keegan 
should take nothing. 
52 
//c?-0 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CYNTHIA L. KEEGAN, Personally 
and as the Personal Representative 
of the Estate of David J. Keegan 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants and 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
Case No. 930302 
Priority 15 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OP TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEES (PART I) AND OPENING BRIEF 
OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AS CROSS-APPELLANTS (PART II) 
PART II. OPENING BRIEF AS CROSS-APPELLANTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Department of Transportation was faced with the 
question of whether or not to replace the median barrier in 
question, and when to do such a replacement. In making this 
decision, UDOT made both a safety and an engineering study of the 
question. The final decision not to replace the barrier was then 
reviewed by the Federal Highway Administration, which agreed with 
the recommendation made by UDOT. These actions were discretionary 
in nature and the State of Utah and UDOT are entitled to absolute 
immunity for their conduct. The trial court erred in denying the 
defendants motion for summary judgment and this matter should be 
reversed and remanded with instructions that the case be dismissed. 
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Even if the State and UDOT were not immune, they were entitled 
to have the proportion of fault of FHWA (a non-party) determined by 
the jury. Because this was not done, the State of Utah was wrongly 
assessed by the jury a greater proportion of fault than that 
attributable to the State. 
ARGUMENT 
VIII. THE STATE OF UTAH AND UDOT WERE 
ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY BECAUSE THE COMPLAINED OF 
ACTIONS WERE DONE IN PERFORMANCE OF 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act protects discretionary 
functions of government. it waives immunity for acts of 
negligence, but makes an exception to the waiver if the injury 
arises out of the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused. 
S 63-30-10(1) (1993). 
Discretionary function immunity is "intended to shield [from 
suit] those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large 
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways . . . " Frank 
V T
 S*ate' 6 1 3 p- 2 d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). The basic policy behind 
discretionary function immunity is "to preclude judicial review of 
certain political decisions which are expressly committed to other 
branches of government." Morris v. Oregon at.*** Transrwr^M^ 
•Commission, 38 Ore. App. 331, 590 P.2d 260 (1979). Simply put, 
certain government activities are not subject to management through 
litigation. Duncan v. Union PaHfir p,
 790 P.2d 595, 601 (ut. Ct. 
App. 1990), ailla;., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). Discretionary 
functions include decisions that balance safety needs and the 
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burden of funding improvements. The Utah Court of Appeals in 
puncan noted: 
Highway maintenance and improvement are 
predominately fiscal matters. Every highway could 
probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we 
will not hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) 
negligent for having to strike a difficult balance 
between the need for greater safety and the burden of 
funding improvements. 
790 P.2d at 601. 
The test for determining whether certain activity is a 
discretionary function is found in Little v. Utah State Div. OL 
Family Servs.. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). This Court held that, in 
order to be found purely discretionary, an act by the state must be 
affirmed under the following four preliminary questions: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or 
objective as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do 
or make the challenged act, omission, or 
decision. 
Little. 667 P.2d at 51. 
The first prong of Little asks whether the activity involves 
a basic government objective. Utah's appellate courts have 
consistently held that a decision concerning public safety on Utah 
roads involves a basic government objective. Duncan v. Union 
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Pacific R.. 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) ("First, a basic 
governmental objective is involved - the promotion of public safety 
at railroad crossings."); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. 
Co. . 749 P.2d 660, 668 (Utah App. 1988) ("installing, maintaining, 
reconstructing and improving safety devices is the consistent 
promotion of public safety, a basic government objective."). 
In the present case, the first prong of frittle is satisfied. 
Public safety was an inherent part of the decision of whether to 
raise the barrier. UDOT and FHWA officials expressly examined the 
safety needs of the motoring public in deciding whether to raise 
the barrier. Therefore, the subject activity involves the basic 
government objective of promoting public safety. 
The second prong of Little asks whether the challenged 
activity is essential to accomplishing the government objective. 
In the terms of this case, the question is whether a decision 
concerning median barrier height is essential to accomplishing 
public safety. This question also should be answered in the 
affirmative. Badalian recognized a potential safety concern 
involving the height of the median barrier in Parley's Canyon. A 
safety study was performed, and UDOT decided to seek federal 
approval to resurface without removing and replacing the barrier. 
That approval was obtained. Thus, the decision making process 
involved here was essential to accomplishing the objective of 
public safety in Parley's Canyon. 
The third prong of the Little test asks whether the barrier 
decision required "the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
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judgment and expertise." Little, 667 P. 2d at 51. Utah's appellate 
courts have held that engineering studies of roads satisfy the 
third prong. In Duncan. this Court explained: 
Third, UDOT exercises "basic policy 
evaluation, judgment and expertise" in 
utilizing a surveillance team to weigh the 
degree of hazard at the crossings it inspects 
and to subsequently assign priorities to those 
crossings where the greatest hazard exists. 
842 P.2d at 832. In the present case, the barrier removal decision 
satisfies the third prong. UDOT inspected the median barrier and 
performed an engineering study of its safety. It then prepared i 
cost benefit analysis that examined several factors: safety 
concerns associated with not raising the barrier; disruption of 
traffic patterns; delay in completing the overlay project; cost of 
removing old and installing new median barrier; savings from 
postponing removal of barrier. UDOT concluded that the most cost 
beneficial approach would be to keep the existing barrier and taper 
the overlay to avoid further reducing barrier height. UDOT then 
sought and obtained approval for this proposal from the Federal 
Highway Administration. The decision making process required 
engineering analysis and the weighing of financial concerns in 
order "to strike a difficult balance between the need for greater 
safety and the burden of funding improvements." Duncan. 790 P.2d 
at 601. This satisfies the third prong of Little. 
The fourth prong of Little asks whether UDOT had the statutory 
power to make a decision to raise replacement of the barrier. UDOT 
is given "the general responsibility for state-wide highway . . . 
and transportation planning research and design, construction, 
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maintenance, security and safety." Utah Code Ann. § 63-49-4(1). 
This statute satisfies the fourth prong. 
This is not a question of first impression. This Court has 
already twice held that the very similar activity of evaluating 
railroad crossings by UDOT was a discretionary function. Duncan v._ 
Union Pac. R.R.. 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992); Velasquez v. Union Par. 
R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970) . The question presented in 
those two cases is virtually identical to that presented by the 
instant action. The discretionary decision making process that is 
used to determine the adequacy of particular safety devices at a 
railroad crossing, and to prioritize the upgrading of such devices, 
is the same process that was used by UDOT in the instant action to 
determine the adequacy of the existing median barrier and determine 
when that barrier should be upgraded. 
In Little, this Court once again emphasized the similarity 
between Utah's exceptions to waiver of governmental immunity and 
those enumerated under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, and stated that Utah has followed the lead of the 
federal cases interpreting that act. Little. 667 P.2d at 51. 
Baum v. U.S.. 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993), presents a closely 
analogous factual situation to the instant action. The Baum 
plaintiffs were injured when the car they were driving in 
penetrated a guardrail designed, constructed, and maintained by the 
National Park Service. They alleged that the Park Service was 
negligent both in the choice of materials used in the construction 
of the guardrail and in the failure to replace the guardrail. The 
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Fourth Circuit held that the Park Service, in making the challenged 
decisions, was entitled to discretionary function immunity: 
The question of what materials to use in such 
a project is also fundamentally described as a 
question of how to allocate limited resources 
among competing needs. Considered in this 
light, we are of the opinion that the Park 
Service's decision in this regard plainly was 
one bound up in economic and political policy 
considerations. . . . and we find the design 
and construction decisions in this case to be 
just the kind of planning-level decisions of 
which the Court spoke . . . . 
986 F.2d at 722. 
The decision of how and when to replace a 
major element of a substantial public facility 
is, like the decisions involving design and 
construction, at bottom a question of how best 
to allocate resources. Such a decision is 
inherently bound up in considerations of 
economic and political policy, and accordingly 
is precisely the type of governmental decision 
that Congress intended to insulate from 
judicial second guessing through tort actions 
for damages. 
986 F.2d at 724. The decision of when to replace the median 
barrier at issue in the present matter is no different than the 
question of when to replace a guardrail. Both of these decisions 
involve considerations of economic and political policy. Indeed, 
the decision in the instant action was expressly made after the 
undertaking of safety and engineering studies, and the balancing of 
many different factors. For this reason, the trial court erred 
when it denied the State of Utah and UDOT's motion for summary 
judgment. The State of Utah and UDOT are entitled to discretionary 
function immunity and the instant action should have been dismissed 
prior to trial. 
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IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND UDOT'S MOTION TO COMPARE THE 
FAULT OF THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION 
In 1986, the Utah Legislature rejected the theory that all 
defendants were jointly and severally liable for the whole amount 
of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. The Legislature enacted 
instead the Utah Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-37, 
et seq. (1992) . The cornerstone of that act is that "no defendant 
is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess 
of the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992). To implement this goal, Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-27-40 (1992) provides: 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to 
any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled 
to contribution from any other person. 
Plaintiff's claim against the State of Utah and UDOT is that 
they decided to retain the median barrier at approximately 27" in 
height, rather than to increase its height to approximately 32". 
But this decision was not taken by the defendants alone. 
Approximately 95% of the money for the 1984 resurfacing project 
came from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) . FHWA approval 
was required before those funds could be spent. The FHWA reviewed 
the decision of UDOT and approved it. If the decision of UDOT 
concerning the median barrier causes the State of Utah and UDOT to 
be liable to the plaintiff, then the FHWA would also be liable for 
its share of the consequences of the joint decision reached by UDOT 
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and FHWA. 
The Liability Reform Act provides two distinct methods by 
which its objective, that defendants only be held responsible for 
the proportion of the damages attributable to their actions, can be 
reached. First, any party to the litigation "may join as parties 
any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the injury or 
damage for which recovery is sought."5 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 
(1992) . Second, the jury can be directed to find separate special 
verdicts "determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery and to each defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 
(1992). 
Pursuant to section 39, the State of Utah and UDOT sought to 
have the proportion of fault attributable to FHWA determined by the 
jury. This the trial court initially approved, but then refused to 
do upon reconsideration. The trial judge explained his reasoning 
as follows: 
It would be prejudicial to the plaintiffs to 
have their judgment diluted as far as the 
amount due the federal government to where 
they would be able to collect it. That if the 
judgment is taken against the State, and the 
plaintiff is successful in obtaining that, 
then the State would have to do what they have 
to do as far as suing the federal government 
to recover it, a proportionate amount. So I 
would deny the Motion to Join the Federal 
Highway Administration. 
5
 The term "defendant" in the Liability Reform Act is defined 
more broadly than to include just "parties-defendant." A defendant 
is "any person not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable 
because of fault to any person seeking recovery." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-37(1) (1992) . 
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R. 1468, 1. 13-21. The trial court's decision is contrary to both 
the specific language of the Liability Reform Act and the intent of 
that act. Section 39 makes it mandatory upon the trial court to 
direct the jury to return special verdicts as to all defendants 
when so requested by any party. The trial court admitted that its 
decision would cause the State of Utah to be assessed more than its 
proportional share of the damages. The rationale of the trial 
court for refusing to follow the clear dictates of the Liability 
Reform Act was that to do so would "dilute" the recovery of the 
plaintiff. 
This Court rejected this argument in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain 
Co. of Utah. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). Sullivan involved an 
employee's action for damages where the party-defendants alleged 
that the employer was also at fault. This Court held that the 
employer, though immune from suit, should still be placed on the 
special verdict form so as to accomplish the purpose of the 
Liability Reform Act. 
That purpose is to ensure that "no defendant 
is liable to any person seeking recovery for 
any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributable to that defendant." 
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation 
is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve." Thus, failing 
to include immune employers in the 
apportionment violates the main purpose of the 
Act by improperly subjecting the remaining 
defendants to liability in excess of their 
proportion of fault. 
853 P.2d at 880 (citations omitted). See also Ericksen v. Salt 
Lake Citv Corp.. 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993); Brown v. Bover-
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w??hinaton Blvd. Ass'n. 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993); Dahl v. Kerbs 
ronstr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah 1993). 
While this Court has not directly addressed the question of 
whether a jury may apportion the fault of persons who are not 
parties to the action,6 section 3 9 of the act clearly permits such 
apportionment. Further, as this Court stated in Sullivan: 
A solid majority of states in the Pacific 
region have adopted the practice of 
apportioning the fault of nonparties in 
negligence actions. 
853 P.2d at 883 n.6. In its Appendix, this Court's decision in 
Sullivan lists twelve out of the fourteen other states in the 
Pacific region as permitting the apportionment of fault of 
nonparties. The rationale for this solid majority position was 
well stated by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Pocatello Indus. Park 
Co. v. Steel W.. Inc.. 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980). 
"It is established without doubt that, when 
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the 
opportunity to consider the negligence of all 
parties to the transaction, whether or not 
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or 
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to 
the other tortfeasors either by operation of 
law or because of a prior release." 
"The reason for such [a rule] is that true 
apportionment cannot be achieved unless that 
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty 
of causal negligence either causing or 
contributing to the occurrence in question, 
whether or not they are parties to the case." 
621 P.2d at 403 (citations omitted) . In Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 
P.2d 163, 165-66 (Wyo. 1981) the Supreme Court held: 
Under comparative negligence law in this 
' Sullivan. 853 P.2d at 878 n.3. 
state, the trier of fact should find the 
percentage of negligence attributable to each 
of the actors who have proximately caused the 
plaintiff's injuries regardless of whether the 
actors have been named as parties to the 
lawsuit. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma made an identical determination: 
The negligence of tort-feasors who are not 
parties to the lawsuit, "ghost tort-feasors," 
should be considered by the jury in order to 
properly apportion the negligence of the 
parties. 
Gaither v. Citv of Tulsa. 664 P.2d 1026, 1029 n.7 (Okl. 1983). 
Accord Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1988). 
Because the trial court refused to permit the fault of FHWA to 
be compared and apportioned by the jury, the State of Utah and UDOT 
were denied their right under section 39 to limit their liability 
to the proportion of fault attributable to them. To rule, as did 
the trial court, that a defendant must be joined as a party under 
section 41 of the act makes section 39 meaningless surplusage. 
Such an interpretation of the act is not only to be avoided, but is 
contrary to the decisions of the solid majority of courts that have 
considered this issue. 
Indeed, such an interpretation is contrary to the clear intent 
of the act. This Court has found the intent of the act to be to 
ensure that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery 
for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992). This did not 
occur in the instant action. Because the State's motion to join 
the FHWA on the verdict form was denied, any proportion of fault 
that was attributable to the FHWA was, instead, attributed by the 
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jury to the State of Utah and UDOT. This is exactly the result 
that this Court sought to avoid in Sullivan. 853 P. 2d at 879. For 
this reason the judgment for the plaintiff must be reversed and 
this matter remanded for a new trial at which the jury may 
apportion the fault not only of the plaintiff and UDOT, but also of 
the Federal Highway Administration. 
CONCLUSION 
As to the plaintiff's appeal, the State of Utah and the Utah 
Department of Transportation urge this Court to uphold the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) against all 
of the constitutional challenges made by plaintiff for the reasons 
given above. The decision of trial court on this issue should be 
affirmed. 
The State and UDOT urge this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The 
defendants actions were taken in the performance of a discretionary 
function for which they are entitled to immunity. This matter 
should have been dismissed before trial. The decision of the trial 
court on this issue should be reversed and this suit remanded to 
the trial court with instructions to dismiss the action. 
The trial court erred in not granting the defendants motion to 
have the Federal Highway Administration (a non-party) placed on the 
special verdict form so that the jury could attribute to FHWA its 
proper proportion of fault. Because this was not done, any such 
percentage of fault was wrongly attributed to the State of Utah. 
This Court should therefore, at a minimum, reverse this decision of 
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the trial court and remand this action with instructions to the 
trial court to grant the defendants a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1994. 
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1 FARMINGTON, UTAH - NOVEMBER 19, 2002 
2 HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: I will just advise the parties that we 
5 have, for some reason there was an adoption that's been 
6 scheduled at 10:30 and we may take a break at 10:30 to do an 
7 adoption that would just take a few minutes. 
8 Okay, we're here in the case Craig Johnson vs. State 
9 of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation, Granite 
10 Construction Company of Utah, and we have - this is set for 
11 pre-trial and arguments on pending motions. There has been 
12 UDOT's motion for summary judgment filed in opposition. 
13 There's been a reply. There's been a motion filed by the 
14 defendants regarding Newell Knight, and there's been an 
15 opposition and a reply to that. There's also been a 
16 continuance - motion for continuance of trial. My attitude is 
17 that people got the chance to respond and we're going to hear 
18 this motion and if that effects the trial, it effects the 
19 trial. If it doesn't, you know, the trial would still go 
20 forward. I have read the motions. This case is set for trial 
21 from December 2nd through 13th with half days on Thursday, 
22 Thursday mornings because the felony law and motion calendar on 
23 the 5th and the 12th. So I have read - do you wish to do the 
24 summary judgment before the Newell Knight one, or what do you 
25 wish to do? 
1 
1 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, the State filed a 
2 motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's filed a motion in 
3 reference to Mr. Knight. 
4 THE COURT: Right. 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: So I have no preference. It's 
6 certainly up to the court. 
7 THE COURT: Okay, maybe before we get started why 
8 doesn't everybody make their appearance for the record so that 
9 we just have that for the videotape? 
10 MR. SHAW: Chris Shaw and Eric Ward for the 
11 plaintiff. 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Scott Christensen on behalf of the 
13 defendant Granite Construction. 
14 MR. JACOBSEN: Scott Jacobsen on behalf of defendant 
15 Utah Department of Transportation. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, and Mr. Jacobsen, do you wish to 
17 argue first then? 
18 MR. JACOBSEN: That's fine, your Honor. And let me 
19 just state first of all on the motion for continuance, 
20 obviously circumstances changed somewhat from when we filed 
21 that, so we had no intent of pursing that today. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. JACOBSEN: Your Honor, UDOT in this case has 
24 filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of 
25 all of plaintiff's claims against defendant UDOT. And as you 
1 indicated, you have reviewed the briefs that have been filed in 
2 support of and in opposition to that motion, so I won't belabor 
3 the facts, but just briefly a general description of what we're 
4 dealing with here. 
5 THE COURT: I guess there's two issues. I guess 
6 there's one issue is, you know, are there disputed facts 
7 because in your first memo you say it's not disputed about, you 
8 know, based on the affidavit that was attached. They come back 
9 and they basically - well, I guess the one question I have to 
10 ask you is if you file your motion, you have numbered 
11 I paragraphs with citation to the record. They file their motion 
12 and their first four pages have nothing to do with your 
13 numbered paragraphs as I read them. 
14 MR. JACOBSEN: I believe that is correct. 
15 THE COURT: And then whey they get to page five, they 
16 start to dispute paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26 
17 where they set out your fact. Then make a claim that they 
18 dispute it and then you claim that they really in fact are not 
19 disputed. 
20 MR. JACOBSEN: And that's correct, your Honor. If 
21 you want we could go those fact by fact. I think -
22 THE COURT: Well, I guess the issue is, I mean, is it 
23 your position that pages one through three, I guess one through 
24 four of the plaintiff's memo in opposition basically is not 
25 disputing anything because it doesn't comply with Rule 4-501? 
3 
1 Is that your position? 
2 MR, JACOBSEN: I believe that's certainly part of our 
3 position. In our reply memo - and I think many of those facts 
4 that were cited there were actually just duplicates of what we 
5 had already - I mean, duplicates of contract language or 
6 duplicates of what happened in the accident. So I think that's 
7 correct. I mean, the burden in this case is on us to set forth 
8 those facts that we think are material to the motion. And as 
9 we argued in our reply memo, several of those facts we think 
10 are entirely irrelevant or non-material to the issues raised in 
11 the motion for summary judgment. 
12 THE COURT: Well, so do you think the argument 
13 basically is based upon the ones that they're disputing on 
14 pages five through eight of their brief? 
15 MR. JACOBSEN: I believe that's correct, your Honor. 
16 That certainly what Rule 4-501 requires them to do is to 
17 respond to those facts and you'll note there that certain of 
18 those facts that they attempted to respond to and dispute, no 
19 evidentiary citation at all. And I think as we noted in the 
20 reply memorandum that in those cases, those facts must be 
21 deemed admitted as they've been alleged by UDOT in its opening 
22 memorandum. 
23 THE COURT: Well, I think the issue, yeah, I mean, 
24 there's no secret why we have Rule 4-501 as it relates to 
25 summary judgment motions, and that is so the judge who has to 
4 
1 review a summary judgment doesn't have to have through, you 
2 know, six inches of paper and then put it together themselves. 
3 It's - you put yours stated in numbered paragraphs with 
4 citation to record. They come back and go one by one down the 
5 list. 
6 MR. JACOBSEN: I agree that's the appropriate way to 
7 do it. 
8 THE COURT: They don't do that as the rule says, you 
9 know, the statements of the moving papers are deemed admitted. 
10 And it's a ^shall begin', it doesn't say may begin, of if you'd 
11 like it to, it says shall. Now the question becomes though, is 
12 that I'm not unaware that the appellate courts of the state, 
13 basically if they get six inches of paper also say that there's 
14 a disputed fact just like some trial judges will heft a binder 
15 like this and say there must be one there somewhere. And so 
16 the issue becomes are there disputed facts, and if there's 
17 disputed facts, summary judgment's not appropriate. If there 
18 really are not disputed facts, even though one side says there 
19 are, then it may be appropriate. And I think that's the issue 
20 and if you're going on these 3, 5,6, 20 to 24 and 26, then that 
21 seems to me what needs to be the issue. 
22 MR. JACOBSEN: I think that is the issue, your Honor, 
23 and I mean, obviously plaintiff has made a tactical decision 
24 here to try and, you know, inject numerous other facts, you 
25 know, because disputed facts, you know, do defeat a motion for 
5 
1 summary judgment. But it's our position that Rule 4-501 sets 
2 forth the procedure they need to follow and it's that second 
3 section of facts which is, you know, can be viewed as their 
4 only response that they complied with 4-501. So that is our 
5 position, your Honor, that any of the facts that they did not 
6 specifically respond to in their second section of facts must 
7 be deemed admitted, and for those few facts that they did hit, 
8 I think we've responded there why we do not believe they're 
9 disputed. There's no question it's our position - it's 
10 defendant UDOT's position that there are no disputed issues of 
11 fact that are material to this motion for summary judgment. 
12 And I think as I go through the argument -
13 THE COURT: I think that we ought to go through those 
14 in detail because I think, you know, specifically what's on 
15 their pages five through eight, and what's on your response to 
16 that I think are things that concern me. 
17 MR. JACOBSEN: Let me just get both of those in front 
18 of me, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: It's on page nine of your - page nine of 
20 your reply memo is basically responding, as I see it, to page 
21 five through eight of their memo in opposition. 
22 MR. JACOBSEN: That's correct. Looking at the first 
23 one, let me just glance quickly and refresh myself as to what 
24 the fact was. 
25 THE COURT: They cited on tJheirs, three says the 
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1 decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to 
2 channel traffic throughout this project area was made by the 
3 upper most officials in the UDOT organization. And maybe we 
4 don't have to spend too much time on that one in your memo or 
5 in your presentation, because you say it's this, is it Mr. 
6 LeFevre? Is that how you pronounce it? 
7 MR. JACOBSEN: Dike LeFevre, yes. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. LeFevre, and they say well, 
9 yeah, it was LeFevre, but they dispute it was "upper most 
10 officials". So I don't know -
11 MR. JACOBSEN: And I guess we've tried to provide 
12 your Honor with some information in our opening memorandum kind 
13 of on the UDOT hierarchy and where that flows. It's our 
14 position - I think -
15 THE COURT: That's really paragraph four, I believe, 
16 that you laid all those people's names and what they did. 
17 MR. JACOBSEN: Exactly. And we attached an 
18 organizational chart as an exhibit and it's our position that 
19 even if you didn't have other people involved, Mr. LeFevre 
20 himself is far higher in the UDOT organization than anybody 
21 that was involved in, you know, if we talk about the Keeaan 
22 cases and the Truiillo cases and the UDOT personnel that became 
23 I involved in those cases, never reached anywhere near the level 
24 that Mr. LeFevre occupies in UDOT. 
25 THE COURT: So your position he's high enough? 
7 
1 MR. JACOBSEN: It's our position that he's high 
2 enough. But in addition to that, it's our position that it 
3 went beyond him. I mean, there's letters in the file that were 
4 clearly copied to Clint Topham who is Mr. LeFevre's supervisor. 
5 He was the executive director for all of UDOT, chief engineer 
6 for the entire state. The only person above Mr. Topham was the 
7 deputy director and he's the one that reported to the governor. 
8 So, you're getting about as high you can go. But Mr. Topham 
9 himself testified in his deposition that he remembers these 
10 issues coming to him, he remembers going to meetings, 
11 discussing these issues with Mr. LeFevre. Obviously, he 
12 granted Mr. LeFevre, who was the head of Region I, the northern 
13 part of the state, some leeway there in what the final decision 
14 was, but those issues were actually brought all the way to Mr. 
15 Topham's desk, were considered by Mr. Topham as well, and then 
16 were handed back to Mr. LeFevre to make the final decision. 
17 But as the director for Region I, it's our position that that's 
18 exactly what he is is one of the upper most officials at UDOT. 
19 As you get down into the next fact that they dispute, 
20 I believe that's where - at one point in our reply memo they 
21 attempt to attack his experience claiming that he is somebody 
22 who was recently hired. Mr. LeFevre is somebody who has spent 
23 39 years at UDOT, he had served as the director of a separate 
24 region for approximately five years, he had been the director 
25 of Region I on a prior occasion, then went into another 
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1 position and then was reappointed as the director of Region I 
2 from 1995 until the point that he retired after 39 years at 
3 UDOT in 2000. So even if plaintiffs want to point to the fact 
4 that, you know, did Mr. LeFevre really consult others, did he 
5 really talk to Mr. Topham, it's certainly our position that Mr. 
6 LeFevre is high enough, and the parties agree that he's the one 
7 that made this decision. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. The next one is number five. 
9 MR. JACOBSEN: Right, just glancing at that. Again, 
10 this goes partly to what we just talked about. Mr. LeFevre's 
11 testified about the involvement of Mr. Topham. Mr. Topham has 
12 acknowledged that he was involved with the review of not only 
13 the traffic control plan, but specific -
14 THE COURT: But if this is accurate or not, then 
15 their opposition on page five where the say LeFevre testified 
16 as his deposition that he was "not sure he talked to Topham 
17 specifically about the barrels. In fact, he probably did not. 
18 He made the decision to eliminate concrete barriers from the 
19 proposal." 
20 MR. JACOBSEN: If you look at the deposition 
21 testimony, and we've tried to provide you with the additional 
22 pages there, what Mr. LeFevre was saying, the question he was 
23 responding to was, if you recall from reading the briefs, this 
24 issue of barrels versus barriers comes up on a few different 
25 occasions. The question there was pertaining only to the issue 
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1 of before this project was ever awarded to Granite, before it 
2 was ever let out to bid, when the initial decision was made 
3 that UDOT was going to use barrels instead of barriers in the 
4 traffic control plan, the question was did you at that time 
5 talk to Mr. Topham about that issue. There was no question 
6 that Mr. LeFevre was involved in the analysis of that issue. 
7 But the question was did you talk to Mr. Topham at that time. 
8 And in his deposition following the affidavit he said, "I 
9 remember we took the traffic control plan to him, he reviewed 
10 it." Mr. Topham actually signs off on the traffic control 
11 plan, his name appears on it. But he says "I can't remember if 
12 at that time I specifically talked to Mr. Topham about the 
13 barrel versus barrier issue." 
14 Later on when Granite comes back and starts making 
15 requests sending in the proposed change orders to have the plan 
16 modified to include barriers, there's no question at that time, 
17 Mr. Topham's testified and Mr. LeFevre's testified that Mr. 
18 Topham was involved with that process. So I think that's why 
19 it's a little misleading is because the statement that they 
20 take and quote in their opposition memo that refers only to 
21 that instance prior to the contract ever being awarded to 
22 Granite, and Mr. LeFevre's testimony was simply I don't 
23 r€>member if I specifically discussed that single issue with him 
24 at that time. And I think they acknowledge -
25 THE COURT: So is it your position that in order for 
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1 you to be successful in the summary judgment that he had to 
2 consult with Topham? 
3 MR. JACOBSEN: No. 
4 THE COURT: Or is that just icing on the cake? 
5 MR. JACOBSEN: I think that's something that 
6 plaintiffs thrown out. They're trying to suggest that Mr. 
7 LeFevre wasn't high enough up the ladder. But as I stated, you 
8 know, one of the things we attached to our reply memorandum was 
9 the brief that was filed in the Keaan case, and there's no 
10 evidence that was presented to the Utah Supreme Court in that 
11 case showing that the decisions that were made in that case 
12 went any higher than the design engineers that fell well below 
13 the region director in that case. I mean, it's our position 
14 that the types of analysis and the involvement of Mr. LeFevre 
15 is certainly high enough, but I think it is icing that Mr. 
16 Topham was actually involved in the process as well. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. JACOBSEN: And we think it's also inaccurate the 
19 reference here that the decisions made by Mr. LeFevre were 
20 based solely on the cost involved. There's no evidence of that 
21 whatsoever. In Mr. LeFevre's affidavit and his depositions he 
22 stated cost was a factor, safety of the workers was a factor, 
23 safety of the public was a factor, and another key factor that 
24 gets mentioned over and over throughout his deposition is this 
25 factor that they felt like they were under immense pressure 
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1 from the public to get this project done and to impact the 
2 public as little as possible. And everybody that's testified 
3 has acknowledged that the use of concrete barriers would have 
4 delayed this project, it would have made it more difficult 
5 because it's one thing to come along if you're trying to open 
6 up two lanes part of the day and one lane part of the day, you 
7 can move barrels back and forth. But if they would have stuck 
8 concrete barriers out there it would have significantly delayed 
9 the time this project would have taken. So that's another 
10 major factor. So it's inaccurate there and there's no evidence 
11 to suggest that Mr. LeFevre's decision was based solely on the 
12 costs involved. 
13 THE COURT: Is it your position on disputed fact 
14 number six - excuse me, go ahead with number six, or is that 
15 the one you were on? 
16 MR. JACOBSEN: Well, no, I believe we were on the one 
17 just before that, so let me look at six. 
18 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question. Is 
19 it necessary for Mr. LeFevre to consult with the federal 
20 highway administration, if he did or if he didn't does that 
21 mean that the motion should not be granted or should be 
22 granted? 
23 MR. JACOBSEN: I think that issue is very similar to 
24 the Quinn Topham issue. If he did, I believe it's icing. I 
25 believe it shows, you know, it's further evidence of the 
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1 analysis that took place. But, no, I don't think it's 
2 necessary, certainly it's not something that was deemed 
3 necessary by the other courts that have looked at this 
4 particular issue. So, no, I don't think it's necessary, but as 
5 we cited in our reply memorandum, if you look at the pages in 
6 the deposition, there's no question, I mean, Mr. LeFevre is 
7 very clear in his affidavit and he was consistent in his 
8 deposition that the federal highway administration played a 
9 role here. 
10 I I think the pages that they refer to here - I'll have 
11 to look back at it - but there was some question in Mr. 
12 LeFevre's mind as far as what his personal involvement was with 
13 the Federal Highway Administration, but he was very clear that 
14 those working below him had consulted the Federal Highway 
15 Administration. One of the things he said in his deposition 
16 was he said on these types of projects and other - up until 
17 that point in time they had typically used concrete barriers. 
18 And it had the problems that we just discussed a minute ago as 
19 far as the timing of the project, the cost involved, so they 
20 wanted to know, you know, would it be okay to use barrels on 
21 this type of a project. So Mr. LeFevre has stated in his 
22 affidavit and his deposition that they went to the Federal 
23 Highway Administration and said what have you done in other 
24 states? Have you used barrels in other states on these types 
25 of projects? And they came back with a feeling that it had 
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1 been done, it had been done safely and that it would be an 
2 appropriate means of doing this. So attempting to state here 
3 that the Federal Highway Administration wasn't involved in the 
4 analysis of that particular issue just isn't supported by any 
5 evidence. 
6 Do you have any further questions on that fact? 
7 THE COURT: No. 
8 MR. JACOBSEN: Okay. The two issues there, I think 
9 we've talked about, but I'll just hit them briefly again. 
10 THE COURT: Well, is your view when they say there is 
11 no evidence that the July change order was reviewed by upper 
12 management? I mean, it's your view that Mr. LeFevre is upper 
13 management. 
14 MR. JACOBSEN: It's our view. 
15 THE COURT: It was reviewed by him? 
16 MR. JACOBSEN: Correct, and in this case they're 
17 simply wrong in the evidence they cite. We included with our 
18 reply memo the deposition testimony of Mr. Topham. Mr. Topham 
19 said he specifically remembers that issue coming to him, 
20 considering that issue, consulting with Mr. LeFevre, and it's 
21 hard to say you can go much higher than Mr. Topham. But again, 
22 it's our view that Mr. LeFevre is high enough. 
23 And then again, there's the financial consideration 
24 claiming that it was the financial consideration which 
25 motivated the rejection. Mr. LeFevre and Mr. Topham both 
14 
1 testified that those other factors were also considered and 
2 that it wasn't simply a dollar decision, although there's no 
3 question that was a factor. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, I believe on 21 you basically said 
5 they haven't cited any record evidence. 
6 MR. JACOBSEN: Exactly, and I think it's pretty clear 
7 that under Rule 4-501 that if you don't support it with 
8 evidence from the record, then I would just note that our fact 
9 was supported by deposition testimony. I believe it was the 
10 testimony of Mr. Hunter in addition to the terms of the 
11 contract which lay out the responsibilities that are imposed on 
12 the contractor. That same thing for number 22. Yes. 
13 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. Twenty-three? 
14 MR. JACOBSEN: I think that's just a misunderstanding 
15 of the fact. We pointed out in our memorandum that Granite, 
16 you know, Granite was never prevented from using concrete 
17 barriers if it wanted to do so at its own cost, but we've never 
18 attempted to suggest that Granite is somehow liable because 
19 they didn't do that. That's just - that fact, the way they're 
20 interpreting it has no materiality that the issues on this 
21 motion for summary judgment. That's not what we've attempted 
22 to allege. And if that's how it came across, then it shouldn't 
23 be interpreted in that way. 
24 Same thing on the next one. On number 24, I think 
25 that's a misinterpretation of what we were trying to say. On 
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1 the speed limit, there's no question it wasn't Granite who - i 
2 well, let's see what they say. They say that the implication 
3 that the 55 mile per hour speed limit was Granite's creation. 
4 If I can just give you a little background on the speed limit 
5 issue. When this project was let out to bid, speed limits 
6 throughout the state - that's back at the time when we were, 
7 the states were under federal restrictions, you couldn't have 
8 speed limits over 55 miles per hour. By the time the project 
9 started-
10 THE COURT: Who drove 50 when it was 55. 
11 MR. JACOBSEN: Yeah. 
12 THE COURT: I mean, 70 when it was 55 and then -
13 MR. JACOBSEN: I don't know that it had much impact 
14 on the change of actual speeds when the law changed. But in 
15 any event, federal restrictions were lifted and the Utah 
16 legislature said we're not bound by that anymore. And one of 
17 the first things that happened is the speed limit for all of 
18 1-15, throughout the state, was raised to 65 miles per hour. 
19 And then they began looking at it on individual basis at other 
20 roads throughout the state. So when the project started the 
21 speed limit had gone up to 65 miles per hour. There's 
22 correspondence that we've submitted to the court with our 
23 original memorandum where we acknowledge that Granite made 
24 requests, Granite said, "Hey, we bid this contract out at 55 
25 miles per hour. The speed limit is now 65 miles per hour. Can 
16 
1 you lower the speed limit?" Well, what happened in response 
2 and what's undisputed is that at the time of the accident, the 
3 posted speed limit - you still have the white 65 mile per hour 
4 signs up, but you also had orange advisory speed signs of 50 
5 miles per hour for construction zone that were posted 
6 throughout the construction zone. The police report and the 
7 investigating officer's testimony that have been submitted to 
8 the court both indicate that those 50 mile per hour advisory 
9 speed signs were posted and in effect at the time of the 
10 accident in this case. But as far as any implication that it 
11 was Granite that lowered the speed or that raised the speed, I 
12 think that's just a misunderstanding of the point that was 
13 trying to be made. 
14 THE COURT: Okay, and 26 is just -
15 MR. JACOBSEN: Twenty-six. Certainly there's disputes 
16 over how the accident occurred, and I don't think -
17 THE COURT: You don't think that's not material to 
18 your motion? 
19 MR. JACOBSEN: Exactly. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. If you'd like to address whatever 
21 else you wish to do. 
22 MR. JACOBSEN: Your Honor, what I would like to point 
23 out and the arguments in addition to the fact that we don't 
24 believe there's any disputed facts that would preclude summary 
25 judgment in this case, we think that there's reasons - in the 
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1 complaint that was filed in this case, the claims were brought 
2 against UDOT and Granite and there was a list of them. We 
3 tried to categorize those in as far as the claims against UDOT 
4 and the categories that we've put in our brief - and I don't 
5 think plaintiff has really objected to it in their response -
6 is first of all there's the claims that UDOT designed a bad 
7 traffic control plan, that they never should have used barrels, 
8 it should have been concrete barriers. 
9 Second type of claim that's been brought against UDOT 
10 is that the traffic control plan as it was designed wasn't 
11 followed, that at the night plaintiff was driving through 
12 there, barrels weren't set up right or things hadn't been 
13 followed dealing with the implementation of the traffic control 
14 plan. 
15 And the third way in which plaintiffs attempted to 
16 bring claims against UDOT is by saying regardless of everything 
17 else, UDOT should be held liable for any of Granite's alleged 
18 negligence, a vicarious liability theory. 
19 And we've addressed each of those three areas in our 
20 briefs, and I'll just go through our arguments to those briefly 
21 just in order to respond to any questions you might have. As 
22 far as the first issue in whether or not UDOT can be held 
23 liable for its design of the traffic control plan or the 
24 decision to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers as 
25 the primary dividing device on this project. It's UDOT's 
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1 position that UDOT's protected under the Governmental Immunity 
2 Act, which is falls in § 63-30-3 of the Utah Code, As the 
3 Court's aware, there's a general grant of immunity in that 
4 section, and then after it there's several other provisions 
5 that modify that. And the cases that are really key here are, 
6 that have been cited by both parties are the Keeqan vs. State 
7 of Utah case and the Truiillo vs. UDOT case. We believe it's 
8 helpful to this case that both of those cases deal with UDOT as 
9 a defendant, deal with the issues that are really quite similar 
10 to what we are dealing with here, deal with cases where summary 
11 judgment was either denied or granted, so it provides the Court 
12 with some guidance as to whether or not summary judgment is 
13 appropriate in this type of a case. 
14 And in Keeqan, the Utah Supreme Court really lays out 
15 the analysis that the court goes through, and then Truiillo was 
16 a subsequent Utah Court of Appeals case where they applied the 
17 Utah Supreme Court's analysis. But the analysis that the 
18 courts are required to go through under Keeqan is basically a 
19 three part test. First of all, the court needs to look at it 
20 and say was the activity or the decisions that are issued, were 
21 they a governmental function. Plaintiff and UDOT seem to agree 
22 on this issue. There's no question that -
23 THE COURT: One of the few things (inaudible). 
24 MR. JACOBSEN: Point two as well. The second issue 
25 is does the statute contain a waiver. Not surprisingly 
19 
1 plaintiff agrees with UDOT that yes, the statute likely 
2 contains a waiver - that being the waiver for injuries arising 
3 out of dangerous conditions on highways. That's a waiver 
4 that's found in § 63-30-8. So the parties are in agreement 
5 there. 
6 The third step is are there any exceptions to that 
7 waiver. And that of course is where the parties differ. 
8 That's what the Truiillo and the Keeaan cases look at and 
9 that's what this Court is faced with deciding. And UDOT's 
10 argument is that § 63-30-10, which contains a whole list of 
11 exceptions to the waivers, that the first exception in that 
12 list which is in subparagraph 1 and it's often referred to as 
13 the discretionary function exception, is what protects UDOT's 
14 decisions and actions in this case. And in that discretionary 
15 function, the way the courts have looked at it and the way it's 
16 laid out and particularly in the Keeaan case, is the court said 
17 there needs to be some protection for decisions that are made 
18 at upper levels within governmental organizations where they're 
19 weighing cost factors, where they're weighing public policy 
20 factors, where they're looking at all of these different 
21 factors and having to make what they call policy-based 
22 decisions, or what the court refers to as the basic policy 
23 making level. That's what the courts have said. It's those 
24 types of decisions, it's those types of acts that fall within 
25 the discretionary function exception. 
20 
1 The other level being the operational level. The 
2 examples that are cited in the cases are, you know, there's the 
3 example I believe in both the Keeaan and the Truiillo where 
4 they talk about a traffic light. If somebody makes a decision 
5 that a certain intersection warrants having a traffic light, 
6 the decision of whether or not to put a traffic light in at 
7 that intersection is a policy-based decision that is protected 
8 under the discretionary function exception. Now if somebody 
9 from the state and comes along and is installing that traffic 
10 light and the traffic light falls over and injures somebody, 
11 that somebody who, at the operational level is executing the 
12 policy that's already been developed, that is something which 
13 is not covered under the discretionary functioning exception. 
14 The facts of the Keeaan and the Truiillo cases are 
15 really important here, and hopefully the Court's had an 
16 opportunity to read those cases because I think that's really 
17 what makes the difference here. You look at the Keeaan case 
18 and the Keeaan - both cases like this case involve barrier 
19 issues. In Keeaan you had a highway that was being resurfaced 
20 going up Parley's Canyon and there's the center dividing 
21 barrier, and the question became how many times can you repave 
22 the road before that barrier becomes short enough that it's no 
23 longer a safe barrier. UDOT's personnel and what's stated in 
24 the facts and the brief in the Keeaan case that we attached to 
25 our reply memorandum, you had a safety studies engineer who was 
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1 involved, you had the project design engineer. Both people 
2 working withing a particular region of UDOT who looked at the 
3 safety issues, who looked at the cost issues, did sort of a 
4 cost benefit analysis, a safety analysis, and decided, "Hey, we 
5 think" - and it's interesting to note in that case in I believe 
6 it's one of the first couple paragraphs of that case where 
7 they're laying out the facts, they note that the decision that 
8 was ult imately made by UDOT that it didn't need to raise the 
9 barrier was in violation of an ASHTO standard - a standard that 
10 UDOT was supposedly required to follow. They decided despite 
11 that standard, we think it's safe enough and cost effective 
12 enough that we're going to repave this road without raising 
13 that barrier. In that case, UDOT brought a motion for summary 
14 judgment - and obviously there was an accident. Somebody went 
15 over the barrier and was injured. And as the lawsuit was 
16 filed, UDOT brought a motion for summary judgment saying, "Hey, 
17 our decision to repave this road without raising the barrier 
18 was something that our design engineers looked at. They looked 
19 at the safety issues. They looked at the cost issues, and they 
20 made a decision and they decided it wasn't necessary. UDOT 
21 argued that was something that fell within the discretionary 
22 functioning exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. Trial 
23 court disagreed, denied the motion for summary judgment, case 
24 proceeded to trial, judgment was entered against UDOT and it 
25 was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
22 
1 On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
2 Court reversed the decision, said summary judgment should have 
3 been granted. They said that type of analysis, that weighing 
4 of costs and benefits, looking at the different factors 
5 involved, they said that is precisely the types of decisions 
6 and acts that fall within the discretionary functioning 
7 exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. I note the policy 
8 reasons in there behind that saying that governmental agencies 
9 have got to be able to, you know, the people who are making 
10 these policy-based decisions have got to be able to make their 
11 decisions without fear of being sued every time they make a 
12 decision. They note in there that, sure, every highway could 
13 be made safer, but somebody's got to make those decisions as 
14 far as, you know, with the available money. Just how safe can 
15 we afford to make this highway. 
16 THE COURT: So your view is if summary judgment is 
17 granted, then it's going to be affirmed by the Supreme Court 
18 because at least two of their members - three of their members 
19 did Keeqan. I guess by the time you, if this were appealed, 
20 you'd have maybe four different members of the Supreme Court. 
21 MR. JACOBSEN: And that's true. But I think the 
22 court would at least be reluctant to alter the path which was 
23 clearly followed. And the Truiillo case, I don't think the 
24 Truiillo case followed any different type of analysis. I 
25 think-
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1 THE COURT: That is lack of facts? 
2 MR. JACOBSEN: Lack of facts. You look at that case 
3 and they state -
4 THE COURT: Well, isn't it basically what you did in 
5 this case is you looked at Truiillo, you saw what was missing 
6 and you got somebody do an affidavit to fill it in? 
7 MR. JACOBSEN: We'd be foolish not to. 
8 THE COURT: I think that's basically what you were 
9 doing. 
10 MR. JACOBSEN: Right. We don't know what facts were 
11 ultimately presented at trial on Truiillo. 
12 THE COURT: You must not have done a very good job 
13 because you didn't convince the plaintiffs that you were right. 
14 MR. JACOBSEN: I didn't expect to, your Honor. We're 
15 hoping to convince you though. But I think you're familiar 
16 with the Truiillo case, you know that it was a lack of facts 
17 issue, and in that case they said them's no evidence here that 
18 you ever even singled out the traffic control plan, not just 
19 the particular barrier issue, but the traffic control plan. 
20 In this case, whether you want to question Mr. 
21 Topham's involvement and the Federal Highway Administration's 
22 involvement, there's no question that that specific issue was 
23 looked at by UDOT. It was something they hadn't done before. 
24 They wanted to be sure it was safe to do it in this case. And 
25 under those facts, we think that the discretionary function -
24 
1 like this case or even more so than the Keeaan case because it 
2 was even a higher official in UDOT, this case has got to fall 
3 within the holding of Keeaan and summary judgment would be 
4 appropriate. 
5 I would just address one more argument that I don't 
6 think we hit in our reply brief, but that came up in the 
7 opposition memorandum, and that's the suggestion that it may 
8 have been a discretionary function type decision the first time 
9 back LeFevre made the decision, but when it was brought back to 
10 him, that was just execution of the policy and so at that 
11 point, UDOT could be on the hook. I don't think there's any 
12 support for that in these cases. You know, it would seem you 
13 could get around the discretionary function exception anytime a 
14 discretionary type decision's been made if you just go back and 
15 ask again, I don't think there's any suggestion in the law that 
16 I that's appropriate. 
17 When Granite came back and proposed a change order, 
18 Mr. LeFevre stated that he went back and he reviewed it again. 
19 He weighed the same safety factors, the same cost factors, the 
20 same time factors, and the fact that he made the same decision 
21 doesn't mean he was simply executing his original policy. I 
22 believe it was a re-evaluation and reaffirming it. So I don't 
23 think that argument should hold any weight with the Court. 
24 Moving on, your Honor, the second issue is is whether or 
25 not UDOT could be held liable for any alleged failure to follow 
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1 the traffic control plan. And in support of that argument, 
2 your Honor, we attached to our initial brief as exhibit, I 
3 believe it's Exhibit 4, contract documents which clearly spell 
4 out the responsibilities for this project, spell out that the 
5 contractor who was Granite had the responsibility of performing 
6 the work in accordance with the terms of the contract, of 
7 supplying the manpower, supplying the equipment, and then 
8 there's the attachment to the contract that was also attached 
9 in our brief where it specifically states that the contractor's 
10 required to provide the barrels, the signs, the warning 
11 devices, to implement those. 
12 There's nothing in the contract documents that 
13 suggest UDOT was any responsibility to be the ones out there 
14 implementing this traffic control plan. Clearly the contract 
15 places that responsibility on Granite. Granite initially on 
16 the project actually subcontracted that out to a third party 
17 who was in charge of the traffic safety throughout the area, 
18 setting out the barrels, doing all of that. But there's 
19 nothing to suggest either in the contract or otherwise that 
20 UDOT had any duty to implement or monitor that traffic control 
21 plan. Even if there was some suggestion that UDOT had an 
22 obligation to inspect Granite's work, to make sure they were 
23 doing it right, then even in that event, your Honor, we've 
24 suggested, we've argued that another exception in the 
25 Governmental Immunity Act, which is the one dealing with the 
26 
1 inspections would apply. If Granite or if UDOT did have an 
2 obligation to inspect Granite's work to make sure they were 
3 following the traffic control plan, that exception in the 
4 Governmental Immunity Act which states that - well, it 
5 specifically says they can't be liable for "a failure" - and 
6 this is § 63-30-10(4) - that they can't be liable for "a 
7 failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate 
8 inspection." So even if UDOT had some obligation to be out 
9 there monitoring Granite's employees and making sure they did 
10 their job right, UDOT can't be liable for that. We've cited 
11 cases in support of that. Those cases, if you had an 
12 opportunity to read them, make it clear that there's some 
13 limits on that exception. A governmental entity can't claim 
14 that its own failure to maintain its own equipment is an 
15 inspection that falls under this. What they state and what 
16 those cases state is that this exception typically applies in 
17 cases where a governmental entity was involved in an inspection 
18 of building, fire, safety codes, that type of thing. They 
19 don't limit it to that, but they say that's typically the type 
20 of case that this comes up in. And we think that's exactly 
21 what was going on here. Granite had a contractual 
22 responsibility to do things to follow the federal guidelines 
23 that had been set up for highway safety, to do it as the 
24 contract documents required, and to do so in a manner which was 
25 safe to both the workers on the project and the motoring 
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1 public. And if UDOT somehow failed to monitor Granite's work 
2 or to inspect their work to ensure that that was being done, 
3 that's precisely the type of act which would fall under this 
4 inspection exception. 
5 Finally, your Honor, the third issue is whether or 
6 not UDOT can be held liable for Granite's conduct. Obviously -
7 THE COURT: I've read the Thompson vs. Jess and I 
8 understand that argument. 
9 MR. JACOBSEN: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: What you're arguing and [inaudible] 
11 position. 
12 MR. JACOBSEN: As far as their response to that, one 
13 thing I would point out, the different sections of the 
14 restatement that are cited, I think it's important to note in 
15 reading the Thompson decision, the court notes those sections 
16 of restatement have never been adopted by the Utah courts. 
17 They evaluate it for purposes of the facts of that case and 
18 conclude they wouldn't apply to the facts of that case. But 
19 there's no other case law that's been cited by the plaintiff 
20 and no reference to any cases in Thompson where the court has 
21 found that those sections of the restatement -
22 THE COURT: Were adopted. 
23 MR. JACOBSEN: - were ever adopted by the Utah 
24 courts, and we would discourage this Court from adopting 
25 something which they haven't yet chosen to do so. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I think that's the business of the 
2 appellate courts. 
3 MR. JACOBSEN: I agree, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Unless they're going to give me more 
5 authority. 
6 MR. JACOBSEN: Okay. Well, your Honor, based on 
7 that, we think the facts of this case, despite plaintiff's best 
8 efforts to suggest that there are disputed facts, we don't 
9 think there are disputed facts that are material to this issue. 
10 I think we've gone through those and we think that the law 
11 that's applicable is clear that summary judgment should be 
12 granted in favor of UDOT in this case. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
14 Okay, why don't we - as I mentioned to the counsel 
15 earlier, we have an adoption that we need to take place. So 
16 we'll be - if you want to just maybe move one of the tables so 
17 they can sit at one. 
18 We can come forward then on the adoption. 
19 (Whereupon another matter was handled) 
20 THE COURT: Okay, we'll go back to our hearing on 
21 Craig Johnson vs. State of Utah Department of Transportation 
22 and others. 
23 Mr. Christensen, do you have any position on this 
24 matter? 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: You don't care if you have less or more 
2 at the trial? 
3 MR, CHRISTENSEN: Well, I don't know what my personal 
4 preference is varying relevance to the Court's decision in this 
5 matter. 
6 THE COURT: Okay, all right, thank you. 
7 Okay, Mr. Shaw? 
8 MR. SHAW: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, I'll 
9 be the first to acknowledge that some of this law and facts are 
10 a little confusing, but what I would like to try to do is 
11 synthesize our argument and the facts into three points, if 
12 possible. 
13 First of all, I think looking at plaintiff's position 
14 in this case, the first point that I think is critical is that 
15 UDOT's failure to require Granite to follow the traffic control 
16 plan was an operational failure, an operational decision, not a 
17 policy level decision. You'll note in the reply memorandum 
18 filed, I guess yesterday or the day before, we didn't get it 
19 until yesterday, and I don't think we got copies of the 
20 exhibits, but you'll note that UDOT does not dispute the fact 
21 that this plan required a two foot barrier or a two foot buffer 
22 zone, if you will, and white striping between the buffer zone 
23 and the barrels. That's undisputed as stated in the reply 
24 memorandum that was filed yesterday. I think it's paragraph 4 
25 in the defendant's reply filed yesterday. 
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1 Now, that failure to comply with the traffic control 
2 plan becomes an operational failure. As Mr. Nichols 
3 testified, the project engineer, I believe at page 29 it's 
4 Deposition Exhibit 4 in our memorandum, he acknowledged that 
5 the plan itself which was filed required those safety measures 
6 and on the night that this accident occurred, that definitely 
7 wasn't the state of affairs that existed. 
8 So I think at that level UDOT's failure to implement 
9 its previously policy-making type decision becomes operational. 
10 And that's what the Truiillo case stands for. That's the first 
11 point, and I'll address Truiillo in more detail later. 
12 The second point is that UDOT personnel ordered or 
13 authorized Granite to open up two lanes of travel as opposed to 
14 one, despite the construction being at stage or phase 4, 
15 wherein the traffic control plan itself indicated that during 
16 off peak hours the traffic lane should be reduced to one lane. 
17 And you may recall Jimmy Key's, Jim Key's testimony we cited in 
18 our memorandum, his deposition testimony was that UDOT 
19 personnel - and I think he indicated it was either Pasket or 
20 Griffin were the ones who authorised that deviation from the 
21 traffic control plan. So at that level you have two instances 
22 of operational type decisions which deviate from the original 
23 traffic control plan. To say that this traffic control plan at 
24 some point prior to the construction commencing was staffed as 
25 has been discussed with upper level people and so forth, Mr. 
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1 LeFevre, Mr. Topham, those people, that's one thing. But then 
2 as the construction is commenced and UDOT acts affirmatively in 
3 a negligent manner with those two instances; failing to require 
4 Granite to follow the plan, and in fact authorizing Granite to 
5 deviate from the plan, these are operational decisions. These 
6 are decisions made by people on site every day. And so at that 
7 level, those decisions become operational and they are not 
8 discretionary functions given the Truiillo analysis. 
9 I don't think there's any dispute about that either, 
10 and in Exhibit 8 of our memorandum, the special provisions talk 
11 about the phase 4 construction, the phase 4 construction plan 
12 clearly indicates that during off peak hours one lane of travel 
13 would be open. What happened here was two lanes were opened, 
14 as the Court knows there was no buffer zone created, these 
15 barrels were placed oftentimes within the cut-out area thereby 
16 causing - creating a condition that UDOT created in our 
17 opinion, and I think the facts at least that is a disputed 
18 fact. UDOT was responsible for creating that condition. 
19 Thirdly, I think it's important to note that once Granite 
20 requests of Kent Nichols that UDOT make changes to the traffic 
21 control plan, that in and of itself creates a different issue, 
22 and creates facts that are very, very similar to the Truiillo 
23 facts. The defense memorandum perhaps lays out the exhibits in 
24 a fashion that are a little easier to follow than ours, but 
25 commencing with Exhibit 10 of the defense memorandum, you have 
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1 a letter from Granite -
2 THE COURT: March 20, 1996? 
3 MR. SHAW: That's correct. March 20, 1996, you have 
4 the letter from Granite to Mr. Nichols wherein they are 
5 requesting pre-cast concrete barriers. The issue was raised at 
6 that point clearly because of safety concerns. They also raise 
7 the issue of the speed limit being reduced. Now it's also 
8 important to note although I'll confess that I don't - in all 
9 the depositions that I've read, I don't know that UDOT - and a 
10 UDOT employee has indicated this - but UDOT controls the speed. 
11 That's clear. The speed was pre-construction speed was 55. 
12 UDOT raised it to 65 as Mr. Jacobson points out. They control 
13 the speed. That was an issue. You look at the next letter, 
14 it's Exhibit 11 in their memorandum, and that's the letter or 
15 memorandum from Kent Nichols to Dyke LeFevre again indicating 
16 the concerns that they were having on site with the question of 
17 barriers versus barrels. 
18 So then you have a response that comes back, and 
19 that's again - well, actually Exhibit 12 is another letter, 
20 March 29, 1986 wherein Granite apparently references a 
21 discussion held at the District 1 office, again making a 
22 specific proposal to alterations of the traffic plan. And so 
23 what we have here are facts that clearly indicate Granite's 
24 concern that maybe that decision that was initially made at an 
25 operational level, and by the way I'm not conceding that point 
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1 at this juncture because I don't think the facts are clear on 
2 that, in order for the defense to succeed they're asking the 
3 Court to rule essentially as a matter of law that LeFevre's 
4 decisions are operational. I don't think that is the state of 
5 the facts and I don't think the Court should rule like that. 
6 THE COURT: Not operational. 
7 MR. SHAW: Oh, excuse me, policy making, I'm sorry. 
8 And I clearly don't believe that that's the case because -
9 THE COURT: If they were operational they'd win then. 
10 MR. SHAW: That's right, I'm sorry. Misspoke, your 
11 Honor. So we're not conceding that issue, but again then you 
12 have specific concerns and they're raised here. Ultimately you 
13 have a response from UDOT back to Chuck Lindsay on April 2, 
14 1996 -
15 THE COURT: What exhibit is this? 
16 MR. SHAW: Thirteen, follows immediately. And 
17 essentially what they say there is "Look, if it can be done for 
18 $450,000 or less and we can save 50 days in construction time, 
19 why that's something we'd consider." And then they indicate 
20 that they're not closing the door completely, but ultimately at 
21 that point in April of A96 nothing is done. Okay? Then you 
22 have a follow up in July and that's Exhibit 14. Again - excuse 
23 me, 14 is another letter. Actually what happened was UDOT 
24 received this Exhibit 14 indicating what -
25 THE COURT: (inaudible)? 
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1 MR. SHAW: Yeah, what Granite could do, and nothing 
2 was done. Nothing was done to alter the traffic control plan. 
3 Then in July, you have the July 2, 1996, and I think it's 
4 extremely important to point out the facts contained in this 
5 letter which clearly indicate that there had been numerous 
6 close calls on the site. Again, these are facts very similar 
7 to Truiillo. In Truiillo the Court might recall that there was 
8 evidence that in this particular area of construction up Weber 
9 Canyon there was a higher incident of accidents occurring and 
10 they were concerned about that. Just as the case here, in 
11 fact, this letter references a specific instance where that 
12 morning a vehicle crashed through the barriers into a cutout, 
13 stopped abruptly, and essentially hit the wall of the slab. 
14 The very kind of accident that we're talking about in this 
15 case. 
16 And again you have Mr. Lindsay's concern directed to 
17 Kent Nichols, project engineer. Again you have the Nichols' 
18 memorandum on Exhibit 16 from Nichols to Dyke LeFevre wherein 
19 Mr. Nichols himself addresses these concerns. And basically 
20 the content of that memorandum is such that Mr. Nichols, one 
21 can tell, was extremely concerned about the traffic control 
22 plan. 
23 Now, from this point forward there's no other 
24 evidence that we've been able to determine as to what was done. 
25 Clearly there was no changes in the traffic control plan. At 
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1 this point in time, they chose to ignore their own project 
2 engineer's request. 
3 THE COURT: That wasn't covered like with Mr. LeFevre 
4 is his deposition or his affidavit or? 
5 MR. SHAW: I was going to address this - that portion 
6 of his deposition, Judge. I think the relevant portions of the 
7 deposition commence on page 91, and I'll indicate to the Court 
8 that it's a little less than clear to me when exactly the 
9 discussion with Clint Topham occurs, and perhaps counsel can 
10 point out exactly when that occurred. But if you read page 91, 
11 the question is asked -
12 THE COURT: Is this 91 of the first deposition? 
13 MR. SHAW: Let's see, Judge, I think that is the 
14 first deposition. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I don't think at the 
16 time of either Mr. Topham's depositions any of the parties had 
17 the correspondence with them to refresh their memory or to give 
18 them reference to specific dates. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It was more just a general 
21 discussion of how the progress of the requested change order 
22 went. 
23 THE COURT: All right, we'll I'm on - my 91 says, so 
24 my question is? 
25 MR. SHAW: Right. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. SHAW: Right. 
3 And I'll concede that, Scott. 
4 The question is the Court can read that, I don't need 
5 to re-read it for the record I suppose, but he says this had 
6 been the initial decision before the contract was let. "Okay, 
7 so you remember specifically talking to Mr. Topham about 
8 whether to use plastic barrels?" 
9 "What - as the district director, you know, I'm not 
10 sure I talked with him specifically about barrels." 
11 THE COURT: But that's the original thing early on? 
12 MR. SHAW: Right. The original thing early on. 
13 And then on page 92 again the question is asked in a 
14 little more detail, he says, "Probably not, but you know, he 
15 asked me is there any concern you have with the project or 
16 anything I should know about?" Now the important point of that 
17 part of the deposition, your Honor, is that it is clear that at 
18 some point in time, at least early on, Topham is asking 
19 Nichols, his project engineer, about concerns that he may have 
20 about the project. To state that the duty UDOT owes to the 
21 public is created by contract is not accurate. The duty that 
22 UDOT owes to the public is created in once sense by our 
23 Governmental Immunity Act. It says that defects in roadways 
24 and highways and so forth, immunity for such defects is waived. 
25 The letters that we just pointed out and memorandum Exhibits 10 
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1 through 16 of defense memorandum clearly indicate that Kent 
2 Nichols as project engineer recognizes UDOT's duty to provide a 
3 safe, not only work zone, but a safe area for the motoring 
4 public, for Utah's citizens. So to say that UDOT can avoid its 
5 duty because there's not some specific reference in a contract 
6 is inaccurate and I think it's contrary to the Truiillo 
7 holding. 
8 The other relevant pages of the deposition that one 
9 might inquire further into, I don't know that it does us a lot 
10 of good, having heard what Scott Christensen just indicated, 
11 and that is that at the time he was deposed we didn't have 
12 these documents in front of us, Exhibits 10 through 16. But I 
13 think it's important again to note that the facts of this case 
14 are so similar to Truiillo, and I want to point some of those 
15 out because I think this is where we disagree and I think the 
16 two cases clearly that we've got to deal with are Keeaan and 
17 Truiillo. And I might say the Keeaan case is easily 
18 distinguishable from the Truiillo facts and from these facts. 
19 And I think it can be said this simply. Keeaan did not involve 
20 conduct by UDOT employees in direct violation of a traffic 
21 control plan. This was not a case, Keeaan was not a case that 
22 involved that at all. Keeaan involved the question of what to 
23 do with an existing barrier in the aftermath of repaving a 
24 highway. The facts of Truiillo and the facts of our case 
25 clearly involve traffic control plans designed to protect the 
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1 motoring public during the construction and designed to protect 
2 the workers during the construction. Keeqan did not involve 
3 that. There was no question at all in Keeqan about the need to 
4 remove this barrier during the course of construction. That 
5 wasn't the issue at all. So I think those facts are readily 
6 distinguishable. 
7 In this particular case as in Truiillo, UDOT 
8 employees were on the mark, they were inspecting the work site 
9 virtually daily. They were there. They had the opportunity to 
10 see what's going on. They made certain again operational 
11 decisions during the course of the construction. And that's an 
12 important distinguishing factor. As the Truiillo case points 
13 out, Keeqan would be more in line with a question about putting 
14 up a railroad barrier or a traffic light. That's akin to the 
15 Keeqan facts. That's not the case in Truiillo and it isn't the 
16 case here. 
17 These facts clearly indicate that what occurred was 
18 UDOT violated its own plan, allowed Granite to violate its own 
19 plan in the two specific areas that I've talked about, that 
20 being the buffer zone, the white striping, and also opening up 
21 that second lane of travel in off peak hours. And so to say 
22 that Keeqan fits I think is inaccurate. It just doesn't fit 
23 under these facts. 
24 With respect to the law that's stated in Truiillo, I 
25 think counsel agrees that the Truiillo case accurately reflects 
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1 the law as does Keecran. Clearly there's a four part test there 
2 set forth in both cases with reference to determining what a 
3 discretionary function is. No one quarrels with that test. 
4 But I think some subtleties of Truiillo ought to be pointed 
5 out. First of allf this issue of whether or not UDOT's conduct 
6 was a discretionary function is an affirmative defense as 
7 pointed out in Truiillo, and the defense bears that burden of 
8 proof at this point in time and in trial. Second of all, 
9 Truiillo points out that this issue is a fact intensive inquiry 
10 that originally would not lend itself to summary judgment. 
11 THE COURT: Well, if it doesn't lend itself to 
12 summary judgment, how do you - who decides it at the time of a 
13 trial and if it's the jury that decides it, how do they decide 
14 it? 
15 MR. SHAW: Well, I think what happens there, Judge, 
16 is just like in any other case. I suppose that if the case is 
17 heard and this Court has witness testimony from the stand and 
18 ultimately determines as a matter of law that it doesn't 
19 measure up, then this Court could say case dismissed ultimately 
20 against UDOT. That could happen on a motion to dismiss. I 
21 don't dispute that. But that's not the level of inquiry today. 
22 THE COURT: But what I'm asking is if the motion 
23 isn't granted and is that a decision that's going to be made by 
24 the jury? You're going to give them the facts of all these 
25 witnesses that have been cited in the motion and then you're 
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1 going to have an instruction for the jury to determine that or 
2 am I going to determine that and how is that going to be 
3 determined if it's not determined on summary judgment? 
4 MR. SHAW: Well, I think given the Truiillo language 
5 where the court clearly says it's fact intensive, I think it 
6 can be determined by the jury. I think they can find that in 
7 fact UDOT's conduct was not discretionary and clearly that is 
8 an option. 
9 THE COURT: So we have a hard enough time 
10 understanding what a discretionary function is and we're going 
11 to somehow explain that to a jury and then say here's what a 
12 discretionary function is and it's up to you to decide whether 
13 they exercised a discretionary function or not? 
14 MR. SHAW: I don't think that's out of bounds, Judge. 
15 I think that -
16 THE COURT: Well, no, I'm just asking a practical 
17 thing. I'm just liking to know how a jury's going to determine 
18 that. 
19 MR. SHAW: It's a tough call, I understand that. And 
20 like I said, I don't know that any of us have researched that 
21 issue in more detail procedurally. Maybe that is a call that 
22 the court will ultimately have to make. 
23 THE COURT: I'm sure somebody here has jury 
24 instructions today like we ordered about two years ago for the 
25 time of the pretrial and you have one that could explain that. 
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1 MR. SHAW: We've got jury instructions. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. SHAW: But, your Honor, back to the issues that 
4 are raised in Truiillo, I think in the Truiillo case I wanted 
5 to pointed out a specific cite in Truiillo, I think it's at 
6 page 7 62. I don't know if the Court has a copy of that case. 
7 THE COURT: I don't have it on the bench with me. 
8 I'll make the note of the page though, 762. 
9 MR. SHAW: Let me just state for the record page 762 
10 what the court stated was "We hold that these remaining 
11 allegations of negligence involve operational decisions on the 
12 part of UDOT which implemented or failed to implement pre-
13 established policy." And it cites Nelson and Keeaan. 
14 "Specifically, we hold the failure to reduce speed in the 
15 construction zone as called for in the plan, the failure to 
16 investigate accidents, the failure to meaningfully consider 
17 corrective action in response to Mr. Neriman's letter," i.e. in 
18 response to Mr. Nichols' letter and Granite's request, "are all 
19 acts and decisions at the operational level. Those everyday 
20 routine matters that do not enjoy immunity under the 
21 discretionary function exception." 
22 THE COURT: It's really nice that the appellate 
23 courts clarify. You know, if they don't want to say it's a 
24 discretionary function, they just call it operational and then 
25 if they want to basically have governmental immunity they will 
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1 just call it a discretionary function they'll cite the facts 
2 one way or the other and it's basically what they want to call 
3 it. They won't say that, 
4 MR. SHAW: I understand. But what they do do is they 
5 cite three or four separate instances of alleged negligence, 
6 all of which are similar to the allegations that we're making, 
7 in essence deviation from the traffic control plan by on-site 
8 employees and then that gets us back to the LeFevre deposition 
9 on what his duties were, and Mr. LeFevre testified I believe at 
10 his deposition that, you know, these kinds of decisions were 
11 essentially every day kinds of decisions. So you have this 
12 distinction I think from implementation of a plan as opposed to 
13 creation of a plan. And clearly the Truiillo court has said 
14 that the implementation of these plans are not operational. 
15 THE COURT: So is it your position that although at 
16 the beginning at this project said we're going to go barrels 
17 instead of concrete barriers, you know, before they even 
18 started and then if somebody asked them later because of 
19 concerns and they make that decision a second time that could 
20 never been a discretionary function? In other words, like 
21 because whether it's Nichols' letters or these other things 
22 that when they're made aware that there are problems with their 
23 initial policy decision, if they get that information, weigh it 
24 all again and say we're keeping by our policy, that's always 
25 going to be operational? 
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1 MR. SHAW: The operative word there is they need to 
2 weigh it all again. They need to study the fact. They need to 
3 take it up the line. They need to do everything that they did 
4 initially and more. 
5 THE COURT: Why do you think they have to take it up 
6 above LeFevre? Why do they have to take it above LeFevre? 
7 MR. SHAW: I don't know that they do, but I'm saying 
8 if they don't, then LeFevre, based on his deposition, those are 
9 the kinds of operational decisions that he makes and we cited 
10 those in the memo. I think those are at pages 102, 103 in that 
11 area of the deposition. And so - in fact, I think I've marked 
12 those, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'm on - I have 103, I don't have 
14 102. It goes from 96 to 103 on what's attached as Exhibit 20. 
15 I'm looking at the deposition, is it in yours? 
16 MR. SHAW: Yes, Exhibit 7 of our memorandum. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. SHAW: I believe what's happening here is Mr. 
19 LeFevre is referred to paragraph 15 of an affidavit Mr. Ward 
20 points out and he expresses his -
21 THE COURT: 102? 
22 MR. SHAW: Yeah. About near the bottom, line 16. 
23 THE COURT: "My duties"? 
24 MR. SHAW: Right. And we're referring to what he 
25 alleges his duties are in an affidavit. Then over on page 103 
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1 he specifically asked whether or not those duties are things 
2 that he did on a daily basis. He says, yes. Then down at the 
3 bottom of the page he's asked at line 21 whether or not that 
4 was not only his job but the job of every other regional 
5 director, and he said that's true. 
6 And so LeFevre might be, I suppose LeFevre might be 
7 classified as some sort of a hybrid employee. At some times he 
8 exercises policy level kinds of decisions, at other times he 
9 exercises operational kinds of decisions. We're not saying 
10 that as a matter of course any time they raise an issue of 
11 safety concerns it's operational. But in this case after July 
12 of 9^6 it appears from the evidence presented that nothing was 
13 done. There was no attempt to make whatever decision they did 
14 make, a policy level decision. 
15 And then again you go back to the issue of UDOT being 
16 the party who doesn't implement or doesn't require Granite to 
17 implement the traffic control, there's no buffer zone, there's 
18 no white striping and there is an extra lane of travel on the 
19 night that this incident occurred, clearly with the barrels not 
20 placed as they should have been or were intended to be placed. 
21 So all of those issues, your Honor, I think are 
22 critical issues of fact that would require the Court to deny 
23 defendant's motions. Unless the Court has specific questions, 
24 that's all I have. 
25 THE COURT: Where do you say these facts come from in 
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1 your memo? Are these the five through eight page facts, or are j 
2 they the one to four page facts? I 
3 MR. SHAW: Let's see, judge, I've circles the exact 
4 paragraphs. Page 2, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. Oh, there's one 
5 correction too I'd like to point out. As I read the 
6 depositions of Mr. LeFevre, there's paragraph 7 there where we j 
7 indicate the MUTCD requires barriers to divide drop off of more j 
8 than six inches. As I went through these depositions I think ; 
9 that's a mis-statement. I'll concede that and defense counsel 
10 pointed that out in the reply. Actually, what was happening is 
11 the witness was testifying to sheet 4 of the traffic control 
12 plan requiring barriers. That was his testimony, so I don't 
13 know how that occurred, but that is a mis-statement. Also 
14 paragraph 12 of our memorandum and paragraphs 14, 16, 18 -
15 yeah, 16 and 18 establish those facts and cite to the 
16 deposition and/or other evidence including the letters that 
17 we've cited. We actually included all of the letters I believe 
18 in our Exhibit 2, Judge, they're one right after the other. 
19 And then paragraph 20 is the cite, again on the night in 
20 question citing Trooper Lundell it was opened to two lanes; 
21 paragraph 18 is the Jimmy Key's testimony that either Pasket or 
22 Griffin authorized and ordered the opening of an extra lane of 
23 travel. 
24 THE COURT: Okay, any reply? 
25 MR. JACOBSEN: Your Honor, once again I want to point 
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1 out with the discretionary function exception, it's not this 
2 Court's job to determine whether or not UDOT's decision was 
3 right or wrong. I mean, that's not something you're required 
4 to do for purposes of this motion and the issues under the 
5 discretionary function exception. That exception applies, it 
6 says -
7 THE COURT: They can be dead wrong if it's a policy 
8 decision. 
9 MR. JACOBSEN: I think you're right. You know, 
10 whether you like the statute or not, that's what the statute 
11 does. There's a lot of facts that were just discussed by Mr. 
12 Shaw that obviously we didn't go through when we went through 
13 facts before. I think as he just went through and pointed out 
14 which facts he believe establish the disputes, it was back to 
15 those pages, I believe, one through four of the opposition 
16 memorandum, those first set of facts which as we discussed 
17 earlier, your Honor, I think are inappropriate under Rule 4-501 
18 for purposes of establishing a disputed fact. 
19 Responding to a couple other things. As you went 
20 through the letters, the various letters that went back and 
21 forth, there's no question that Granite was making requests to 
22 UDOT for additional funding for the purposes of using barriers. 
23 That's well documented in the letters. But I think what's 
24 important and what distinguishes this case even more from 
25 Truiillo, in Truiillo where the court says we don't even see 
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1 anything to lead us to believe that the traffic control plan 
2 was ever singled out. In this case you've got the evidence of 
3 what went on before the plan was ever let out to bid, but then 
4 you've also got the fact that you've got a well documented 
5 occurrence of that specific issue, the barrels versus barrier 
6 issue, being re-examined. Where Granite comes back and says 
7 reconsider this, several letters back and forth, Ken Nichols 
8 didn't make that decision. Ken Nichols was UDOT's project 
9 manager. You know, I suppose if Ken Nichols had made a 
10 decision out on the job site as the project engineer, we'd be 
11 arguing over whether or not that decision was operational or 
12 policy making, but it didn't stop with Ken Nichols. In fact, 
13 as the letters went on, you see Ken Nichols as saying I think 
14 Granite's got a valid concern here. You know, we should 
15 consider this. We need to give this more thought. And as a 
16 result, that's why it climbed that ladder again. That's why it 
17 made it's way back to Dyke LeFevre, that's why it went from 
18 Dyke LeFevre to Clint Topham and they looked at it again. It's 
19 undisputed that Mr. LeFevre considered the same cost factors 
20 and he said, "Can you do it for cheaper. How much time can you 
21 save off the project if we allow you to do this." He had those 
22 different factors that he's weighing. The bucks got to stop 
23 with somebody in Region 1 in UDOT's organization, that's where 
24 that final decision rested. They want to characterize Mr. 
25 LeFevre's decisions as operational because those are the types 
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1 of decisions he made on a daily basis. He was the 
2 administrator. He's the one who was appointed to gather that 
3 information, listen to his project engineers, listen to the 
4 safety engineers, listen to the design engineers, and balance 
5 those factors. That was his job. He's the one who that 
6 ultimately rested with. And the fact that that was part of his 
7 job duty, I don't think makes him a hybrid employee as 
8 plaintiff has suggested who sometimes making a policy-making 
9 decision and other times making an operational decision. In 
10 this case, you know, perhaps he could argue it was operational 
11 if Ken Nichols had just said to Granite, "Sure, makes sense, go 
12 ahead and do it." But that's not what happened. Those facts 
13 take this case so far out of the realm of Truiillo, and I think 
14 take it beyond what you had in Keeaan. And I think it's 
15 important to note that there is the language in Truiillo where 
16 the court says it's fact intensive and obviously the court was 
17 asking for more facts in that case and that summary judgment 
18 doesn't typically lend itself to fact-intensive analysis like 
19 that. But the Keeaan court made it clear that summary judgment 
20 can be appropriate in this type of -
21 THE COURT: Keeqan denied summary judgment and then 
22 they went to trial? 
23 MR. JACOBSEN: They went to trial. 
24 THE COURT: And then was that sub-issue of 
25 operational versus policy making submitted to the jury? 
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1 MR. JACOBSEN: It's not clear from that opinion, your 
2 Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. JACOBSEN: And I think -
5 THE COURT: So I mean you basically, if I deny the 
6 motion you can just give it like Keegan after the trial for 
7 case review? 
8 MR. JACOBSEN: But I - well, but I don't think that's 
9 the message that the Utah Supreme Court is trying to send is 
10 that let's let these cases go to trial and we fix it later. I 
11 mean, I think they -
12 THE COURT: Well, I think there's probably a 
13 difference of opinion of what the Supreme Court is telling us 
14 about summary judgments. I mean, you know, you can grant 
15 summary judgments, you can think that they comply with Rule 4-
16 501, they can go up and they can be reversed, and so I don't 
17 know what message they're sending to us. 
18 MR. JACOBSEN: And I guess that's difficult to 
19 interpret. 
20 THE COURT: I follow the rules that the rules of 
21 summary judgment's appropriate should be granted whether it's 
22 going to be reversed or not by an appellate court if it's based 
23 upon the facts they're undisputed and it complies with Rule 4-
24 501 and the law of the State of Utah at the time. 
25 MR. JACOBSEN: And I would agree with that. 
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1 THE COURT: I guess the problem though is I'm going 
2 to ask you the same question. If the motion isn't granted, how 
3 do you perceive this being given, you know, who decides this or 
4 how would it be instructed to a jury? 
5 MR. JACOBSEN: Well, I think there's no answer to 
6 that in Keeaan or Truiillo. I would image what happened in 
7 Truiillo is that case went to trial and then there was probably 
8 a motion for directed verdict when all of the evidence was 
9 before the judge. Certainly the court would have an 
10 opportunity at that time based on the evidence presented at 
11 trial. I think if you give that to the jury, I think you're 
12 looking at a nightmare for the jury because not only are you 
13 asking the jury to weigh whether or not UDOT's actions 
14 constituted discretionary actions or operational level actions, 
15 but then you're going to be asking them to apportion fault 
16 between areas of fault that are perhaps protected under the 
17 Governmental Immunity, and areas of fault that aren't protected 
18 under - I mean, I believe it would become a real nightmare for 
19 the jury, I mean, the special verdict form in that situation, 
20 not only in instructing them on discretionary function issues, 
21 but also then in asking them to begin apportioning fault 
22 between some conduct which is under the Governmental Immunity 
23 Act and other conduct which isn't. It would become a 
24 nightmare, and I think it's probably the Court's responsibility 
25 either at this point if there are no disputed facts or at the 
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1 conclusion of the evidence to determine the applicability of 
2 that statute. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. JACOBSEN: That said, your Honor, unless you have 
5 additional questions, we'll submit this to the Court. 
6 THE COURT: No, I don't. Okay. All right, well I 
7 want to decide this decision today, and I guess the one 
8 question we can do is if we want to take a break now or you 
9 want to come back, you know, in an hour or something, we could 
10 do it that way, or we could talk about the other things. I'm 
11 going to take a break at some point to review some more things 
12 before I make a decision, but I want it made today so that we 
13 know where we're going on the case. But it's up to you whether 
14 you want to talk about the Newell Knight motion now and then 
15 take a break and then we can - because what I have to do, 
16 basically we still need to talk about jury instructions, voir 
17 dire, etc. 
18 MR. WARD: [inaudible] if the Court wants time to 
19 consider this but also wants to make a decision today, we're 
20 going to all be together later this afternoon in a deposition 
21 and maybe we can touch base with you by phone since we would 
22 all be together. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. WARD: Does that make sense to you? 
25 THE COURT: That's fine. Yeah, you're going to be -
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1 MR. JACOBSEN: I guess my only preference would be is 
2 if you're going to break at some point, you know, it would make 
3 more sense to me to have you considering those issues and 
4 looking at that while it's fresh in your mind before we've gone 
5 into everything else. I would have no objection -
6 THE COURT: I think there's - well, it's up to - it 
7 doesn't matter. What time is your deposition? 
8 MR. SHAW: It starts at 3:00. 
9 THE COURT: Where is it at? 
10 MR. JACOBSEN: Strong & Hanni. And I guess if we had 
11 a decision prior to that point -
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: The deposition is going to go 
13 forward. 
14 I MR. JACOBSEN: Yeah, the deposition would go forward, 
15 but that would certainly impact our involvement with the 
16 deposition. 
17 MR. WARD: Maybe we can call the court at 2:30 or 15 
18 to 3:00 or something? 
19 THE COURT: Well, why don't we just take a break now. 
20 Let me go through some things. I want to - you don't - I mean, 
21 I wouldn't go away, I mean, it may be a half hour, it may be 
22 less. I don't know. 
23 MR. ?: Should we remain available, your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: Yeah, if you want to just - well, we can 
25 either do this. You can come back at 12:30 and then I don't 
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1 think what we have left to discuss is basically - I don't think 
2 that other motion is going to take that long. 
3 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, I don't either. 
4 THE COURT: And I think besides unless you could 
5 settle it over the next hour. 
6 MR. CHRISTENSEN: My point is I'd just as soon, given 
7 the time if the Court would prefer us to come back at a time 
8 certain, I think that might be preferable. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you come back at 12:15. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: 12:15? 
11 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. 
13 THE COURT: You can leave everything here. It will 
14 be locked or you can take whatever you want. 
15 (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
16 THE COURT: Okay, we're back on the record in the 
17 case of Craig Johnson versus UDOT and Granite Construction 
18 Company. 
19 Well, I've read these cases especially the Keeaan and 
20 the Truiillo case again, and it seems to me the way I read 
21 these cases, I mean, first of all I think there's always 
22 something interesting when the Utah Supreme Court decides one 
23 case and the Court of Appeals or a panel of the Court of 
24 Appeals decides another case. And when they do that, I mean, 
25 in one case they don't even cite Keeaan as an issue of summary 
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1 judgment. When the Court of Appeals says this is a fact-
2 intensive issue that's really not appropriate for summary 
3 judgment, they cite a couple of cases, then they say but see, 
4 but they don't respond to Keeqan who they denied the summary 
5 judgment and then it was reversed. And I don't know what all 
6 that means. I think that this a very difficult issue, but I 
7 mean, I also think that if - we can do one of two things in the 
8 case. We can try the case and then the issue comes up at the 
9 end of the trial, or we can have this issue decided, now 
10 whether that's appealed pursuant to 54(b) and not go forward 
11 with the trial, that's an issue. 
12 But the way I review this case is this way. First of 
13 all, it appears to me that what has happened in this case is 
14 that the Defendant UDOT has taken the Truiillo case and 
15 basically where they've gone through and said we didn't have 
16 this evidence in the record, we didn't have this evidence in 
17 the record, etc., that they basically got an affidavit to say 
18 now we do. 
19 Then the plaintiff in the case as they went through 
20 their - so I believe UDOT complied with Rule 4-501, and I'm not 
21 doing a technical description, but I think that the plaintiff 
22 has not complied with Rule 4-501 on pages 1 through 4. They 
23 set forth all those facts and I don't know how many times this 
24 needs to be said, but the whole purpose of Rule 4-501 as to 
25 summary judgment is to help a judge say is there an issue, 
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1 because everybody's going down the same way and following the 
2 procedure. And when they don't do that, it's very hard. But I 
3 don't believe Rule 4-501 has been compiled with and rule (sic) 
4 1 to 4 I think it has been with pages 5 through 8. But I don't 
5 think on pages 5 through 8 that there is created a genuine 
6 issue of material fact. As the reply memos pointed out and as 
7 was discussed in the argument and not really gone over that 
8 much more with the plaintiff is that issues such as whether Mr. 
9 LeFevre was upper most management or not. I don't think that's 
10 really a disputed fact where the other facts that were - facts 
11 3, 5, 6, 20 through 24, 26, I don't believe that those - I 
12 believe that there was an attempt to make then a disputed fact, 
13 but I think looking at the deposition transcripts, looking at 
14 the context of which some of those questions were asked in a 
15 deposition, I don't think there is a genuine issue of fact. 
16 Now, I can say that there are different points of 
17 view that can say whether what I'm about to do is right or 
18 wrong, but I'm going to grant the motion for summary judgment 
19 because I feel that this is a policy-making decision and not an 
20 operational decision. Now, obviously, reasonable people might 
21 disagree. But in light of that decision, I think it's more 
22 appropriate to grant that motion at this point in the case, 
23 have that ruled upon and whether you want to appeal that issue 
24 and postpone the trial, you know, had this been filed sooner we 
25 might have been able to do something different than we're doing 
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1 now, but I understand that we've got a two week trial date on a 
2 1997 case, so what do the parties wish to do? I have no 
3 problem certifying this for Rule 54 (b) and having this appealed 
4 immediately so that you can get the decision issue resolved. 
5 If you want to go ahead and try the case and then, you know, 
6 appeal that issue, I don't want you trying the case twice, but 
7 we may be trying the case in vain if I denied the motion and it 
8 went on appeal then you might be back or not have them in the 
9 case. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: And, your Honor, I think that's Mr. 
11 Shaw's call. 
12 THE COURT: Well, I don't know if you want to make a 
13 decision right now, but what -
14 MR. SHAW: Right, I'd like to take that under 
15 advisement with co-counsel and make a decision, then we could 
16 approach the Court if we decided to do that. Frankly, I don't 
17 think we'll decide to do that. I think we'll move forward. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, if that's the case, then 
19 let's go forward with the other motion then. 
20 MR. SHAW: Okay. Has the Court had a chance to read 
21 the briefs filed with regard to -
22 THE COURT: I have and I believe that expert 
23 witnesses need to assist a jury. 
24 MR. SHAW: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: I've read 702, just so you know I've read 
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1 the Rules of Evidence, I'm on the Rules of Evidence Committee 
2 and I was also on the Rules of Evidence Committee that proposed 
3 to the Utah Supreme Court that we adopt the federal recent 
4 changes to those rules because they're easier to follow for 
5 trial judges, and the Supreme Court basically told us to go 
6 chase ourselves, so but we did submit those rules and I'm 
7 pretty familiar with the rules of expert witnesses. 
8 MR. SHAW: Well, with that in mind, your Honor, I'll 
9 try to keep this simple and straight forward. I think we've 
10 set forth in paragraph 6 of our memorandum, pages 3, 4, 5, 6 
11 and 7 basically, and into 8 the areas that we think Mr. Knight 
12 is not qualified as an expert to testify. Essentially, if I 
13 might characterize it as such, I think what the deposition 
14 testimony reflects is Mr. Knight's attempt to cloak a lay 
15 opinion, if you will, as an expert opinion in many ways. 
16 THE COURT: You don't have any objection to somebody 
17 else coming in and saying a person in the plaintiff's position 
18 could have seen this, or these were the conditions that 
19 confronted the plaintiff at the time of the trial - at the time 
20 of the accident? 
21 MR. SHAW: I don't have objection to that because 
22 that's what we're going to do. We're going to do that with 
23 Trooper Lundell. We're going to do that with the plaintiff. 
24 One of the considerations in that regard with respect to Mr. 
25 Knight is I don't believe he visited the scene at all. So what 
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1 he's relying on are photographs only in that regard. I don't 
2 dispute that if Mr. Knight had some basis to reconstruct and 
3 tell us what he believes based on a reconstruction occurred 
4 here, he could do so. But really what he does is he attempts 
5 to make statements regarding a propensity to go to sleep. He 
6 makes statements regarding vision issues, visibility issues, 
7 driver distances that he really has no idea on with respect to 
8 the night of the accident. He also talks about the placement 
9 of barrels which again he has no personal knowledge of 
10 regarding the accident. He makes statements, let's assume the 
11 barrels were placed 100 feet apart, let's assume the lane of 
12 travel was 12 feet, etc, etc. And those statements are pointed 
13 out in those pages as I reference in our memorandum without 
14 really any factual foundation at all. It's our opinion in 
15 order for Mr. Knight to testify he's got to have that actual 
16 factual predicate, an adequate foundation for him to render 
17 those opinions. Clearly Mr. Knight testified in his deposition 
18 that he's not a sleep expert, he's not a vision expert, he's 
19 not a human factors expert, and essentially the types of 
20 opinions that he's rendering here are human factors analysis. 
21 He's not qualified to do so. 
22 He references this positive guidance theory without 
23 any foundation as to its reliability whatsoever. There's no 
24 statement in the deposition. I presume if Mr. Knight could 
25 come to court and lay that foundation, yes, this is the 
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1 positive guidance theory, this is the method by which it has 
2 become generally acceptable, this is a reasonably reliable 
3 scientific theory and here's why, and set all that out, well, 
4 then we may have a different quarrel. But at this juncture he 
5 does none of that. He talks in terms of positive guidance and 
6 really in rambling -
7 THE COURT: What is positive guidance? 
8 MR. SHAW: Well, I don't know. I'm here to tell you 
9 I don't know from reading this deposition. He talks in terms, 
10 it's on page 8 of our memo I think, Judge, where he goes on and 
11 on about what it is - 7 and 8 - and I don't know what it is 
12 from that portion of his deposition. So our objection is 
13 primarily foundational. 
14 The next point I guess and the final part of the 
15 analysis is no matter what, assuming that he could lay a 
16 foundation - we don't think he can or will - but then the Court 
17 would have to adopt the comparative analysis with Rule 403 in 
18 I determining whether or not Mr. Knight's statements as made are 
19 probative and whether or not the probative value substantially 
20 outweighs the potential for prejudice or confusion of the 
21 issues. I'd submit to the Court if you read that bottom of 
22 page 7 up on to page 8 and tell me what the positive guidance, 
23 for instance, has to do with the concept of accident 
24 reconstruction. And then he goes on and on and on there, but 
25 again no foundation for those opinions. And so we would ask 
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1 that he be strictly limited to testimony relative to 
2 reconstruction principle, which he may be qualified to talk 
3 about. But for him to come in and say Craig Johnson should 
4 have seen, he didn't see, he ran into the cutout area, based on 
5 his foundation as set forth in this deposition I think goes 
6 beyond what the expert witness Rule 702 requires. And really 
7 I becomes argumentative, it becomes a bolstering of defense 
8 counsel's argument and nothing more. 
9 Typically also I think the Court would agree that 
10 when a lay opinion is rendered it's based on facts observed 
11 contemporaneously often times with an occurrence. Clearly, 
12 that's not what occurred here and Mr. Knight's offered as an 
13 expert. He shouldn't be allowed to come into court and say I'm 
14 going to offer this opinion based on no foundation and couch it 
15 in terms of an expert witness. He doesn't qualify given the 
16 current state of the foundation. So we believe that on that 
17 basis, Mr. Knight's testimony should be limited as we've set 
18 forth in the memorandum. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Christensen. 
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It may be refreshing, your Honor, 
21 but in one sense I do not disagree with plaintiff's counsel. I 
22 agree that this is a foundational question and I agree that 
23 there was no foundation laid at Mr. Knight's deposition as to 
24 the opinions that he intends to render, and the reason for that 
25 is he wasn't asked those questions by plaintiff's counsel. I 
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1 certainly didn't take the opportunity to qualify my own witness 
2 in the course of the deposition. I think this motion is 
3 premature. 
4 THE COURT: Well, what about this. While it may be 
5 or it may not be, I guess the question is it raises the issue 
6 that they're anticipating based upon his deposition what he's 
7 likely to say. 
8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Oh, I understand that. 
9 THE COURT: And, well, what I'm going to propose and 
10 you tell me what both of you think of this. There's no way I 
11 can really resolve this issue. I can tell you if Mr. Knight's 
12 going to come in here and say, hey, you know, this guy could 
13 have seen this and he could have seen that, and he could have 
14 seen this, you know, the jury doesn't need - that doesn't help 
15 a jury telling them what a person could see or not see. 
16 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand that. 
17 THE COURT: He's basically substituting his opinion 
18 for what the jury is going to decide in the case. If there's 
19 something else because of background or experience, I mean, in 
20 the federal court, you know, you can have with the new rules of 
21 Federal Rules 702 to 704 they basically have a preliminary kind 
22 of matter before trial so that everybody can hear it so we 
23 don't stop in the middle of the testimony and send the jury 
24 out. And I think - do any of you have any objection to having 
25 that at some point, you know, prior to the trial or before 
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1 trial some day or -
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Let me respond to that if I could, 
3 your Honor. And let me explain how I perceive the issues to 
4 come down at trial and in what respect I anticipate testimony 
5 from Mr. Knight. Because a lot of the testimony in Mr. 
6 Knight's deposition was responding to hypotheticals that were 
7 proposed to him by Mr. Ward and there was a lot of give and 
8 take back and forth between them which I don't think really got 
9 to the essence of what Mr. Knight is prepared to testify about. 
10 Now the issues as I see it in this case, to simplify 
11 them as much as possible, is the plaintiffs are going to allege 
12 that there were barrels missing and that there was 
13 noncompliance by either the state or now Granite with the 
14 traffic control plan and as a result, it lured Mr. Johnson into 
15 an excavation on the side of the road and the accident 
16 occurred. The evidence that we anticipate presenting will show 
17 that there were barrels in place and that Mr. Johnson, in fact, 
18 fell asleep and drifted off through the barrels into the 
19 excavation and that's what caused the accident. 
20 Now Mr. Knight's - the Court then has the obligation 
21 and the responsibility to determine if under the facts that are 
22 presented under either of those theories, which is what I 
23 anticipate will happen, there is a point where expert testimony 
24 may be of assistance to the jury in trying to determine which 
25 of those scenarios is more likely than not to have occurred. 
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1 And then if the Court rules that that is an area that is 
2 properly the subject of expert testimony, then the inquiry then 
3 shifts as to whether this individual expert has the necessary 
4 qualifications to render that testimony. 
5 Now as I understand Mr. Knight's testimony, he talked 
6 about - he put a label on it, this positive guidance, and what 
7 I understood his testimony to be was that taken in total there 
8 was enough information available to the motoring public to 
9 allow them to safely travel through the construction zone. 
10 THE COURT: But is this, you know, usually when you 
11 have an expert you can say like in the federal rules somebody 
12 else can replicate what they do, they can basically see 
13 studies, they can do other things. When you talk about 
14 positive guidance, that's just kind of like mumbo jumbo. You 
15 can say, hey, all these things I call positive guidance. Now 
16 can you have 15 other experts who are all Mr. Knight type of 
17 experts who are going to come in and say, yep, this can all be 
18 replicated; yep, this is all the same? Or is it just Mr. 
19 Knight saying this is my thing. I don't have any problem with 
20 Mr. Knight in his subject, it's a question of is he in his 
21 element right now. 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand that. I understand 
23 that. And I think that's my obligation is to lay sufficient 
24 foundation to convince the Court that Mr. Knight's opinions are 
25 based upon his training, experience and education. That's my 
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1 obligation. 
2 THE COURT: But how do we do that without hearing 
3 from him, you know, outside the presence of the jury? 
4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That may be fine the way the Court 
5 wants to do that, but I guess what my problem is is that if I 
6 lay my foundation and I think the jury's entitled to hear that 
7 as is the Court when I'm introducing Mr. Knight's testimony. 
8 They've heard the different arguments, they've heard the 
9 attorneys stand up and make their opening statements and 
10 they've heard the witnesses say were there barrels there, 
11 weren't there barrels there, what was actually there, what 
12 wasn't there, and then if I lay the necessary foundation for 
13 Mr. Knight's testimony, then if at that point the Court wants 
14 to exclude the jury and then make some pointed inquiries as to 
15 Mr. Knight as to whether, you know, what it is about his 
16 experience or training or education that allows him to render 
17 this kind of testimony, I think that's certainly appropriate. 
18 THE COURT: What I'm saying is that I don't want to 
19 stop a trial in the middle of the trial, send the jury out for 
20 an hour so we can do that. A better way to do it is to do it 
21 before trial. 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: If the Court wants to do that and 
23 have [inaudible] evidentiary hearing and where I do have an 
24 opportunity to present that evidence, I'll be happy to do that. 
25 But I think the problem is is that at this point, plaintiff's 
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1 counsel didn't make those kind of pointed inquiries nor did I 
2 because -
3 THE COURT: Well, I'm not arguing with you. I'm 
4 thinking the best way that we have to do is basically, unless 
5 it's in the context that it's going to be done and whether it's 
6 going to be appropriate. 
7 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's certainly within the Court's 
8 prerogative, and I will certainly present Mr. Knight -
9 THE COURT: And I don't have a problem, I mean, I 
10 guess - is the trial going to be shorter or longer in light of 
11 my other ruling? 
12 MR. SHAW: I think it's going to be a little bit 
13 shorter. It won't be -
14 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Dramatically. 
15 MR. SHAW: Yeah, it won't be dramatically shorter. 
16 But I'm not familiar with what, you know, how many witnesses 
17 you're going to call, Scott. I think there'd be time perhaps 
18 during the course of the trial to say you show up with Mr. 
19 Knight at 8:00 in the morning and we can deal with that issue. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's certainly acceptable. 
22 THE COURT: Well, okay, well then let's just resolve 
23 it. I'm not going to rule on this right now, I mean, I'm aware 
24 and I think it's good that this issue be brought. I'd rather 
25 have the issue brought up earlier than hear it the day of the 
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1 witness. So I understand what the facts are. I guess what I'm 
2 going to tell both of you is that if some other witness can 
3 say, you know, were there barrels are there, were those barrels 
4 apparent from 100 feet away or 50 feet away, you know, that's a 
5 factual thing, that's a factual thing, and if you say - and 
6 then you can argue, I mean, it's kind of an argument that he 
7 saw or he should have saw them. It's not a witness thing 
8 saying, you know, because if you get some guy up there then 
9 somebody else can say well, yeah, he shouldn't have seen them. 
10 You know, I mean. 
11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I guess the problem is, your Honor, 
12 is not all testimony is the result of the application of 
13 formulas and -
14 THE COURT: No, I agree with you. 
15 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: And I think part of the evaluation 
16 should be based on his experience and education, for example. 
17 THE COURT: Well, what if we say this. I have had a 
18 lot of discussions about, you know, State vs. Ramash and the 
19 federal cases and the new federal rules of evidence as it 
20 relates to expert witnesses. And you know, when you talk to 
21 people on the Supreme Court and you talk to people on the Court 
22 of Appeals, you know what they say? They basically say not in 
23 their decisions but they say to you generally something to the 
24 effect that they both get to the same point. And that being 
25 the case, I'll tell you one thing. Most district judges 
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1 believe that it would be a lot easier to follow the federal 
2 rules. And when I review things, mentally I follow the federal 
3 rules. So if you want to - when we talk about this, why don't 
4 you look at federal rules 701 to 704 along with, because 702 
5 talks about, you know, basically you just can't have an expert 
6 say "I'm a big hot shot expert." 
7 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand. 
8 THE COURT: "Nobody else could validate my results, 
9 nobody else could do my studies or anything else." I'd like 
10 it, you know, I'm going to look at those type of issues. 
11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I appreciate that input, your 
12 Honor, thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right, well, in 
14 light of that issue, then what other issues do you have that 
15 you anticipate we need to discuss before the trial? 
16 And before I forget, Mr. Jacobsen if you'll make an 
17 order regarding the summary judgment ruling and then pass it 
18 around to the other parties before it's submitted to me. 
19 MR. JACOBSEN: I'll do that, your Honor. 
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, my suggestion is we do 
21 still have the deposition, follow-up deposition of the 
22 plaintiff that's scheduled this afternoon at three o'clock. If 
23 Mr. Shaw and Mr. Ward could at least give us some indication as 
24 to what their intentions are in reference to appealing the 
25 Court's ruling by then, I think, you know, if they decide not 
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1 to do that, then we can proceed -
2 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to tell them they 
3 have to decide by three o'clock. I'm just saying that if you 
4 want to do that, I have no problem certifying this as 54(b). 
5 If I'm not right, we ought to know that earlier than later. 
6 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I agree. 
7 THE COURT: But I mean -
8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: The problem is is that there's so 
9 much else that needs to be done if they're not going to. 
10 THE COURT: I understand. Well, realistically, Mr. 
11 Shaw, what do you - I'm not putting you in a corner, I'm just 
12 asking when do you think you'll be able to talk to your client 
13 and Mr. Ward and know? 
14 MR. SHAW: He's obviously, for instance - Mr. Ward 
15 went to get him at the airport, that's why he's not back. But 
16 he'll be here this afternoon I'm sure it will be discussed at 
17 length and we will probably have a decision this afternoon. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Let's hope for that, and if 
19 there's some other problem then we can discuss it. 
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: There is one other issue, and I 
21 guess it falls on me to raise it now since the state is out. 
22 And I don't know what plaintiff's intentions are. There is an 
23 additional deposition that they have noticed of a state 
24 employee who was I think may have been the individual who 
25 developed the traffic control plan. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, if I've missed something, but 
2 weren't we supposed to have all discovery done -
3 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I know, and our objection is is 
4 that that individual was never designated as a witness, he was 
5 - by any of the parties that they intended to call or utilize 
6 on. It's sort of a follow-up discovery he was identified in 
7 one of these subsequent depositions as far as Clint Topham or 
8 Dyke LeFevre, and they've noticed up his deposition. I 
9 objected to them using him at trial in this matter because he's 
10 never been called, I don't know what he's going to say and I 
11 don't have an opportunity to respond to his testimony. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, what's the response on that issue? 
13 MR. SHAW: I would say we go ahead with the 
14 deposition, and again I don't know what he's going to say 
15 either. He may not be a relevant witness at all that we 
16 called, especially in light of the Court's most recent ruling. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, well, my attitude is having the 
18 deposition if it's already set up does not mean you can make 
19 your objection as to whether that person should be allowed to 
20 testify or for that to be used. 
21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I guess I'll reset - they simply 
22 noticed him up, and so that's my objection. He was never 
23 identified as a witness, you know, it's past time for 
24 additional discovery. 
25 THE COURT: Okay, when's the deposition scheduled 
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1 for? 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't know. 
3 MR. JACOBSEN: I can tell you, your Honor, I believe 
4 it may be the 25th. It's next week. Next Monday or Tuesday. 
5 THE COURT: Well, why don't you if you want to argue 
6 that at another time after you discuss the matter after the 
7 deposition today let me know. 
8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, what about jury instructions? What 
10 have the parties done? 
11 MR. SHAW: We filed a set of instructions. 
12 THE COURT: Were they filed here? 
13 MR. SHAW: I think so. 
14 THE COURT: I haven't seen them. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I filed jury instructions, voir 
16 dire, and special verdict form. The special verdict form -
17 THE COURT: You filed them here? If you file them in 
18 Farmington I get them about three weeks later. 
19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm not sure they were filed. 
20 THE COURT: Okay, so I have -
21 MR. SHAW: It says Layton Department, I'm assuming 
22 they got filed here. 
23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't know whether the runner 
24 that we had filed them -
25 THE COURT: Okay, I haven't seen them. So -
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1 want to do on that? 
2 MR. SHAW: We submitted proposed voir dire to the 
3 court. I think most of it's pretty innocuous. There may be 
4 one or two questions he might object to, but -
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I haven't seen those. 
6 MR. SHAW: Based on past experience. 
7 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think my voir dire were also 
8 included in there along with the special verdict form. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: So I think the real, the easy way 
11 to deal with this is for both of us to look at the others and 
12 then maybe see if we can decide on which ones we disagree on 
13 and let the Court resolve those. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. And our trial dates we said 8:30 
15 didn't we? 
16 MR. SHAW: I think so, yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, that's what we usually do. Okay. 
18 MR. SHAW: The only other issue is in our proposed 
19 voir dire, there is a proposed confidential jury questionnaire. 
20 I don't know how the Court feels about those. 
21 THE COURT: I don't have a problem dealing with them 
22 in most cases. I guess the problem is unless they come in 
23 before the trial then we give them to them, then they have to 
24 be written out, then they have to be copied, and then they have 
25 to be looked at, and I guess my attitude is, I mean, if this 
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1 were a case, you know, this isn't the -
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: A high profile case. 
3 THE COURT: Well, it's not a question of high 
4 profile, it's just not question of - like the issues are 
5 basically negligence, damages and causation and - I haven't 
6 looked at it so I'll look at it, but how would you propose 
7 doing it if we did that? 
8 MR. SHAW: It's five questions I think. The way that 
9 we've done it in the past is the jury gets that questionnaire 
10 in advance. If the court's going to start at 8:30, it may 
11 require bringing the jury in the day before something like 
12 that, but they get it in advance, we make one photocopy and -
13 MR. CHRISTENSEN: We'd have to have - how many for 
14 the jury panel are you bringing in? We'd make one copy of each 
15 of the jury panel responses. 
16 THE COURT: Well, how many jurors are you planning on 
17 having if this is going to go for two weeks? 
18 MR. SHAW: What's the court's normal? 
19 THE COURT: I just don't want to start with eight and 
20 we don't have that at the end. And so, I mean, it depends on, 
21 you know, if it's two weeks I think you need some, an alternate 
22 or two, I don't know how many, but. 
23 MR. SHAW: I think at least one alternate. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah, I just don't know. I just don't 
25 want somebody - you never know. I usually have had very few 
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1 people in even a two or three week trial that has gone sick, 
2 but somebody else gets sick or they have a funeral or they have 
3 something else. 
4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, at least one possibly two. 
5 I'm not sure what the Court's information is. 
6 THE COURT: Well, it won't make any difference if 
7 it's one or two. I think if we could do two we'd be safe. 
8 MR. SHAW: That's fine. 
9 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm just wondering what your own 
10 experience might be as to which would be preferable. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I've never done just one extra. 
12 It's usually two because the jury thinks nine, that doesn't 
13 sound right, you know, you say 8, 10 or 12. That sounds good. 
14 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I would suggest 10 then. 
15 MR. SHAW: We can agree on 10. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, then we'll just have two extras and 
17 then we'll just do the pre-empteries, you know, like whatever 
18 the rule says I think you get three for without for the eight 
19 and then you get -
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: One each for the -
21 THE COURT: Yes, whatever it is. Whatever the rules 
22 say. 
23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: All right. 
24 THE COURT: Okay, what about - okay, where are you at 
25 in settlement? 
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1 MR. CHRISTENSEN: We've had a mediation that was 
2 unsuccessful. 
3 THE COURT: Well, that doesn't answer the question. 
4 I'm not determining damages. 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, I understand. The last offer 
6 we had was $420,000. So we were significantly apart. 
7 THE COURT: I mean, was that a combined offer or both 
8 or just? 
9 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, that was from plaintiff. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I'm talking about the response. 
11 Are there responses from both or what? 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, there was a response from 
13 both. So there was an offer made on behalf of all defendants, 
14 the response was $420,000 and -
15 THE COURT: Well, as it stands it does not look like 
16 it's going to settle. 
17 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's my impression. 
18 MR. SHAW: What was the - I'm not even - I didn't 
19 attend the mediation. I told Mr. Jacobs I wasn't even aware of 
20 it until recently. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't have those figures today. 
23 THE COURT: Well, whatever, but you're saying that 
24 there's not going to be any significant movement that you see? 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: We put what we felt was a 
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1 reasonable figure. We were willing to, you know, depending on 
2 the responses to reconsider that, but the gap at the time the 
3 mediation terminated was so wide that it didn't appear to 
4 warrant further exploration of settlement on our behalf. The 
5 ball is in their court if, you know, from our scrooge like 
6 prospective if they wanted to get more reasonable, we'd be 
7 happy -
8 THE COURT: Well, it's also a good time for UDOT to 
9 think, you know, just because they got summary judgment granted 
10 doesn't mean they can't try to resolve the case either because 
11 you don't know what's going to happen on appeal. 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand. 
13 THE COURT: Okay, is there any other things that you 
14 need to discuss before trial? I mean, how long will 
15 plaintiff's case you anticipate it would take? 
16 MR. SHAW: We're thinking, judge, that it will go 
17 through the first week. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, knowing that we'll have Thursday 
19 from 8:30 till noon? 
20 MR. SHAW: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22
 m MR. SHAW: I think we can make good use of that half 
23 day perhaps -
24 THE COURT: What are the injuries of the plaintiff? 
25 MR. SHAW: Primary injury is a severe fracture disk 
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1 location of his ankle and it's a really complex orthopedic 
2 injury. He's got -
3 THE COURT: I saw the picture of the foot in one of 
4 these -
5 MR. SHAW: Right. And that's the primary injury. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. And how old is he? 
7 MR. SHAW: He was 16 at the time. He's now 22. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. SHAW: Approaching 22. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Do you have a, I mean, do you know 
11 who you're going to call or approximately what order? 
12 MR. SHAW: I have a rough outline, but in light of 
13 the ruling this is going to change fairly significantly I 
14 think, but I'm just looking at it and I'm thinking we should be 
15 able to get, you know, through our case by that Friday. 
16 THE COURT: Well, what I will do usually at the end 
17 of the day is I will ask who the next witnesses are going to be 
18 so we just, everybody knows who's coming. Is there any 
19 question besides this last person whose depositions being taken 
20 about who the witnesses are or any exhibits? 
21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think except for the number of 
22 people who may have driven on this road that we weren't able to 
23 identify everybody [inaudible]. 
24 THE COURT: Is this 89 or where was it? 
25 MR. SHAW: This was 1-15 right out here. 
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1 THE COURT: Oh, just by Layton and Clearfield. 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. There have been -
3 THE COURT: My mother lives in Clearfield. I've 
4 driven the road. 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, she may have been designated. 
6 MR. SHAW: We've got a couple of surprise witnesses 
7 that we intend to call. 
8 THE COURT: Then when do you want to exchange your 
9 witnesses and exhibits? Is there some date? What I usually do 
10 is just if you just mark your exhibits just plaintiff 1 through 
11 whatever and defendant 1 through whatever. If you need 
12 stickers get the stickers, but we just do them by numbers PI, 
13 Dl and what I would suggest is just mark them and then have a 
14 day where you exchange them unless you want to wait till trial. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: A week before trial? 
16 MR. SHAW: That's Friday. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. SHAW: You mean this Friday? 
19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It would be this Friday because -
20 THE COURT: Well, next Friday you've got after this 
21 week you've got -
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: A full week. 
23 MR. SHAW: Why don't we -
24 THE COURT: You've got Thanksgiving. The Monday 
25 before Thanksgiving? 
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1 have you ever seen these jury instructions that are given 
2 before trial that Judge Mclff has done? 
3 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I have seen some. 
4 THE COURT: I have used them for about the last, you 
5 know, two or three years, and they're basically, what you do is 
6 you give instructions as you go along the way before opening 
7 statement and they're in a not legalistic form. What I could 
8 do is I'll make copies of those and they can just be sent to 
9 you. And that will just show you what - I give those to you 
10 usually the first day, but those are just the - they'll be the 
11 preliminary jury instructions. They'll talk about burden of 
12 proof. They'll talk about preponderance of evidence. They'll 
13 talk about those issues, credibility of witnesses, all of those 
14 things, but they're taken - some are said before opening 
15 statements, some are said before the first witness is called, 
16 and then a lot of them will be just some of the standard ones 
17 that you have, but I've done that. 
18 Now the other thing that I do, I'm glad we remembered 
19 this. I allow jurors to ask questions, and this is how it 
20 works. Basically we have a process under the rules and the 
21 committees that after you put on a witness and you've cross-
22 examined the witness and you've re-directed, then I ask the 
23 jurors, do you have any questions of this witness. If they do 
24 they write them down on a piece of paper on their notepad. 
25 Their notepad, then that's given to me, you approach - and I 
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1 explain this to the jury this is how we're going to do it, you 
2 come up, you make your objections if there are any and then I 
3 ask the question. Once I ask the question - if it's not 
4 objectionable I'll ask the question, and then you have the 
5 right to ask any other questions. In the way it's worked in 
6 the past, you know, especially in an injury case, there will be 
7 things where both of you think that have been crystally clear 
8 made and they will ask a question that you haven't even hit, 
9 you know, what they've said. It may be just a repeated thing. 
10 If they ask something that's inappropriate, it's not read, it's 
11 not done anything else. It's just preserved in the record. 
12 I've done this 14 or 15 times and it has been positive each 
13 time. It keeps the jury awake and I've never seen a bad 
14 experience. So whether you like it or not, it involves the 
15 jury a lot more and it makes them more a part of this trial and 
16 it's most attorneys who were dead set against it, after trials 
17 have been converts because they see you get to know what the 
18 jury's thinking. When they ask you a question, you know what's 
19 on their mind. So I do that. I've never seen it abused 
20 either, you know, like you get Perry Mason asking 1,000 
21 questions. But I will do that and that will be explained in 
22 those preliminary instructions, that procedure that I just 
23 explained. So I'll send the jury instructions to you so you'll 
24 have them before. 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That may eliminate a number of the 
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1 jury instructions, the standard ones. 
2 THE COURT: Well, you can look at that. I'll look at 
3 yours too, but I mean, these are just and these are given in a 
4 lot more normal language. It's not like the MUJI preliminary 
5 instructions that are still - these are Judge Mclff down in the 
6 Sixth District sent these out three or four years ago, and most 
7 of the judges in Davis County have been using them and they've 
8 been working really well because it gives a lot more 
9 instruction to a jury as the trial goes along instead of just 
10 at the end. And so it tells them what to look for. I mean, 
11 we're not going to go - this isn't a big - I mean, the issues 
12 in this case aren't that difficult in terms of negligence and 
13 damage and causation and other things of what the jury's going 
14 to have to determine. Okay, well if there isn't anything 
15 further, then we'll see you on 8:30, is that on the 2nd? 
16 MR. SHAW: Yes, Monday the 2nd. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, Monday the 2nd, and then well, why 
18 don't you come actually at 8:15. 
19 MR. SHAW: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: The court will be open at 8:00, so 
21 whatever. Do you have any - if you're going to use any things 
22 for, like opening statements, whatever, I mean, we have some 
23 easels and things, but if you have something else, you need to 
24 check with the clerk's office. 
25 MR. SHAW: Okay. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
Tab 5 
Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
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Nine Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
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Facsimile: (801) 323-2090 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH, 
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, 
JOHN DOES l-V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 970700411 
Judge Thomas L Kay 
The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Thomas L Kay on the 18th 
day of November, 2002, for hearing on defendant Utah Department of Transportation's 
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney H. Scott Jacobson appeared for 
defendant UDOT, attorneys Erik M. Ward and Christopher L. Shaw appeared for plaintiff 
FILED 
JAN 8 2003 
Layton District Court 
Craig Johnson, and attorney Scott W. Christensen appeared for defendant Granite 
Construction. The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and having heard 
the arguments of counsel for UDOT and plaintiff, and being otherwise fully apprised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary 
judgment on plaintifTs claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 1-20 
on pages 1 -4 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment 
do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOTs Statement of Facts. 
While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26, found on 
pages 5-8 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiffs response to those facts does not establish any 
genuine issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment. 
2. For the reasons stated in UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting memoranda, and for the reasons stated by UDOTs counsel during the 
November 13,2002 orai arguments, plaintiffs claims against UDOT must fail as a matter 
of law. 
3. The decisions made by UDOT Region One Director Dyke LeFevre 
surrounding the use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-
2 
Clearfield Project were decisions made at the policy-making level, and were immune from 
liability under the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1); see also Keeaan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1995). 
4. Although plaintiff still has separate claims pending against co-defendant 
Granite Construction, there is no reason to delay the entry of final judgment on plaintiffs 
claims against UDOT. 
5. In order to avoid the possibility of multiple trials, the remaining claims 
between plaintiff and Granite Construction should be stayed pending the resolution of any 
appeal by plaintiff of the claims against UDOT. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
2. That all of plaintiffs claims against UDOT are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
3. That UDOT shall be awarded costs as prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be established by affidavit, with 
interest to accrue at the rate provided for by law. 
4. That this Judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3 
5. That the remaining claims between plaintiff and Granite Construction shall 
be stayed pending the resolution of any appeal of the dismissal of the claims against 
UDOT. 
DATED this ^ _ day of <C\MUflM 200? 
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